
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THE Barrier-Treaty VINDICATED.

The Third Edition.

LONDON:

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THE Barrier-Treaty VINDICATED.

THE Securing the *Protestant Succession* as limited by Parliament, and the providing a sufficient *Barrier* in the *Netherlands* against the Encroachments of *France*, are Points so absolutely necessary to the Preservation of the Religion and Liberty of every *British* Subject, (in the Safety of which, the True Glory of the *Prince*, as well as the Happiness of the *People*, consists;) that I was very much surpriz'd to find that a Treaty made for Securing to the Nation such invaluable Blessings, should have the Misfortune to be thought Dishonourable to Her Majesty, and Prejudicial to the Interest of *Great Britain*. I could not but think it strange, that the Settlement of the Crown in the Protestant Line, should constitute the principal Glory of a former Reign; and that the Securing the very same Settlement in the most effectual manner, should be the first avowed Dishonour of the present: That in Concerns of lesser Moment, *The Introduction.*

and upon remote Prospects of Danger, *Foreign Alliances* should be studiously sought and diligently cultivated; and yet in an Affair of the nearest Importance to the Publick Safety, it should be thought a Diminution to the Imperial Crown of *Great Britain* to strengthen it self with a *Foreign Alliance*, against the Opposition of a *Foreign Enemy*: That covering *Flanders* with a strong *Barrier*, should always *hitherto* have been esteem'd of the most immediate Concern to *England*; and that *now* every Inch of Ground assign'd for that purpose, should be canvassed and disputed, as if the Neighbourhood of an *Enemy* were more desirable than that of an *Ally*; As if taking from *France* were weakning *Our selves*, and there were at last some danger of clipping her Wings too close, and reducing her too near to her ancient Limits. Yet such a strong Delusion is gone forth, such a thorough Change hath been wrought amongst us, that even these *Absurdities* have been industriously *spread* by some, and as greedily *receiv'd* by others; as if the very Measure and Standard of our Interest were inverted, and a Change of Persons had made a real Change in the Nature of Things themselves.

It was given out indeed at that time, to such as were so bold as to ask a *Reason* for what was doing, That whatever *Interest Great Britain* might have in the Points settled by this Treaty, (which was insinuated to be *little enough*,) she certainly paid *too dear* for securing them; that several Advantages, and particularly some relating to *Trade*, were thereby sacrificed, without any other Recompence than that of the *Needless* and Inconsiderable Assistance of Seven *Dutch* Provinces. But upon the Publication of the

the *Barrier-Treaty* it self, with the Letters and Instructions relating to it, I must own that, to my great Surprize, I was so far from discovering any Advantage sacrific'd, or any dear Bargain made; that I found no Stipulation throughout the whole Treaty, but what we were either engag'd to by *Previous Treaties*, or what it would have been our undoubted *Interest* to have made, tho' we had had no *Succession* to secure; nor any other Recompence to expect, than what will naturally accrue from the *Netherlands* being well defended against the Arms and Ambition of *France*. And as I am firmly persuaded my self, that this Treaty is the best and most solid Security, not only for *preventing* for the future any Attempts from Abroad in favour of the *Pretender*, but likewise for Supporting the *Protestant Interest* in general, and for confirming to *Great Britain* the Blessing of a *lasting Peace*; I hope it will be no unacceptable Office to endeavour to recover (if possible) a deluded Part of the Nation from the dangerous Infatuations, into which their own Partiality and the Arts of Designing Men have betray'd them: by considering coolly and impartially a Treaty, whose Subject-matter must be confess'd to be in it self of the *greatest Consequence* to the Welfare of these Kingdoms.

In order therefore to form a right Judgment of this Treaty, I shall endeavour to explain the *Nature* and *Importance* of the *Two* great Points propos'd to be secur'd by it; and to shew the *Necessity* there was of providing for their Security by a Treaty of this Nature; which I hope to do in such a manner, as to leave no material Objection unanswer'd.

The fatal Consequences of submitting to a Popish Prince; and the Necessity of securing the Protestant Succession.

And first, as for the *Protestant Succession*, every True *Englishman* must acknowledge That to be of the *utmost Consequence* to the *Religion*, *Liberty*, and *Peace* of these Kingdoms. A *Popish Prince* is so many ways engag'd to Propagate his own Religion, is taught to place so much Merit in Enlarging the Dominions of Holy-Church; and *Slavery* is such a sure Attendant on that blind and implicit Obedience wherein Popery is founded; that from the Moment a Prince of that Persuasion ascends the Throne, a Protestant Nation is reduc'd to the unhappy Choice, either of Surrendring tamely all its Religious and Civil Rights, or of seeing it self brought into the utmost Distraction and Confusion. The sad Experience of King *James's* Reign is too fresh in our Memories to suffer us to doubt what we are to expect, should we ever be so unhappy as to fall into the hands of the *Pretender*; One who hath been educated among the *Enemies* of our *Country* as well as of our *Religion*, train'd up in *French Tyranny* as well as *Popish Superstition*; One whom the Nation hath *attainted* and *abjured*, and who will not therefore come upon us with the favourable Prepossessions of a *Legal Successor*, but with the Anger and Resentment of an *Injured Exile*; One, lastly, who, to compleat our Misery, must hold his Crown as it were in Vassalage from *France*, and sacrifice the Interest of his own Subjects out of Gratitude to his Foreign Supporter. If any one can possibly doubt of this, let him only call to Mind those memorable Words that accompany'd the *French* King's Present to him, when he sent him to invade us,

us, as recorded by a * Writer of their own: "Remember (*said he, putting the Sword into his Hands;*) if you prove successful, "that it was a *French Sword.* To which the other most dutifully reply'd, "That if it were "his good Fortune to get Possession of the "Throne of his Ancestors, he would not content himself with returning him *Thanks* by "Letters and Ambassadors, but would shew "his Gratitude by his *Actions.* Thus was the Sword of *France* in the Hands of the *Pretender*, to have reaped the Conquest of *England.* Thus were we to have been reduced into a *French Province*, and with the Misery of Slavery to have had the Ignominy of being Slaves *at second Hand.*

* *Memoirs of the Chevalier de St. George*, p. 50.

The Dangers from a Popish Succession, acknowledg'd even by the Jacobites themselves.

But there is the less Occasion to enlarge on the Dangers of a *Popish* Succession, because they are confessed even by the greatest part of the Advocates of the Pretender, who are not professed Papists. They own that they submit to it no otherwise than as a hard Case, and an unhappy Circumstance which they could wish themselves at liberty to alter; a Case that has sufficiently exercised their Loyalty, and put their Obedience to its utmost stretch. They do not pretend to think it for the Interest of their Country or Church, to trust the Guardianship of the *Reformed Religion* with a *Popish Successor*, or to lodge the Supremacy of the Church of *England* in the Hands of a Dependant on the See of *Rome.* And there is Reason to believe, that even *some Papists themselves*, may rather desire to enjoy their Civil Properties under a free Government, than to sacrifice their Estates and Liberties to their Bigotry. Therefore waving any farther Argu-

ments, in behalf of the *Protestant Succession*; I shall proceed to shew,

1. That *under its present Circumstances*, it can no otherwise be effectually secured than by a *Foreign Alliance*.

2. That no Alliance is so useful for that Purpose, as that of the *States*.

3. In the Last Place, I shall *Answer the Arguments* that have been brought against Securing it by a Foreign Alliance: Which Points being fully settled, will I hope remove all Objections that can possibly be made to that Part of the Treaty.

That the Protestant Succession, under its present Circumstances, can no otherwise be effectually secured, than by a Foreign Alliance.

1st, That the Protestant Succession, *under its present Circumstances*, can no otherwise be effectually secured than by a *Foreign Alliance*, will appear to any one who doth but reflect, that there is not only *a Person* living who pretends to disturb that Settlement, and whose Pretensions are favoured by no inconsiderable Party amongst our selves, but that he is likewise actually supported by the greatest Power in *Europe*, our most constant and inveterate Enemy. 'Tis well known, with what open Arms the King of *France* received the late King *James*; what constant Assistance he afforded him, and what restless Endeavours he used to restore him to his Kingdom; what a considerable Annual Expence he was at for the Maintenance of him and his Family, with a numerous and indigent Set of Followers; well knowing, that if once he could re-place that unfortunate Prince on the Throne of *England*, he should receive ample Recompence, by securing to himself an entire Influence on all our Affairs,

Affairs, and by that means put an end to the Endeavours we have so long and successfully used, to stop him in the pursuit of Universal Monarchy; not doubting but that it will be out of our Power to assert the Liberty of *others*, when once we shall have lost *our own*. This was his Design then, and the same no doubt is still the Reason of his harbouring the Pretender. Accordingly, we have seen a *French* Fleet with an Army commanded by a Mareschal of *France*, already attempting one Invasion in his Favour; and no one, I believe, can think, that what has happen'd since that time, should make them less forward to attempt a second.

How little the French King's Promise of not Supporting the Pretender, is to be depended upon.

In answer to this, I know we are told, that the *French* King hath *promised* to acknowledge Her Majesties Title, and so remove the Person of the Pretender out of his Dominions. But all the World must be convinced, by what has happen'd since the Treaty of *Ryswick*, that neither the most formal Acknowledgments, nor the strongest Promises and Engagements, are in this Case of any Weight with *France*. And as for his sending the Pretender out of his Dominions, it is so easy to elude the Intention of that Promise, by *supporting him* when gone, that no one can look upon that alone as a sufficient Security, tho' it should be comply'd with. The Friends of the Pretender appear in no pain about that Event; as knowing, that wheresoever he goeth, he carrieth with him the Assurance of the *French* King's Assistance. For his Friends have been pleased to let us know, that in the dying Moments of the Late King *James*, at a time when it is reasonable to suppose that the Impressions of Humanity, and the Solemnity of the Occasion, might di-

Memoirs, p. 26.

spose his *most Christian Majesty* to be more than ordinarily sincere; his Last Promises to the expiring King were, *That he would never abandon the* Pretender, *but always look upon him as his own Son; That he would acknowledge and entertain him as King of* England, *and hoped to see him treated in the same manner by all the World*: And this he declared himself *indispensably* obliged to, by the unalterable Motives of *Affinity and Conscience*; calling on the Lords and others that were present (who offer'd to withdraw from the Bedside thro' Respect,) to be Hearers and Witnesses of what he said. All which was directly contrary to the Promises and Engagements he made at the Treaty of *Ryswick*. Yet this Publick Violation of his Faith hath been the most constant and copious Topick of Flattery for all his Subjects, and was highly applauded by the Pope himself in a Speech deliver'd in a full Consistory; who likewise wrote a Letter to the Pretender on that Occasion, in which he comforts him with the Consideration of the singular Affection the *most Christian King* had for him; who *thinks with Reason*, says he, *that having acknowledg'd you a King, it concerns his Glory to give you constant Assistance*. And the same Author informs us, "* That in the Year 1706, "when the *most Christian King* found himself "under the Necessity of suing for Peace; it "was not without severe Struggles of Con- "science, to depart from the Promises he "had made the late King *James* the Second: "That he first consulted the Court of "St. *Germains*, and, in a private Conference "with the *Queen Dowager* and the *Pretended* "*Prince*, at that time assured them, That "he would never depart from their In- "terest,

P. 46.

"terest, tho' the present Exigency of Affairs, "and the pressing Instances of his Subjects, "obliged him to make some Overtures of "Peace to the Enemy. To which the *Pretended Prince* himself reply'd, among other Dutiful Expressions, "That he was content "to leave his Cause to Providence, being "entirely assured of his Majesties sincere Af-"fection to him. And is it not reasonable to believe, that Counter-Assurances of the same Nature may have been given at present, supposing the King of *France* doth really intend to remove him out of his Dominions? What such great Gainers therefore shall we be, by shifting the Scene and altering the *Circumstances* of our Fear, while the *Cause and Foundation* of it still remain the same; while the *Root* of our Evil is not struck at; while his *Power* to disturb us is left unbroken? Will he with the Pretender send away his *Bigotry*? his *inveterate Hatred* to the Protestant Religion? his *settled Design* of bringing us to wear his Yoke, and to be governed by his Counsels; and That at a time, when by the Accession of *Spain* and the *Indies*, he is nearer accomplishing his Design of Universal Monarchy than ever, to which the Connivance (at least) of *England* is so absolutely necessary? Will it not always be his *Interest* to support the Cause of the Pretender, to keep up the Hearts and Courage of his Party, and by that means to foment and perpetuate our Divisions, which have already been of greater Service to him than all the Fleets and Armies he hath paid? Will it not flatter his *Vanity*, and gratify the *Superstition* of his declining Years, to have the Credit on Earth, and the Merit in Heaven, of restoring

Popery

Popery in these Kingdoms? since therefore no Question can be made, but that the Pretender, where-ever he removes, will always be supported by *France*; and that That Crown will by the Terms of Peace be in a better Condition to do it, than even at the Time when these Premises first were made; and since nothing but Power is a reasonable Security against Power; it might justly have been thought an unpardonable Omission in the Last Ministry, had they not oppos'd a *Foreign Alliance* against a *Foreign Enemy*, and provided a Balance of Power in Support of the *Protestant Succession*, equal to that which is engag'd in its Disturbance.

England alone, not sufficient to defend her self against France.

Were the Succession either not disputed, or the Disputer of it not upheld by a Foreign Power, or *England* alone a Match for that Power; were she, in the Style of a late self-sufficient Writer, *able to defend her self against all Her Majesties Enemies and Allies put together*; then indeed it would betray an unnecessary Fear, to trouble our selves about forming *Foreign Alliances* on this or any other Occasion.

But that this is far enough from being the Case, our New Politicians themselves are forward enough to own, when it serves their Purpose. It is not unpleasant to observe them contradicting themselves: To hear them gravely doubting, whether they should end one War out of Necessity, or begin another out of Wantonness. If the supposed Pride and Stubborness of a few *Dutch Provinces*, is to be chastised; then *Great Britain* is set forth with her *Shield* and *Spear*, and all the Emblems of her *Greatness* are displayed; then her Successes can be remembred, her Riches confessed, her Power

or magnified: Alone she conquers Provinces, and reduces Kingdoms, and threatens to cope with Friend and Enemy. But is an ill Peace to be forced upon her? Immediately the very same Hands fall to work to strip her of all her Grandeur both imaginary and real; She is made to confess Wants she never felt, and Weaknesses she was never guilty of; all on a sudden she is dis-peopled by War, impoverish'd by Taxes, eaten up by Debts, overspread with Profaneness, torn in Pieces with Faction, imposed upon by Foreign Friends, and plunder'd by Domestick Enemies. This is the Dress, in which she is made to believe it will best become her to supplicate for Peace; This the moving Figure by which she is to soften that obdurate Enemy, whom her many Successes have not yet been able to compel to Reason. Since humbling *him* proves a Work of Labour and Difficulty, the shorter and cheaper Way, she is told, is to humble *her self*; to cancel her past Successes by In-action; to expiate her Zeal in forming Alliances, by abandoning her Allies; and her Forwardness in pushing the War, by yielding up the most valuable Fruits of her Victories.

But not to make use of the Concessions of Men that manifest so little regard for Truth; we have the Experience of Two long Wars to convince us, that the strongest Confederacies which can be formed, are scarce a Match for *France*; and therefore they that are for trusting to the *single Strength* of *England* in Opposition to a Force so much superior, can hardly avoid the Suspicion of meaning to betray the Cause they so lamely support. Our Constitution won't consist with a standing Army: The

French

French King on the contrary can never be without one: Therefore it is our business to secure the Assistance of such as have always a standing Force ready to oppose to him; and by their Fleets at Sea, as well as their Armies on the Continent, may in conjunction with us, either deter him from invading *England*, or, if he does, soon find him so much work at Home, as may oblige him rather to think of defending his *own* Dominions, than invading his *Neighbours*.

That no Alliance is so useful to us, in order to secure the Protestant Succession, as that of the States-General:

2. Having thus proved, that the Protestant Succession, *under its present Circumstances*, can no otherwise be effectually secured than by a *Foreign Alliance*; it must without any difficulty be acknowledged, that none can be so effectual for that purpose, as that of the *States-General*; whether we consider their *Situation*, their *Strength*, their *Religion*, or their *Interest*.

Whether we consider their Situation;

They *lye the most convenient* for concerting Measures with us, and providing for any sudden Emergency. Their *Situation* likewise gives them the greatest Opportunities of distressing *France* both by Sea and Land.

their Strength;

The *Number of Veteran Troops* they are obliged to maintain in the time of Peace, are the properest Forces that can be opposed to the disciplined standing Armies of *France*; Their *Naval Power* is likewise the only one in *Europe*, besides our own, that is in any degree able to cope with that of *France*.

their Religion;

As, next to *Great-Britain*, they are the strongest Bulwark and most zealous Supporters of the *Protestant* Interest, so there is nothing they can have more at heart, for their own sakes, than preserving *our Succession* in the Protestant Line; since, if *Popery* should once over-

spread

spread these Kingdoms, and close Them in on this side also, it would be impossible for Them to withstand the Universal Torrent, and to preserve their *Religion* uncorrupted, in the midst of surrounding Superstition.

or their Interest;

The last Circumstance that recommends their Alliance to us, is, that their *Interests* are inseparable from our own: The Safety of each Country depends upon that of the other. For as on the one hand, should *Holland* fall under the Dominion of *France*, *Britain* would be entirely cut off from any Communication with the Continent, (which, join'd to the great Accession of Naval Strength which *France* would acquire by this Conquest, must bring immediate Ruin upon *Britain*;) so on the other hand *Holland* must inevitably lose both its Religion and Liberties, the moment that *France*, or any Popish Prince under the Influence and Direction of *France*, gets Possession of *Britain*. From whence it necessarily follows, that the mutual Defence and Preservation of each other, ought to be one of the chief Maxims of Government to both Nations.

and the Nature of their Trade, *compared with Ours.*

This is so plain, that the only Handle which the Emissaries of *France* have made use of to divide Us and the *Dutch*, has been the Point of *Trade*, in which they have always endeavoured to represent them as dangerous Rivals. It's certain, the Wealth and Strength of each Nation doth depend entirely upon *Trade*; and that therefore, neither we nor they, can be too careful and tender in that Matter. But the World is wide enough for us both: And if the Pains and Expence that have been employ'd in the Quarrels we have had with one another upon the Pretence of Trade, had been apply'd to the

the keeping a watchful Hand over our Enemies, and preventing the Encroachments they have made upon us in this valuable Article; it is evident the Trade of both Nations would have been much more extensive and flourishing than it is at this time. And I am far from allowing, that the Trade of the two Nations engages them in such a Rivalship and Competition with one another, as is generally pretended. For all that have any Insight into the Affairs of *Holland* must acknowledge, that *Their* Trade is chiefly founded upon their carrying Goods cheaper than any Nation of the World: The Hard and Penurious Way of living they are inured to, enables them to perform the longest Voyages with much less Consumption and Expence than other Nations: By this means they are become the common Carriers of the Product of other Countries; having none of their own, except what arises from their Settlements in the *Indies*. *Our* Trade on the contrary, consists almost entirely in vending and dispersing the Product and Manufactures of our own Country and the Plantations, while our Freight is dearer than that of any other Nation. The main Branch therefore of the *Dutch* Commerce, no way affects not interferes with ours; neither, if They were to lay it down to-morrow, would any share of it devolve to *Great Britain*, but to the *French*, the *Danes*, the *Swedes*, the *Hamburghers*, and the other *Hans* Towns, who all both can, and actually do, sail much cheaper than we. And were the *Dutch* at this time to lose their Plantations in the *Indies*, every knowing and impartial Man must own, considering the present Posture of Affairs in *France*, and the vast Acceſſion

cession of Power She will in all Probability obtain by this Peace, that even these Plantations would inevitably fall into Her Hands. *France* therefore is our most formidable Rival, and the proper Object of Jealousy to both Nations; who by fomenting Animosities and Quarrels between us, has had the Address to weaken us at our own Expence, and to make her self Powerful under Favour of our Folly and Connivance. The Divisions between *England* and *Holland* first gave her the Courage and Opportunity to increase her Naval Strength, to extend her Dominions in the *Indies*, to drive the *English* out of the Trade of *Hudson's-Bay*, and of great Part of *Newfoundland*; to lay such high Duties on our respective Commodities as amount to a Prohibition, and thereby to encourage and even force her own Subjects to establish our Manufactures in *France*, and by that means to run away with a great Part of Ours as well as the *Dutch* Trade to *Spain*, the *Levant*, and other Countries. These are part of the Fruits of our former Quarrels with the *Dutch*; which, one would hope, might at least have that Effect, as to make us wiser for the future, by teaching us that the only way to retrieve our past Follies, is to unite, in order to recover those valuable Branches of our respective Trades which *France* has taken from us; to preserve a Balance of Power in *Europe*, that Peace and Trade may flourish; to provide for the Security of the Seas, and Safety of Commerce; and to oppose any growing Naval Force that may endanger it.

Since therefore it appears from all that has been said, that as the *Situation* and *Strength* of *Holland* do truly *enable* them, so their *Religion* and

and *Interest* indispensably *oblige* them to be zealous in the Support of the *Protestant Succession*, as the only Means to preserve themselves; nothing more can be wanting to prove that their Alliance must be the most useful and lasting, the most hearty and effectual of any for that Purpose.

The Objection, that this is a lessening the Independency of the Crown of Great Britain, *consider'd.*

3. But here we are told, that it is a lessening the Independency of the Crown of *Great-Britain*, to *call at every Door* for Help to put her Laws in *Execution*; and neither right in Point of Policy nor good Sense, that a *Foreign* Power should be invited to *confirm our* Succession.

These invidious Terms sufficiently denote the Spirit and Designs of those that use them; they shew the true Place where the Treaty pinches; *viz. The Execution of those Laws, and the Confirmation of that Succession.* But they have not in reality the least Colour or Pretence for saying that the *Dutch* take upon them to *confirm our* Succession, or to *execute our* Laws. The Succession was Then *confirmed*, when it receiv'd the Sanction of the Legislature; and *Britain* will be left peaceably to *execute* her *own* Laws, if *France* does not interpose to hinder her. All therefore that the Authors of these malicious Insinuations can mean, is, that it is neither safe nor prudent to strengthen ourselves with a *Foreign Alliance* against a *Foreign Enemy*, for securing a Point of the greatest Importance, in which *that Enemy* openly pretends to disturb and oppose us. And if this be their Meaning, they carry with them their own Confutation; For then all *defensive* Leagues in general must be renounced, as derogatory to the Honour of the Crown; this Treaty being in reality no other than a *Defensive League*,

confined

confined to the Two Points that are most essential to the common Safety of both Nations. Indeed, no Prince or State can enter into a general Defensive Alliance with the Crown of *Great-Britain*, but that in Truth, by Virtue of that Alliance, they will be obliged to interpose in our *Defence*, in case we are Attack'd upon the Account of our *Succession*: And we our selves, by Virtue of *our former Defensive Alliances* with *Holland* still in force, were obliged to have assisted *them* in case they had been Attack'd on the Account of their *Barrier*, even tho' the present Treaty had never been made. However, this does not make it the less reasonable, when extraordinary Cases are in View, which may require an extraordinary Degree of Assistance, to provide for them expresly, by *particular Treaties*. It appears therefore, that either *all Defensive Alliances* in general ought to be rejected, as derogatory to the Honour of the Powers that made them; or, that the Treaty now in question cannot justly be thought such. But it both is, and always has been, the constant Practice of all the Princes and States in *Europe*, to make *Defensive Alliances*; no single Power being in a Situation to maintain its own Rights against the United Forces of its Neighbours. Even *France* it self at the highest Pitch of all its Grandeur, has been so far from thinking it any *Diminution of its Independency*, to enter into Alliances of this Kind; that it has always carefully courted the Friendship, even of the most Petty Princes and States. What Dishonour therefore can it be to

Great-Britain, to strengthen it self against *France*, by a *Defensive Alliance* with a powerful Neighbouring State, for securing a Point so necessary to its Safety, and yet in so much Danger from abroad, as the *Protestant Succession*?

The Sense of Both Houses of Parliament on this Head.

The Sense of Both Houses of Parliament on this Head, may be seen by their Joint Address to Her Majesty, the Third of *March*, 170$\frac{8}{9}$, in which they most humbly beseech Her, "That for preserving the Repose and "Quiet of *Europe*, and preventing the Ambi-"tious Designs of *France* for the future, Her "Majesty would (among other Things) be "pleased to take Care at the Conclusion of "the War, to continue and establish a good "and firm Friendship among the Allies; and "that the *French* King may be obliged to own "Her Majesty's Title and the Protestant "Succession, *and that the Allies may be engaged to* "*become Guarantees for the same*". To which Her Majesty was most graciously pleased to answer, "That She was of the same Opinion "with Her Two Houses of Parliament in "the several Particulars of that Address, as "She had also been in all the others which "they had made on the same Subject; assu-"ring them, that no Care should be wanting "on Her Part, to attain the Ends that were "desired". And several fresh Circumstances which have arisen since the signing of this Treaty, and which sufficiently betray the Temper and Designs of a certain Set of Men amongst us: Such as the Aspersions cast on the late Revolution, and on the Principles by which alone it is to be justified: The strenuous Assertions of an Indefeasible Hereditary Right in

in the *last* Addresses; and that Neglect of the *Hanover* Succession, which is so much affected and encouraged in the *present*: The Contempt thrown on his Electoral Highness's Minister and Memorial, and the Treasonable Insinuations of Inconveniences that may arise from the Succession of that Illustrious House: these things, as they cannot but mightily have raised the Hopes of the Pretender, and encouraged *France* to persevere in his Interest, so they must entirely satisfy and convince all those who wish well to the Succession, of the *Prudence* of the Advice given by Parliament, and Her Majesty's Declaration thereupon, in pursuance of which this Treaty was made.

The Objection, that this Treaty is needless for securing the Protestant Succession, consider'd.

But we are told by some, that it is so much the *Interest* of the *Dutch* to maintain the *Protestant Succession*, that it needed not have been provided for by a *particular Treaty*. And here we have a fresh Instance of the ill Faith and Insincerity of those we have to deal with. At *one* Time and to serve *one* Purpose, the *States* are represented as dangerous *Rivals* and formidable Neighbours; as a People that would triumph in our Confusion, and gladly establish themselves on our Ruin. At *another* time, their Interests are acknowledg'd inseparable from our own; and they are said to be obliged for *their own Sakes*, to maintain that Succession on which *our* Peace and Happiness depend; to preserve us from all that Misery and Distraction which Popery must introduce, and which it never can be the Interest of a Rival or an Enemy to prevent. Be it so therefore, since these Gentlemen are so liberal as to allow us our Choice: Be our Interests Mutual and our Safe-

ty Reciprocal, as I am perſuaded they will always be found; Are they at all the leſs ſo, by virtue of this Treaty? Shall that Concurrence of Intereſts be made an Objection againſt *this*, which is in Reality the Foundation of *every* Defenſive Alliance? Does not a Treaty upon any Point, occaſion it to be more conſidered, and better underſtood; to be publickly avow'd, and ſteadily purſued? Are Nations always ſo true to their own Intereſt, as to need no Ties and Obligations to bind them down to the Proſecution of it? No Preſervatives againſt the Practices of an Intrieguing Enemy, or the Weakneſs and Corruption of a Selfiſh Miniſtry? Was it thought at all the leſs reaſonable to form the *Grand-Alliance*, becauſe it was the undoubted *Intereſt* of the Parties contracting, mutually to ſtand by and aſſiſt one another? Or, would it have been prudent to have begun a War againſt *France* with ſuch a looſe Confederacy, whoſe Parts were linked together by no Engagements, but left at liberty to fall to Pieces as faſt as private Views and ſeparate Intereſts ſhould draw them aſunder? Notwithſtanding therefore that it was the *Intereſt* of *Holland* to maintain our Succeſſion, a *Treaty* muſt have been made with them when the Caſe ſhould come to bear: And would it have been prudent to defer ſettling a Point of ſuch Importance, to a Seaſon of ſo much Hurry and Diſtraction? But above all, may not ſuch a Treaty, made in time, exclude *France* from all Hopes of prevailing on the *States* to ſtand unconcerned Spectators of our Ruin, and conſequently make her leſs forward to attempt it? Beſides, could we have been

ſecure,

secure that the *States*, being at such a time become necessary to us, would not have *affected* a Negligence and Supineness in our Preservation, on purpose to have forced us to purchase their Assistance upon *hard* Terms, which now we are assured of *for nothing*? I say, in the strictest Sense *for nothing*: For notwithstanding the extravagant Price, at which some would insinuate that their Assistance is bought, I doubt not but to make it appear in the Sequel of this Discourse, that it cost us *nothing*: That the supposed Price is really an Essential Part of our own Security; and what it would have been our undoubted Interest to have stipulated, even tho the *Protestant Succession* had been entirely out of the Question.

Thus I have consider'd the Nature and Importance of the *First* great Point proposed to be secured by this Treaty; and have shown, that *under its present Circumstances* it stands in *need* of a Foreign Guaranty; and that none can be so *proper* and *effectual* as that of the *States-General*. Besides which, I have answered the principal *Objections* made against securing it in such a manner.

The *Second* Great Point I proposed to consider, as necessary for forming a right Judgment of this Treaty, is that of the *Barrier*. But as this is not of so simple a Nature as the other, nor of so small a Compass as to come under one short View; To set the whole of it in a clear Light, and that all the Questions falling into it may be fully understood, I shall endeavour to make good the *Five* following Propositions. *Of the Barrier.*

1. That it is, in it self, and apart from all other Considerations, the true *Interest* of *England*, that there should be a good and sufficient *Barrier* against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*; and that no Barrier can be sufficient, that is not at least *equal* to that settled in the *Barrier-Treaty*.

2. That no *Barrier*, how large soever, can be effectually *defended* against *France*, but by being put into the Hands of the *States*.

3. That for the Defence of a good *Barrier in their Hands*, it is necessary they should have a *free and safe Communication* with it; and reasonable, that the *Barrier Country* should it self *contribute towards the Expence* of maintaining it.

4. That the *Dutch* had a *Right* to a sufficient *Barrier*, and to have the *Defence of it themselves*; and that this Right was *acknowledg'd* and agreed to by the Allies; *previous to the Barrier-Treaty*.

5. That their having a Barrier, pursuant to this Right, and conformable to the present Treaty, will be *far from exposing Us to any sort of Danger from Them*.

That it is in it self, and apart from all other Considerations, the true Interest of England *that there should be a good and sufficient Barrier against* France *on the side of the* Netherlands.

1. As for the *First* Proposition; the *former* part of it, *That it is in it self, and apart from all other Considerations; the true Interest of* England, *that there should be a good and sufficient Barrier against* France *on the Side of the* Netherlands, is a Point so evident in it self, and hath been so constantly received as the known and avowed Sense of the Nation; that I am ashamed to think, there should be any Number amongst us, who want to have That *proved* to them *now*, which hath *hitherto been always allowed* as a *standing Maxim* of our Government, and is now become our Interest more than ever.

To

The fatal Consequences of the Netherlands *falling into the hands of* France.

To have a good *Barrier* against *France* in the *Netherlands*, is as necessary for us, as it is to preserve a Balance of Power on the Continent, and to prevent all *Europe*'s being enslaved by *France*. For the Situation of the *Netherlands* is such, with respect to *Holland* and the Empire, and even to *Britain* it self; that if *France* be once suffered to get Possession of them, it will not be in the Power of all *Europe* to set any Bounds to the Progress of her Arms. The *United Provinces* must in that Case unavoidably fall a Prey to her; as every one must be fully convinced, who will but reflect upon the Extremities to which they were reduced by the *French* King's seizing the *Spanish Low-Countries* at the Death of the late King of *Spain*. The *Empire* having by that Means lost the Assistance of the *States*, and being cut off from all Communication with *England*, would soon follow the same Fate; being, as we see by long Experience, hardly able to make Head against a handful of *French* Troops, while the main Strength of *France* is diverted and employed on the Wars in *Spain*, *Italy*, and *Flanders*: Much less can it be thought in any Condition to defend it self when it is without Allies, and *France* having rid her Hands of other Wars is at liberty to pour in her whole Force upon it. So that if *France* could finish her long-laid Design upon the *Netherlands*, she might without Opposition carry her Conquests as far as she pleased into *Germany*. Let us next consider the fatal Consequences that will attend the Loss of the *Netherlands* with respect to *Britain* in particular. If *France* be once Mistress of those Provinces, she will from that Moment have the *Command of the Narrow Seas*; so that

our Trade will neither be able to go out nor to return with any tolerable Safety. We see of what Consequence it is thought to *England*, that *Dunkirk* should be taken out of the Hands of the *French*, or at least that the Harbour of it should be ruin'd; and thence we may judge how fatal it would be to this Nation, to let them get Possession of the *other Flemish Ports*, with such an Increase of Naval Strength as that Acquisition would give them. Our Coasts and River would then be exposed to perpetual Insults, and our Trade would be in so much danger in the *Narrow Seas*, that we should soon be obliged to give it over. But this is not all: Should *France* be suffered to be Mistress of the *Netherlands*, it is not to be thought the *United Provinces* could maintain their Independency: They must either become directly the Subjects of *France*, or live in an absolute Dependance on that Crown: And the unavoidable Consequence of That would be, that the Great Naval Force of the *Dutch*, which hath hitherto acted in Conjunction *with us*, would then be turned *against* us; and such a vast Accession to the Fleet of *France*, would give her such a Superiority at Sea, as no one I suppose is sanguine enough to think we could dispute: We should in that case not only suffer all the Inconveniencies that necessarily attend our being cut off from the Continent, but we should be perpetually unsafe in our own Ports: For our whole Strength, when without Allies, is in the Sea; and therefore when that Security is gone, we are in a State perfectly naked and defenceless. And as our *Riches* depend chiefly upon our Trade, *they* also must sink with it. Let therefore *France* but

get

get the *Netherlands*, and *our* Ruin needs not wait for that of *other* Countries upon the Continent: If *France* can force the Submission of the *States*, and have the Use of their Ports and Fleets, *England* must truckle to *France*; if the rest of *Europe* would be content to look on: And if they should not, all the Efforts they could make would be of little Service to us. For while we have no Maritime Power on our Side, we can have no Help at Sea, where it would be most wanted; nor any Support in case of an Invasion, tho' its Suddenness and Strength should make it of the last Necessity. And as for any Efforts made in our Favour on the Continent; when the *States* are either Slaves to, or on the Side of, *France*; we may be sure they would be too weak to make any great Impression, or to cause any considerable Diversion in our Favour. So that the Ruin of *England* seems to be the certain Consequence of the Loss of the *Netherlands*: We must for Want of Strength in our selves, or Help from abroad, suffer the Fate of other Nations; only with so much the greater Misery, by how much our present Condition is happier than that of others.

If it were sufficient to have *Reason* on one's Side, I might think it needless to say any more to prove, that it is the true Interest of *England* that there should be a good Barrier against *France* on the Side of the *Netherlands*. But because I write in a Time in which *Authority* seems to have much more Force than Reason, I shall in further Proof of this Proposition, appeal to *Authority*, and shew that the *Netherlands* have in all Times past been looked upon as the Barrier to *England*; and that it was always thought our Interest to hinder the Growth of

A remarkable Passage of Philip de Comines *upon this Head.*

France

France on that side. To shew this, I might go back to the Time in which those Countries were governed by the House of *Burgundy*, one of the most Ancient and most Useful Allies to the Crown of *England* against *France*. But this may seem looking too far backwards into the History of Ancient Times; and therefore I shall only take notice of one memorable Passage in the Excellent History of *Philip de Commines* to this purpose; who speaking in the Beginning of his 6th Book, of the Conquest of the Dominions of the House of *Burgundy* by *Lewis* 11th, who laid the first Foundation of the Greatness of *France*, begins his Second Chapter with these Words. "Those, *says he*, "that hereafter shall read this History, will "wonder that the *English* suffered the King "to take the Towns bordering so near up-"on them, namely, *Arras*, *Bolloin*, *Ardes*, and "*Hedin*, with divers other Castles, and to lie "so long with his Camp before St. *Omers*". And the Reasons he gives for this, are such as deserve to be remembred, which are these; That "the King of *France* in Wisdom and "Sense surmounted far *Edward* 4th of *Eng-"land* then reigning, who was a very Corpu-"lent Man, and much given to Pleasures; "and endeavoured by all means possible to "content him and entertain him by Ambassa-"dors, Presents, and smooth Words, to the "end he should not intermeddle with his "Affairs. That he knew well the *English*, as "well Nobles and Commons, as the Clergy, "to be naturally inclined to make War upon "his Realm; therefore he perceived that he "must in any wise keep the King of *England* "and his Principal Servants his Friends, whom

"he

" he saw altogether inclin'd to Quietness, and
" very greedy of his Money; for the which
" Cause he paid duly at *London* the Pension of
" 50,000 Crowns, and farther gave Yearly
" 16,000 Crowns, besides many goodly Pre-
" sents, to the said King's Principal Servants;
" and their Acquittances are yet to be seen
" in the Chamber of Accounts at *Paris*. Fur-
" ther, he gave goodly Presents to all the Am-
" bassadors that came to him, were their Mes-
" sages never so sharp and bitter; and sent
" them home with goodly Words and Prince-
" ly Rewards, that they returned well con-
" tented: *And notwithstanding that some of them*
" *understood that he did all this only to win Time,*
" *the better to atchieve his Enterprize in the Con-*
" *quest of the Duke of* Burgundy's *Dominions*,
" yet winked they at it, because of the great
" Riches they received at his Hands; and so
" did the King of *England* himself, though
" some of his Council told him plainly it
" would be very prejudicial to his Realm;
" and in Parliament divers wise Men that
" smelt the Dissimulation of *France* afar off,
" and received no Pension as the others did,
" were very desirous, and yet the Commons of
" the Realm more desirous, that the King should
" send Aid without Delay to the Lady of
" *Burgundy*, Daughter of Duke *Charles*: And
" undoubtedly if the King had not been pre-
" vailed upon by these and some other Rea-
" sons, he would never have suffered the King
" of *France* to take Places bordering so near
" upon the *English* Dominions, but have
" sought to defend them; and if at the begin-
" ning he had declared himself for the said
" Lady, the King had never weakned this
" House

"House of *Burgundy* as he hath". The whole Chapter is very well worth reading, of which this is but an Abstract. And upon it I beg leave to make these few Remarks: That this History was written about 230 Years ago, by a Person of great Credit, who was not only an Eye-witness of these things, but had a principal Hand in the transacting of them: Which leaves no room to doubt the Truth of what he says; that it was then looked on as the known Interest of *England*; to hinder the Growth of *France* in the *Low-Countries*, even in those days, when the *French* Dominions were bounded by the *Soam*; when the Dutchy of *Britain*, with the Port of *Brest*, was no part of them; and the Strength they have now at Sea, was not so much as begun: That it was then a Maxim in our Government, to cherish a strict Alliance with the House of *Burgundy*, to prevent the *French* from extending their Dominions on that side, and making nearer Approaches towards us; the Dangers being foreseen at that distance, which we have since felt from the Neighbourhood of a Power, which through our own Fault we have suffer'd to grow so very formidable: And lastly, that this very Ancient and Useful Alliance with the House of *Burgundy*, which *England* had before so strictly cultivated, was lost, and That great House ruin'd very unaccountably, not by the Strength and Policy of the Enemy, so much as by the Weakness and Covetousness of their Friend King *Edward*, and the Corruption of his great Ministers, who were all Pensioners of *France*: That it was *French* Gold well placed in *English* Hands, that procured this Accession to their Dominions then, and prevailed with the

Court

Court of *England* to suffer them patiently to extend their Conquests in *Flanders*: And they that will carefully look into our History, will find but too much Reason to think that all the Additions that have been made to the Power of *France* in later Times, particularly the mighty Increase of their Naval Strength, and the great Extent of their Conquests in the *Low-Countries*, have been chiefly owing to the same Causes, to the ill Conduct and wrong Measures of our Princes, and the corrupt Practices of their Ministers, sacrificing the Interest of their Country to their own Avarice, and for a *French* Pension selling both the present and future Safety of the Nation.

The Judgment of Queen Elizabeth upon this Head.

But to come to better Times, and the Days of good Queen *Elizabeth*, a Name that will be always dear to *Protestants* and *Englishmen*. Every body knows how much she ventured to weaken the Power of *Spain* in the *Low-Countries*, upon the same Principle, and in Pursuit of the same Interest, as should teach us now to weaken that of *France*; the House of *Austria* aiming then at Universal Monarchy, as *France* hath done since; tho' their Views were never grounded on so solid a Foundation, as those of *France* have been; nor had their Dominions the same Advantages of Situation and Compactness; nor was their Scheme for Empire built upon such Rules of good Policy, as those of the Two great Masters *Richlieu* and *Mazarin*: So that *England* then had much less Reason to be alarm'd at the Greatness of the Power of *Spain*, than our Age has had to be alarm'd at that of *France*. But this did not hinder the good Queen from being always on her guard, and taking all proper Measures to weaken a Power, whose Greatness

neſs made her think them too near Neighbours. She could not be eaſy, nor think her Kingdoms ſafe, while the Strength of *Spain* was ſo great in the *Low-Countries*. But what Courſe did ſhe take to weaken it? Was ſhe for increaſing the Power of *France* in the *Low-Countries*, in order to leſſen that of *Spain*? or would her Kingdoms, in the Opinion of that wiſe Princeſs, have been ſafer by thoſe Countries changing Maſters, and the Dominion of them being transferr'd from *Spain* to *France*? By no means: She was even then Jealous of the Growth of *France*; and, as much as ſhe was concerned to break the Power of *Spain*, and reduce it within Bounds, or at leaſt remove it farther from her; yet ſhe did not think it good Policy to humble one Power by advancing another, which in time might be as dangerous a Neighbour to her Kingdoms as the firſt. She made Alliances indeed with *France*, but went no farther into them than the Neceſſity of Affairs obliged her: The way by which ſhe choſe to humble *Spain*, as beſt in all reſpects for the Intereſt of *England*, was to encourage a Third Power diſtinct from the other Two, and which in Conjunction with *England* might be able to lower the Power of *Spain*, without raiſing that of *France*, and might upon occaſion balance either of them: She favour'd, in ſhort, the Revolt of the *United Provinces*, and gave all manner of Protection and Support to the *Dutch* in the Infancy of their State; which no body I ſuppoſe is ſo weak as to think ſhe did merely out of Humanity and Tenderneſs; No, ſhe wiſely ſaw this was the moſt ſenſible Blow ſhe could give to *Spain*, and would moſt effectually remove from her Kingdoms the Dan-

gers

gers that threatned them from the Nearness of so formidable a Power; And as she judged rightly in this, so the Measures she took had all the good Effects she could expect from them. This was the way That wise and excellent Queen took, to pull down the Greatness of the House of *Austria* in the *Low-Countries*, without building up that of *France* on its Ruins.

A Passage of the President Jeannin, *concerning* Q. Elizabeth's *Behaviour in this Case.*

And *France* was sensible how well the Queen understood this to be her Interest, as appears by a Passage in the Negotiations of the President *Jeannin*; who giving his Master *Henry* the 4th of *France* his Thoughts about a Peace with *Spain* (concluded not long after at *Vervins* in 1598,) speaks thus of Queen *Elizabeth*: "As "to the Queen of *England*, we ought to think, "*says he*, that she will be always just so much "for us as she ought to be for Reasons of "State, and no farther; and Experience al-"ready lets us see, that she desires the Increase "of *France* even in the *Low-Countries* no more "than that of *Spain*; so that she will always "weigh her own Interest with ours, when she "is to give us any Help; and will be more or "less hearty for us, not as we shall desire her "or want her Help, but as she shall find it "most for her own Service, and best for her "Affairs; and therefore her Assistance can't be "depended on, if we continue the War in "hopes of conquering the *Netherlands* from "*Spain*. On the other hand, if a Peace be "made, and *Spain* be suffer'd to be Masters of "the *Low-Countries*, and either to keep them "themselves, or give them to the Arch-Duke "*Albert* in Marriage with the Infanta *Isabella*, (which was then design'd, and afterwards perform'd;) "besides other Inconveniencies arising

"from

" from a Peace, what *France* hath most reason
" to be afraid of, is, that the Ancient Alliance
" between *England* and the House of *Burgundy*
" should be renewed with them against *France*,
" of which she hath formerly felt so many sad
" Effects ". From this Passage we may observe that Queen *Elizabeth* thought close Engagements with *France* the least desirable way to lower *Spain*; and would have chosen for the Security of *England*, had it been in her Power, that the *Netherlands* might have been in the Hands of neither of them. As *France* was Jealous of the Power of *Spain* in the *Low-Countries*, so was the Queen wisely Jealous of both; and therefore preferred That way of weakning one, which made no Addition to the other; *viz.* to assist and support the *Dutch*:

To remove the Jealousy that both *England* and *France* had conceived of the Power of *Spain* in the *Low-Countries*, was (as we are told in the same place) one of the chief Motives that induced *Philip* the IIId, then K. of *Spain*, to give those Countries in Dowry with his Daughter to the *Arch-Duke Albert*; since they would have nothing to fear from a Prince, who having no other Dominions, would be obliged to live in Friendship with them. And this View in it was in some measure served with respect to *France*. For Monsieur *Jeannin* makes it one Reason for the King's making Peace with *Spain*, that the *Spanish* Court might be at liberty to conclude this Marriage, which could never be done while the War lasted: " And what,
" *says he*, can his Majesty desire more, than
" that the King of *Spain* should accomplish
" such a Design; that instead of a Rival and
" Enemy, who is obliged to be so on Reasons

" of

"of State, he may have for his Neighbour, a "Petty Prince, who will not dare to become "his Enemy; and if he should, would be very little to be feared. And this Consideration made *France* less unwilling to abandon the Support and Protection of the *States*. But the Safety and Interest of *England* was not by this Scheme so well provided for. To give away the *Low-Countries* to a Third Power, destitute of any other Dominions, might remove the Jealousy of *France* against *Spain*, but it could by no means remove the Jealousy of *England* against *France*. For tho' *France* could have nothing to fear from such a Prince, such a Prince would have a great deal to fear from *France*, against whose Power he could never be able to defend himself. And *France* must necessarily have greater Hopes of gaining those Provinces when separated in this manner from the *Spanish* Monarchy, than while they continued to be a Part of it, and consequently under its more immediate Protection. It was therefore the Interest of *England* to adhere to the Support of the *States*, and to cultivate the strictest Friendship with them, as the most effectual way to keep the Two Rival Powers in Respect, and to secure *England* against the dangerous Neighbourhood of Both. This was the Policy and Wisdom of that good Queen; and had those that came after her followed the same wise Counsels, we should at this time have been in no pain about a good Barrier in the *Netherlands*.

Another Passage of Monsieur Jeannin, *concerning K. James's coveting an Alliance between the Successors of the House of* Burgundy, *Himself, and the Low-Countries.*

But another Thing we may observe from these Passages of Monsieur *Jeannin* is, that as an Alliance with the House of *Burgundy* was always covered by the Crown of *England*

gland, so it is their constant standing Interest against *France*, to substitute an Alliance in the room of it with those who have succeeded that House. And it is upon this Principle of *English* Politicks, that the same Monsieur *Jeannin*, in a Discourse upon the Affairs of *Holland* near 90 Years after, (in 1622.), where he considers whether War or Peace between *Spain* and *Holland* were more for the Interest of his Master *Lewis* the XIIIth, speaks thus of K. *James* and the Part he would be like to take: "As "for the King of *England*, says he, there is "no reason to doubt, but he would promote "a Peace between them upon such and such "Terms, because That would be in effect to "renew the Ancient Alliance with the House "of *Burgundy*, between *Spain* which hath suc-"ceeded to it, Himself, and all the *Low-"Countries*; an Alliance, which the Kings of "*England* have always been very fond of. And "this the Two Kings of *Spain* and *England*, "will think as useful to them, as it will be "prejudicial to *France*; there being nothing "which his Majesty ought not to endeavour "and attempt to hinder it. This was the Sense of a very Able *French* Minister concerning the Interest of *England* against *France*; which leaves no room to question whether it be so or not. But it hath been our misfortune from those times quite down to the Revolution, that Foreigners and Enemies have known the Interest of *England*, better than *England* seems to have known it its self.

Of Cromwell's siding with France, against the Interest of his own Country.

To say nothing of the Unactive and Inglorious Reign of K. *James* the Ist; and the Unfortunate one of his Successor: When the Nation was at an end of its unhappy Civil Wars, *Cromwell*

Cromwell might have renewed such an Alliance as Monsieur *Jeannin* speaks of, with great Advantage; and have preserv'd such a Balance between *France* and *Spain*, as might effectually have hinder'd the former from extending their Conquests in the *Netherlands*. But he, (and what better could be expected from him?) sacrificed the Interest of his Country to his own; and sided with *France*, that *France* might in return support him. Men of Arbitrary Designs are always fond of *French* Alliances, for a very plain Reason. As they are not in the Interest of their Country, they can't hope to be supported by such Allies as have the same Interest with it; for that would be strengthning their Country against themselves. But Arbitrary Governments, and the Enemies of the Nation are Naturally, and upon Principle, Friends to such as will invade and oppress the Nation's Liberties: And these are the only Alliances that can be confided in by Men of such Designs. And thus it was with *Cromwell*: As he was equally false and bold, under the most specious Pretences of Liberty he had assumed the most Arbitrary Government. As this lost him all Confidence in the Affections of the People, to support his Usurpation and Tyranny he found a *French* Alliance very necessary, and therefore entred into great Intimacy with *Mazarine*; which the Cardinal readily embraced; and to make such an Alliance pass with the People, who have naturally an Aversion to *France*, the Cardinal put him in Possession of *Dunkirk*, and granted him other Conditions in appearance very advantageous; and this procured *Cromwell* a great Reputation with several, who, being unable to look forward, fancied from the present View of things, that he

had entirely the Ascendant of the Cardinal. But wiser Men, who could judge of the Affairs of *Europe*, and knew the Interest of *England*, how much it concerned them to check the Growth of *France*, and how much they had it in their Power at that time, plainly saw that *Cromwell* was in truth the *Dupe* of the Cardinal; and that That Alliance with *England* was a Master-piece in *Mazarin's* Politicks. Who was so sensible of the Service he had done the *French* Nation, and what a wrong Step it was on the Part of *Cromwell*; that it is known he used to call him, by way of Contempt, the *fortunate Fool*.

The Inclinations of the Court in the Reign of K. Charles *the* IId, *and K.* James *the* IId.

This was one of *Cromwell's* last Actions; and happy had it been for this Nation, if these false Politicks had ended with his usurped Government. There was great Reason to hope, that when the Nation returned to its True and Ancient Establishment, its True and Ancient Interest would have been resumed; and that those who bore so just a Hatred to the Name of *Cromwell*, would have been the last to have gone into *Cromwell's* Measures. But the Event has shewn how much the Friends of *England* were mistaken in these Hopes. Our Princes losing their Religion in their Exile, and perhaps with that, all true Affection to their Country; or at least having contracted an utter Hatred and Aversion to our Form of Government by Parliaments, returned with strong, tho' dissembled, Inclinations to *Popery* and *France*. And what a Fatal Influence that had upon all Counsels, from the Restoration to the Revolution; in respect to the Memory of Princes, who had otherwise a great many good Qualities, I care not to repeat; especially after

cer, so many Things have been Publish'd, and some very lately, upon so disagreeable a Subject.

But whatever Designs those unhappy Princes were engaged in, the Nation was steddy to its true Interest, and unalterably bent upon the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; that Provinces so very near to *England*, might not fall into the Hands of *France*. Neither the implicit Devotions of the People to the Prince, nor all the Influence of the Court, at a time when siding with the Court was very Popular and passed for *Loyalty*; nor all the Practices that could be used upon a Parliament, that was under their Management for above Seventeen Years, could make the People or their Representatives change their Sentiments, in a Point so essential to the Safety and Welfare of the Nation. Every Body knows what Differences there were between the King and his People for much the greater part of that Reign; all which were owing to this one Cause, that the Court were suspected to be, as they really were, in Measures with *France*. Whereas, had they gone heartily into the Interest of the Nation, and enter'd into vigorous Measures with *Spain* and *Holland*, for setting Bounds to the Power and Ambition of so formidable a Neighbour; there is nothing the Parliament would not have comply'd with, to oblige a Prince so much beloved; nothing they would not have given him, to support a Confederate War for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*. For Proof of this I might appeal to the Universal Joy the Nation expressed upon his making the *Triple Alliance*, and the great Sums they gave to express their grateful Sense of it; tho' it soon

The Sense of the Parliament and Nation, in the Reign of K. Charles the IId, concerning the Necessity of preserving the Netherlands from falling into the Hands of France.

after appeared, that the King was at that very time in *French* Counsels, and concerting with them the Second *Dutch* War; which, when it began, filled the Nation with such Jealousies, and raised such a Ferment in the Parliament, as made the King, after Two Summers, glad to put an end to it. After which, the Court having made their own Peace with the *States*, to please the People, offered to mediate one between *France* and Them, and the other Confederate Princes, whom the War made upon the *States* by *France* and *England* had engaged in their Defence. But as long as this Mediation had no Influence upon the Progress of the *French* Arms, who made every Year great Advances in the *Netherlands*, the Nation was not to be quieted; nor could any thing content them, less than the King's entring himself into the War, and taking part with the Confederates, that the Weight of *England* might do what the King's Mediation would or could not.

The Sense of the *Commons* upon this Occasion, can no way be better seen, than from their own Journals; and therefore I shall give the Reader a short Abstract of them.

The Opinion of the Two Houses in 1677 concerning this Matter.

In the beginning of 1677, the *Commons* did directly, and in very pressing Terms, represent to the King, that the Minds of his People were very much disquieted with the Dangers arising from the manifest Growth and Power of the *French* King; especially by the *Acquisitions* made, and like to be made by him, in the *Spanish Netherlands*: "In the Preservation and Security whereof, *say they*, we humbly conceive the Interest of your Majesty, and the Safety of your People, are

highly

" highly concerned; and therefore we most " humbly beseech your Majesty to take the " same into your Royal Care, and to strengthen your self with such stricter Alliances, " as may secure your Majesties Kingdoms, and " preserve the said *Spanish Netherlands*, and " thereby quiet the Minds of your Majesties " People.

And when the *Lords*, who concurred with the *Commons* in this Address, would have had particular Mention likewise made of *Sicily*, *it being of great Importance to our Trade, that* Sicily *be not in the Hands of the* French *King*; the *Commons* disagreed to it for this Reason, because " the special mentioning of *Sicily* would seem to put " less Weight upon the Preservation of the " *Spanish Netherlands*; the Conservation of " which they conceive to be of much more " Moment to his Majesties Kingdoms, than " that of *Sicily*. For tho' it may be of great " Importance to our Trade, that *Sicily* be not " in the Hands of the *French* King; yet the " *Safety of his Majesties Kingdoms is not so immediately endangered thereby*, and therefore it " ought not to be equally insisted on.

A Second Address from the House of Commons upon the same Subject.

The King agreed with his Parliament in owning the *great Importance the Conservation of* Flanders *was of to* England; but the rest of his Answer, which shewed his Aversion to enter into a War for its Defence, was so little Satisfactory, that a Motion was immediately made for a *Second* Address to his Majesty, to enter into a strict and speedy Alliance with the Confederates; And in pursuance of this Motion, the House did about a Fortnight after (*March* 20th) in a *Second* Address, " with most earnest " and repeated Desires implore his Majesty, " that

"that he would be pleased to take timely Care to prevent those Dangers that may arise to these Kingdoms by the *Great Power of the French* King, and the *Progress* he daily makes in the *Netherlands* and other Places; and that he would not defer the entring into such Alliances as may obtain those Ends, promising fully to assist His Majesty if he should be engaged in a War in pursuance of such Alliances.

And a Third. Within Three Days after the King's Answer to this Address, *April* 12th, the House made a *Third* Address, to assure his Majesty that "*they would with most chearful Hearts*, proceed both then and at all other times, to furnish his Majesty with such large Supplies upon this Occasion, (to preserve the *Netherlands* and check the Growth of *France*,) as might enable him, by God's Assistance, to maintain the Alliances they had advised, against all Opposition whatsoever".

And a Fourth. This Address, upon the King's Answer to it, was immediately followed by a *Fourth, April* 16th; assuring his Majesty of their Duty and Affection; and that he might not only depend upon the Supply he desired, but upon all such Assistances as the Posture of his Affairs should require: "In Confidence whereof, *say the Commons*," we hope your Majesty will be encouraged in the mean time to *speak and act such things as your Majesty shall judge necessary, for attaining those great Ends we have formerly represented to your Majesty*".

And a Fifth. These repeated Addresses from so Loyal a House of *Commons*, sufficiently shew how much the Nation was alarmed upon the Dangers to which they saw the *Netherlands* exposed. The

Commons

Commons were so bent upon this Point, as a Matter of the last Consequence, that they would take no Denial: Which made the Court resolve upon adjourning them for five Weeks. But what passed in this Interval did not make the *Commons* alter their Sentiments, or less earnest in the Pursuit of them. When they met again, *May* the 21st, they fell into very warm Debates, and resolved to advance still one step farther in a Matter of so great Concern, which was to address his Majesty *to enter into a League offensive and defensive with the STATES, and to make other fit Alliances against the Growth and Power of* FRANCE, *and for the Preservation of the Spanish Netherlands:* And in this Address they tell his Majesty how highly sensible they are, of the Necessity of *supporting*, as well as *making*, the Alliances desired in their former Addresses; "*which we still conceive*, say they, *so* "*important to the Safety of your Majesty and your* "*Kingdoms, that we can't without Unfaithfulness* "*to your Majesty and those we represent, omit upon* "*all Occasions humbly to beseech your Majesty, as* "*we now do, to enter into a League offensive and* "*defensive with the STATES*, &c." And that no Time might be lost in doing this, they give his Majesty this Reason among others; "The great Danger and Charge which must "necessarily fall upon your Majesties King-"doms, if, through want of timely Encou-"ragement and Assistance, the *States*, or any "other considerable part of the Confederates, "should make a Peace with the *French* King, "(the Prevention whereof hitherto, *say they*, "must be acknowledg'd to be a singular Effect "of God's Goodness to us;) which if it should "happen, *your Majesty would afterwards be ne-*

"*cessitated*

"*cessitated with fewer, perhaps with no Alliances,*
"*to withstand the Power of the* French *King,*
"which has so long and so successfully con-
"tended with so many and potent Enemies;
"and whilst he continues his overbalancing
"Greatness, must always be dangerous to his
"Neighbours; since he would be able to op-
"press any one Confederate, before the rest
"could get together, and be in so good a
"Posture of offending him as they are now,
"being Jointly engaged in a War; and if he
"should be *so successful as to make a Peace, or dis-*
"*unite the present Confederation against him*, it is
"much to be feared whether it would be *pos-*
"*sible ever* to *reunite* it. At least it would be *a*
"*Work of so much Time and Difficulty, as would*
"*leave your Majesties Kingdoms exposed to much*
"*Misery and Danger.* Having thus discharged
"our Duty in laying before your Majesty the
"Dangers threatning your Majesty and your
"Kingdoms, and the only Remedy we can
"think of for preventing it, and quieting the
"Minds of your People; we most humbly be-
"seech your Majesty to take such Resolutions,
"*as may not leave it in the Power of any Neigh-*
"*bouring Prince, to rob your People of that Happi-*
"*ness they enjoy under your Majesties gracious Go-*
"*vernment.* Then they oblige themselves not only by their Promises with great Unanimity renewed in a full House, but by the Zeal and Desires of those they represent, and by the Interest of all their Safeties, most chearfully to give his Majesty speedy and plentiful Supplies.

And a Sixth. This earnest and importunate Address, which was presented *May* the 26th, expresst not only the Sense of a very full House, but indeed of the

the whole Nation; which gave it so much Weight, that the Court saw they should be forced to comply with it, unless they betook themselves to the last Refuge in such Cases, and immediately put an end to the Session. The Parliament therefore was accordingly dismissed, and not suffered to sit again till the end of *Jan.* 167⅞. But tho' the Court could interrupt the sitting of the Parliament as they pleased, it was not possible to change their Sentiments; and they no sooner met again, but they resumed their former Debates with more Earnestness, if possible, than before. For as that long Interval, in which they had not been suffered to have any Opportunity of interposing their Counsels with His Majesty, had given the *French* so much farther Leisure to finish their Designs upon the *Netherlands*; the Nation was so much the more alarm'd, and in a New Address *Jan.* 31st, they "humbly "desire his Majesty, with the highest Zeal for "his Honour and the Safety of his People, "*not to admit of any Treaty of Peace, whereby the* "French *King shall be left in Possession of any lar-* "*ger Dominions and Territories, or of any greater* "*Power than what he retained by the* PYRENEAN "*TREATY; less than which, they conceive, can't secure* "*his Majesties Kingdoms and the rest of* Europe "*from the Growth and Power of the said King*, but "that he alone may be able to disturb the Peace "thereof, whensoever he is inclined to attempt "it". — And they farther desire "*that in all* "*Treaties in order to the obtaining that End, his* "*Majesty would be pleased to provide, that none of* "*the Parties that shall Join with him in making* "*War for that purpose, may lay down their Arms* "*or depart from their Alliances, until the said King* "*be*

"*be reduced AT LEAST to the said Treaty.*" The *Commons* had Reason to hope for a Compliance with this Address; the King having in his Speech acquainted them, that he "had made, according to their desire, such Alliances with *Holland*, as were necessary for the Preservation of *Flanders*; That since a good Peace could not be had by fair means, it should not be his Fault if it were not obtained by Force of Arms; That if he be supported by them, he will not be weary till *Christendom* be restored to *such a Peace, as it shall not be in the Power of any Prince alone to disturb.*"

And a seventh. But whatever influenced the Counsels of the Court, (which is a Subject I am willing to decline,) this Address met with no better Reception than their last. They had been *Then* told, that "what they did was an Invasion of "*the Prerogative*"; and *Now* they were told, not only the same thing, but, what is more surprizing, that "the King having asked the Advice of both Houses, can't act upon any that does not jointly come from both". The Commons however not rebuted with this Treatment, persevered; immediately voted a good Supply; and upon *March* 14th resolved to Address his Majesty, "*That to quiet the Minds of his Subjects, and encourage the Confederates, he would be pleased immediately to proclaim and enter into an actual War against the* French *King*; promising constantly to stand by and assist his Majesty with plentiful Supplies": To which Address they desired the Concurrence of the *Lords*; But before it could be entirely obtained, they were adjourned to the middle of *April*; and from thence to the 29th; when the Lord Chan-

Chancellor acquaints them in the King's Name, "That the *States*, whom he had long found "weary of the War," (and indeed had *made* so; for they were quite discouraged from expecting Help from *England*, when they saw the Zeal and Spirit of the Nation entirely defeated and eluded by the Court;) "were making "haste to get out of it, and were entred upon "Considerations of accepting such a Peace as "*France* had thought fit to offer, tho' it be "without his Majesty's Consent or Privity; "*a Peace as ill for themselves, and the rest of* Christendom, *as their Enemies could wish.*" And in this difficult Conjuncture the King desires their Advice, (when it is too late,) and resolves to pursue it now; tho' their giving it before in time, when it would have been of the greatest Consequence, was made a high Crime. It is not my Business to expose the Insincerity of the Court in this whole Affair: They who would see this, need only read Sir *William Temple*'s Letters and Memoirs; a Person of undoubted Reputation and Authority, and who was in those Times his Majesty's Ambassador in the *Low-Countries*. But I can't but observe from these words, what a Character the King gives of that Peace that was a little after concluded at *Nimeguen*; and what made that Peace so ill a one, was the leaving so much of *Flanders* in the Possession of *France*, and the remainder so much exposed by a weak and insecure Barrier.

Followed with two other Resolutions upon the same Head.

But to proceed: The *Commons*, who were willing to hope, that, if the Court were sincere, Things might be yet retrieved; came *May* 4th to *Two Resolutions*, which they laid before the King, without staying to put them into

into the usual Form of Address, *by reason of the Importance of the Affair, and the Exigency of the Time.* In the *first*, they "declared the League "made with the *States* to procure a Peace between the Two Crowns upon certain Terms "therein specified, not to be pursuant to their "Addresses, nor consistent with the Good "and Safety of the Kingdom:" And yet by these Terms (had *France* been obliged to accept them,) *Tournay*, *Conde*, and *Valenciennes*, were to be restored, together with the Dukedom of *Lorrain*. The *other* Resolution was, to desire his Majesty "forthwith to enter into the "Confederacy for the vigorous carrying on "of the present War; and particularly, that "effectual Endeavours might be used for continuing the *States* in the Confederacy; and "that no Peace might be made with *France*, "without general Consent first had." And upon the King's refusing to give any Answer till he had the concurrent Advice of both Houses, they immediately resolved to address his Majesty to give a speedy Answer to their last Address, and to remove those Counsellors who advised the Answers to their former Addresses of the 26th of *May* and 31st of *January*, or either of them; "*by which Answers*, they "say, *his Majesty's good Subjects had been infinitely "discouraged, and the State of his Affairs reduced "to a most deplorable Condition:*" They mean the Progress of the *French* in *Flanders*, and the great Jealousy and Uneasiness That gave the Nation. And notwithstanding the King told them *May* 23d, that Things were driving violently on towards a Peace; yet still, to prevent *so much* of *Flanders* remaining in the Hands of *France*, they resolved, if his Majesty would

then

then enter into a War against the *French* King, they were, and always would be ready to assist him. But these and all the other Efforts the *Commons* could make, could not force the Court into right Measures, or prevent an ill Peace; and served only to vindicate themselves to Posterity, from having any Hand in it; and this I presume it will be allowed they have done.

The King concurs in the same Sentiments with the Commons; when it is too late.

It is impossible to read this short Account of the Proceedings of the *Commons*, and not observe of how very great Importance they thought the saving of *Flanders* was, to the Safety and Security of this Nation. This was so plainly the known and certain Interest of *England*, that all the Arts the Court could use, could not divert them from pursuing this Point. This was the first Parliament that was chosen after the Restoration; which continued sitting above 17 Years; and cannot be suspected either of not having a true Regard for the Prerogative; or a due Deference for the Sentiments of the Court. But the Interest and Safety of their Country was so much concerned in the Preservation of *Flanders*, that this Consideration carried them into these Measures in Opposition to the Ministry; in which they steddily and unalterably persevered; And the Nation was entirely with them; the Point they pressed against the Court, having apparently no other Foundation than their hearty Zeal and Concern for its true Interest. And the King himself thought fit, when it was too late, to express at least the same Concern They did, and to concur in the same Sentiments; as appears from his Speech to them not long after, in which *he opens his Heart freely to them*, and tells them

them he was " resolved to save *Flanders*, either " by a War or a Peace, as *the greatest Foreign* " *Interest of this Nation*: That things seem al- " ready to have determin'd in a Peace, at least " as to *Spain* and *Holland*; that he is resolved " to give his Guaranty to it in the strongest " manner he is able; but that he could not " tell how far that would go; *for that they had* " *already sent him word, that unless* England *and* " Holland *will both join in the Charge of Main-* " *taining* Flanders *even after the Peace, the* Spa- " niards *will not be in a Condition of Supporting it* " *alone, and must fall into other Measures*: That " *France* on the other hand will be left *so great*, " that nothing Abroad can treat with them " hereafter upon *an equal Foot*, without the " Hopes of being supported by this Crown: " That tho' after the Supplies they had given " towards a War, they may think the Peace " an ill Bargain; perhaps they won't believe " it so, if they consider that by it so great a " part of *Flanders* is likely to be saved; where- " as without the Paces made towards a War, " there is nothing so certain *as that the whole of* " *it would have been absolutely lost that Campaign.* " *And I believe you would*, says the King, *give* " *much greater Sums than this will cost you, ra-* " *ther than the single Town of* Ostend *should be in* " *the* French *Hands, and* 40 *of their Men of War* " *in so good a Haven over against the River's* " *Mouth.*

If a Nation will ever be allowed to speak its own Sense, it must be own'd the *English* Nation did so on this Occasion; and the Reader will observe that the King in this Speech, where *he opens his Heart to them*, justifies their Sentiments. Here then is the Voice of the Nation declaring

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in the fullest and most unexceptionable manner, that it is the true Interest of *England*, that there should be preserved a good *Barrier* in the *Netherlands*; and in order thereunto, that *France* should on that side be reduced *at least* to the Terms of the *Pyrenean* Treaty. And it adds to the Weight of this Authority, that in this Concurrence of Prince and People in the same Sentiments, the People don't concur with the Prince, (in which they might be thought to be influenced or overawed,) but the Prince with his People; which it is certain could proceed from nothing in this Case, but that they had most evident Reason on their side, which was too manifest to be denied, however their Desires were eluded or refused.

The Opinion of the Nation since that Time: And that the Necessity of a good Barrier, was one of the principal Reasons of entring into the present War.

I might proceed to shew, that the Nation has always continued in the same fixed Opinion of the *Necessity* of a good *Barrier*, for our *own* Safety as well as that of our *Neighbours*; but it would be altogether superfluous to spend any time in proving this. The Vigor wherewith they have prosecuted Two long Wars against *France* since the Revolution, being the best Demonstration that can be given, how much they think it the Interest of the Nation, that That exorbitant Power should be reduced within some Bounds, and particularly that it should not extend it self in the *Netherlands*. Nor is any body ignorant, that the Danger arising to *England*, as well as *Holland*, by the Seizure of the *Netherlands* by *France* upon the Death of the late King of *Spain*, was one of the most immediate Causes of our entring into the present War. For it was impossible to give greater Proofs than both Nations did, of their sincere Concern that the Peace might be preserved;

They shewed by their previous Acknowledgment of the Duke of *Anjou* for King of *Spain*, that they would not have taken up Arms, if they could have enjoyed any tolerable degree of Safety without it; but for Peace-sake would have been content with any Terms; And they made that Step, upon a Belief that the King of *France* would not refuse to grant such Conditions, as the Peace of *Europe* and their own Safety unavoidably obliged them to insist upon. But these Conditions, so far as related to the Security of the Two Nations, consisted chiefly in a *Barrier* for the *Netherlands*; as may be seen by the * Proposals made by the *States* to Count *d'Avaux* at the *Hague*, March 22d. 1701; To whom Mr. *Stanhope*, the late King's Minister at the *Hague*, did at the same time deliver Propositions on the Part of *Great Britain*; Both which, were such as their Fears made them believe would not be denied, not such as in Reason they could think sufficient. The Two Nations were under such a Consternation, that they were willing, for preventing a War, to give up almost every other Point; but a *Barrier* in the *Netherlands* was of that immediate Concern to their Security against *France*, that it could upon no Consideration whatever be receded from; and consequently a Refusal on the Part of *France*, unavoidably forced them into Arms; since they must have been ruined without a Barrier, but had a Chance to be saved in Fighting for one. It must therefore be allowed that the Loss of their Barrier by the Seizure of the *Netherlands*, was, as I have affirmed, one of the most immediate Causes of their entring into the present War; and consequently, in the Judgment of the Two Nations,

* *See* below, P. 93.

this, a good Barrier is the nearest and most immediate Interest of Both. Can more Proof, or better Authority, be desired in so plain a Case? Can any one be so perverse as to think the *Maritime* Powers can for Ages together have mistaken their Interest, in a Point for which so much Blood and Treasure have been spent? Can it be thought they have had a more than needful Concern for preventing *France* from getting Possession of the *Netherlands*?

The Judgment of France *her self, concerning this Matter; shewn by the Earnestness wherewith she has constantly pursued the Acquisition of the* Netherlands.

But we need only look into the Views and Designs of *That* Crown, to be convinced that in this the Two Nations have not mistaken their true Interest; *their Enemies themselves being Judges.* For there is no one Point *France* has so constantly and with so much Earnestness pursued, as the Acquisition of the *Netherlands*: And That is a convincing Proof, that there is nothing which the *Maritime* Powers are more concerned to prevent. I might shew this has been the Aim of *France* for Two Ages past: But, to look no farther back than the Reign of the present King and his immediate Predecessor; what Endeavours has not that Crown used to compass this Design, which was the Favourite Project of its Two Great Ministers; *Richlieu* and *Mazarin*? The Court of *France* have often applied themselves separately to each of the Powers concerned in the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; to *Spain*; to *England*; and *Holland*; to amuse and lull them asleep; to win them by Menaces or Bribes; that they should favour and consent to, or at least connive at, their extending their Dominions on this side. They have tried *Matches*; *Exchanges*; *Partitions*; for this End; they have made *Wars* at a vast Expence;

with or *without Pretence*; and have made *Treaties* again and again, with no other Design than to break them as soon as made; that they might get by Surprize at one time One, at another time Another Piece of those Countries, which they knew their Neighbours were too much interested to suffer them tamely to take by open Force and at once. It was this View made *Lewis* the 13th and the *Queen-Mother* so fond of a *Spanish* Match; And we find in *Sully*'s Memoirs, that *Henry* the 4th would gladly have done the same thing, *and have Married the* Infanta *of* Spain, *were she never so Old and Ugly, if he could have Married the* Low-Countries *with her*. And when *Spain* would not consent that the *Low-Countries* should be given in Dowry with her, *Richlieu* then applied himself to *Holland*, and for several Years proposed to them a Partition of the *Netherlands*, if they would not make a Peace with *Spain*, but join their Arms with *France* for the entire Conquest of them; And a Treaty was actually made to this purpose in 1635, tho' the Design of it was defeated by the Treaty of *Munster* in 1648; when the *States* having plainly discovered what the Ambitious Views of *France* aimed at, made their Peace with *Spain*. But this could not induce *France* to lay aside its Design on the *Netherlands*, or so much as to desist a while from it. If they could not compleat the Conquest of these Countries in conjunction with the *States*, they were resolved to pursue it by themselves. *Mazarin*, who succeeded *Richlieu* in this Ministry, did all that was possible, to break off the Negotiations of *Munster*, that no Peace might be made till the *Low-Countries* were entirely reduced; and when he could not compass that, he would have

have consented himself to any Terms of Peace with *Spain*, and willingly have given up all the Conquests *France* had made in *Roussillon* and *Catalonia*, if they would have parted with *Flanders* either in Exchange, or under the Notion of a Dowry, upon a Match between the present King of *France* and the then *Infanta*. This Point the Cardinal laboured with all his Might, as may be seen at large in the Negotiations of the Treaty of *Munster*. And when neither *Holland* could be prevailed on to continue the War, nor *Spain*, consent to purchase a Peace of *France* by the Exchange of the *Netherlands*, the Cardinal found means to have the Treaty of *Munster* finished without including the *Spaniards* in the General Peace: by which means the *French* were at liberty to turn the whole Weight of their Arms against *Spain*, unassisted by any Friends, and without any other War upon their own Hands. Thus *Spain* and *France* were engaged in a War for 12 Years longer, while one Side would not give up the *Low-Countries* for a Peace, nor the other make a Peace without them. As the *Spaniard* was Obstinate, so the *Cardinal* was Indefatigable: And tho' the Civil Troubles the Kingdom was involved in, gave him sufficient Cause to wish the War well ended; he could not be persuaded to quit this View: And when he found that *Spain* would neither give up those Provinces, nor could be beaten out of them, he tried again in 1657, to have them yielded to *France* in favour of a Match; and Monsieur *Lionne* was sent to *Madrid* to Negotiate the Affair, but without Success. At last, when a Marriage could not be obtained *without* a Renunciation, he advised the

marrying the Infanta *with* one; Since, *whatever Renunciation were made, the King might*, in the good Cardinal's Opinion, *by virtue of such a Match, pretend to the Succession of* Spain *and the* Low-Countries. The Match was accordingly agreed to, in order to *a lasting Peace* between the Two Crowns, concluded by the Famous *Pyrenean* Treaty in *November* 1659. By this Treaty, besides other very considerable Acquisitions, *France* was left in Possession of large Dominions in the *Low-Countries*, and the Match was in due time to give a Title to the rest. This was the Cardinal's Scheme, who laid the Greatness of *France* in the Acquisition of the *Netherlands*. How well the *French* King has pursued *His* Measures, all *Europe* sees and feels. In 1667, upon the Death of *Philip* the 4th, without the least Ceremony he Invaded *Flanders* as belonging to him in Right of his Queen; and he has ever since engaged the World in perpetual Wars, still ending one with no other View than to disarm *Spain* and the Powers concerned in the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, that he might with more Success begin another. And to his Arms he has joined all manner of Intrigues; he hath corrupted all the Courts of *Europe* to induce them to favour his Designs, or to engage them in Quarrels among Themselves, or by other Ways to hinder them from Combining together to check his exorbitant Ambition. He hath tempted *Spain* with very advantageous Offers, to Consent to the Exchange of the *Netherlands*; and has procured the most lively Representations to be made, of the Expence and the Impossibility of keeping them; That they were an insupporta-

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ble Burthen to the Crown, and involved it in perpetual Wars, without the least Advantage coming from them. At other times he has offered, both to *England* and *Holland*, a Part of the *Low-Countries* to facilitate the Conquest of the rest; and there is no way he hath not tried to amuse them both, and to bring them into his Designs, or to make them patient and easy under them, or to weaken them by Divisions in order to prevent their Opposition. And it is well known, the true Reason of the terrible Resentment he expressed against the *States* in the Year 1672, was to be revenged of them for the *Triple League*, by which he found the *States* could never be made so far his Friends as to favour Designs so prejudicial to themselves: A Stiffness he did not find on the Part of *England*; and therefore, That Friendship he courted above all Things; And the Use he made of it was to conspire the Ruin of the *Dutch*; because, if that Obstacle were once removed, there was nothing left that could stop the Progress of his Arms. By these Methods, the King of *France* has been perpetually gaining Ground in the *Netherlands*. Almost every Year was distinguished by some Advances on that Side; Places were either taken by War, or seized under the Notion of Dependencies in Times of Peace, which by his want of Faith were more fatal to those Countries than open War: And these Places no sooner fell into his Hands, but all the Force of Art was used to render them impregnable; which shewed he knew the Value of them, and never design'd to part with them on any Consideration.

A Passage Sir William Temple upon this Subject.

Thus steddily was the Design on the *Netherlands* pursued, and One Conquest was followed by another, till the Death of the Late King of *Spain* made way for the Seizure of the Whole; which, tho' a little Spot of Ground, is of that vast Consequence, that Sir *William Temple*, upon an Apprehension of *Spain*'s consenting some time or other to give the *Netherlands* to *France* by Exchange, could not forbear telling my Lord *Arlington*, in a Letter written in 1669, that "within Two Years after the "King of *France* were well possessed of those "Provinces, he doubted no Prince or State in "*Christendom* would pretend to dispute with "him, any more than the *Spaniard* did then. "And this was an Event, which in his Opi-"nion *deserved* at that time, *to be a little more* "*thought of than it was*.

The Conclusion of this Head.

If therefore Reason and Experience, if the constant Sense of our own Nation, and of all that wish well to us; if the Opinion of our Enemies themselves, concurring in the same Judgment; will be allowed to prove a thing: it must be owned, that I have undeniably proved it, *to be in it self, and apart from all other Considerations, the Interest of* England, *that there should be a good and sufficient Barrier against* France *on the side of the* Netherlands. And if this be true; if a good Barrier be the Interest of *England*, as certainly as it is of *Holland*; it is also true, that whatever *England* in Conjunction with *Holland* has done, or shall at any time do, for the Recovery of such a Barrier, or for the Preservation of it when recovered, is done because it is *our own Interest* it should be done: What *we* do in it, we do for *our selves*, and for *our own Security*; as well as what the *Dutch*

do

do towards it, is for *themselves* and for *their Security*. It is *our Barrier* as well as *theirs*; the Interest is mutual; and while they act in Conjunction with us in Defence of it, both Nations may with equal Truth be said to provide for the Safety of each other, by providing for their own. And this one single Inference, if apply'd as a Rule to the Libels that have been written against the *Barrier-Treaty*, will it self defeat the greatest part of what they say, and show it to be absolutely false.

I have been the longer in the Proof of the *first* Part of this Proposition, because it is the Foundation of all that follow; and because such Clamours and unfair Methods have been made use of, to extinguish the Ancient Sense of the Nation, and mis-represent entirely to the People, a Point in which their Safety is so immediately concerned.

That no Barrier can be sufficient, that is not at least equal to that stipulated in the Barrier-Treaty.

I come now to the *second* Part, *viz. That no Barrier can be sufficient, that is not at least equal to that stipulated in the* Barrier-Treaty. It being evident, that the Trade, Peace, and Safety of *Britain*, do absolutely depend upon the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; and Experience having shewn us, that upon That Account the whole Weight and Burthen of their Defence has, ever since the *Pyrenean-Treaty*, been in a manner wholly thrown on the Maritime Powers, and must for the same Reasons continue to be so for the future; it is amazing, that any *Englishman* should think it possible for those Countries to be too well secured; especially, those amongst us, who would have it thought

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their peculiar Characteristick, *not to delight in War.* For, unless the Safety of the *Netherlands* be effectually provided for, We and the States shall not only be inevitably exposed to a *new War*, but continue at the Mercy of the House of *Austria*, as to the *Terms* upon which they'll please to engage with us in it; and consequently, we shall be sure of never being put upon a more equal or favourable Foot than that of the last and the present War. One would have thought therefore, that the Authors of the Libels and Invectives that have been spread against this Treaty, would have been careful how they had quarrelled with it, upon a Point that so apparently favours the Peace and Repose of *Britain*, which they pretend to be so passionately concerned for. But perhaps, finding *France* averse to comply with so good a Barrier as is requisite for the Safety of the Allies, they found it necessary to remove the Blame from *France*, by laying it on the Allies; giving it out that it was very unreasonable to insist in the *Preliminary-Treaty* upon the Restitution of so many strong Places, as not being in their Opinion requisite for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; and that the *Barrier-Treaty* carrying those Demands still farther, could be intended only to aggrandize the *Dutch*: Not doubting, but, the *Dutch* being once brought into the Question, our Heat and Prejudices will at this time so far blind us, as to make us abandon *our own Interests* without the least Hesitation. Thus are the unreasonable Impositions of *France*, made to pass upon us as the Effects of our own Choice; and the Restitution of the strongest Towns in the *Netherlands*, is re-

represented not as a *necessary Evil*, but as an *Eligible Condition of Peace*. I shall prove therefore, that the Barrier settled in the *Preliminaries of* 1709, was in truth not sufficient for the Security and Defence of the *Low-Countries*; and that all which may be farther claimed by virtue of the *Barrier-Treaty*, is far from being more than what is necessary for that Purpose.

That the Barrier insisted on in the Preliminaries of 1709, *was not sufficient for the Defence of the* Low-Countries.

That the Barrier insisted on in the *Preliminaries of* 1709, was really not sufficient for the Defence of the *Low-Countries*, will appear, by comparing it with the *End and Intention* of a Barrier in general; which is, to put a Country in such a Posture of Defence, that it may not easily be invaded or over-run. But no Country can enjoy that Security, while it is covered with *One single Line or Chain of Towns only*, which if it be in any one Part broken into, gives the Enemy Entrance into the very Heart of the Country. Such a Barrier therefore can never be thought a sufficient and reasonable Security, especially against an Enemy who has always in readiness a Force superior to what on a sudden can be brought against him.

But such is the Situation of the *Netherlands*: It has an Enemy hovering upon its Borders, who is always in a better Posture to invade, than those Provinces are to defend themselves; and when their Outworks are taken, all within is an open Country at the Mercy of the Conqueror. There are indeed many great Towns in the *Netherlands*; more perhaps than in any other Country of the like Extent; But it is That

which

which in some Respects helps to make its Weakness. They are in no Condition to stop the Progress of a Victorious Army, as we our selves found this very War after the Battel of *Ramellies*, when they opened their Gates to the Duke of *Marlborough*, as fast as he could summon them. And, were they in other Respects capable of making some Defence, they are so large, that each of them would require almost an Army for its Garison: So that there is a necessity for those who defend this Country, either to leave those Towns without Troops, or to have no Army in the Field: Either of which would end in the Loss of the *Netherlands*. And supposing they had an Army, it could not stir out of Sight of their Towns, without leaving them too much exposed. It was this obliged the Allies last War to be in a manner altogether upon the Defensive; the *Netherlands*, for want of a sufficient Barrier, being so much exposed, that they never durst venture to leave them without an Army. And what a fatal Influence this had upon that War, I need not say; while *France* was so well covered, as to have nothing to fear from the Allies, and therefore was at liberty to Act Offensively on any side; but the Hands of the Allies were tied, and it was more than they could do to defend a large and weak Frontier. This may let us see, that a good Barrier is more particularly necessary for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, than of any other Country; and that *One single Chain of Towns only* is by no means sufficient to that end; since *France* by a sudden Invasion having taken but one Town, may make all the rest of the Barrier perfectly insignificant, and over-

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run the whole Country before any Measures can be concerted for its Defence.

But the Barrier settled by the *Preliminaries of* 1709, in most Parts of it, consists but of *One single Line of Towns*: From *Newport*, for Example, to *Menin*, (that is, from the Sea to the *Lys*,) there is no Place of any Strength but *Ypres*; and from *Tournay* to *Namur*, (that is, from the *Schelde* to the *Maes*,) there is no Place of Strength for a Second Line but *Mons* only. Nor is the Barrier any stronger between the *Lys* and the *Schelde*; where *Lisle* is plainly too much exposed, if *Douay* continues in *French* Hands, as it does by the *Preliminaries*. If therefore we would have the *Netherlands* covered by such a Barrier as may in any Degree answer the *End and Intention* of a Barrier in general, and be a tolerable Security against *France*; it must be so formed, as not to leave it easier for *France* to invade than to be invaded; otherwise, those Countries, though they were in other Respects equal to *France*, would never be sufficiently secured, but must always be in Danger from a Prince whose own Country is so much better covered, that he may hope to invade them with Impunity. Whereas when Things are on such a Foot as may make it full as easy to invade *France* as it is for *France* to invade her Neighbours, she will not easily be the Aggressor; and if she should, she may have Reason to repent it: The Consequence of which would be, that this Part of the World might hope to enjoy a *lasting Peace*. But that this can never be effected by the *Barrier* fixed in the *Preliminary Treaty*, is evident from what has been said above; and therefore That *Barrier* cannot be thought

Because it consisted but of one single Line or Chain of Towns.

thought sufficient for the End proposed. This was the Opinion of all that were acquainted with the Interest of the *Low-Countries* at the time of these Negotiations; insomuch that the *States* were mightily blamed for not insisting upon a better Frontier for the *Netherlands*, and particularly for receding from *Valenciennes*, which the *English* Ministers were directed to insist upon for a Part of their *Barrier*, as appears by their Instructions lately Printed. So far were the *States* from being guilty of the Design charged upon them by the Emissaries of *France*, of continuing the War in order to aggrandize themselves by the Conquests in the *Low-Countries*; that it is plain they would have been content for the sake of Peace, to sit down with, in Truth, a less *Barrier* than their own immediate Safety required.

That, what may further be claimed by Virtue of the Barrier-Treaty, *is far from being more than is necessary for that End:*

But that the *Barrier* insisted on in the *Preliminaries of* 1709, fell short of what was requisite for the Security of the *States*, will appear still plainer by what I am next to prove; namely, That what may farther be claimed by Virtue of *This Treaty*, is far from being more than is necessary for the forming a good *Barrier*.

The *French* King having refused to ratifie the *Preliminaries* concerted at the *Hague* in *May* 1709, all Hopes of Peace vanished, and the *Allies* found themselves under the Necessity of carrying on the War, and consequently of pushing it in *Flanders*, in order to bring *France* to Reason. It was therefore agreed in the *Barrier-Treaty*, which was not signed (as appears by the Date) till several Months after

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the *Preliminaries*, that *Valenciennes*, and all the Towns which should be conquered from *France* in the Course of the War, should make a Part of the *Barrier* for the *States*, upon the same Terms, and under the same Regulations, as the other Towns specified in the Treaty. And this was no more than what in Justice and Reason ought to have been done: For the *French*, by their Insincerity, having rendred the Endeavours of the *Allies* towards a Peace, ineffectual; and put them under the hard Necessity of continuing the War; and the *Barrier* stipulated in the *Preliminaries* being plainly not sufficient for securing the great End proposed by it; nothing could be more reasonable, than that under these Circumstances Care should be taken, that (in case God was pleased to continue the Success with which he had to that time blessed the Arms of the *Allies*) the Places taken from the Enemy should serve to make good this *Barrier*, which is of so much Importance to *England* and *Holland*; and by that means compensate, in some Measure, the vast Expence that we and the *Dutch* were unavoidably engaged in by the farther Prosecution of the War.

As appears by comparing it with the Pyrenean *Treaty.*

The Towns taken since that time, are *Douay*, *Aire*, *St. Venant*, *Bethune*, *Bouchain* and *Quenoy*. And that, tho these Towns with *Valenciennes*, are added to the *Barrier* fixed in the *Preliminaries* of 1709, yet the Whole will not be more than is necessary for the Security of the *Netherlands*, will easily appear, by comparing it with that which was left by the *Pyrenean* Treaty, which has constantly been thought to be but barely sufficient for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*. For, that

that the *Pyrenean* Treaty did more than reduce Things to an Equality between the Two Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, and turned the Balance in Favour of the former, is, I think, confessed on all Hands. It was so advantageous to *France*, that she has, by Favour of it, not only removed all Dangers from her self ever since (till the surprizing Turn of Affairs in the present War,) but has been able to give perpetual Disturbance to her Neighbours, and has more than one pushed fair for the Conquest of the whole *Netherlands* in Two Campaigns; which plainly shews; That even *That Barrier* was far from being more than what the *Allies* had Reason to insist on as a necessary Security for those Provinces. Accordingly it has generally been their Aim, in all their Wars and Negotiations with *France* ever since that Treaty, to reduce things again, if they could, to that Foot. This is what the Parliament desired of King *Charles*, in their Address of the 31st of of *January* 1678 already mentioned, *as the Least that was necessary for the Security of his Majesty's Kingdoms and the rest of* Europe, *against the Growth and Power of the* French *King*. And this they were so solicitous to obtain, that they farther desired his Majesty *to provide, by the Treaties that were to be made for that End, that none of the Parties that should joyn with him in making War, might lay down their Arms or depart from their Alliances, until the said King were reduced, AT LEAST, to the said Treaty*. And this is what King *Charles* proposed to the *States*, when it was too late, if they would joyn with him in vigorous Measures, and reject the Offers

fers made by *France*; which they had in a manner accepted at the time when that Proposal was made; being quite spent and exhausted with a long War, and not daring to put much Confidence in the Promises of a Court that seemed to act with so little Steddiness. This, I say, was what the *Allies* always aimed at, though their ill Success obliged them to be content with a great deal less: The Consequence of which has been, that the *End of one War* has been in Effect the *Beginning of another*; and Experience has shewn us, that this will always be our Case, till such a *Barrier* be obtained, as may put it out of the Power of *France* to invade the *Netherlands* at Pleasure. But if that left by the *Pyrenean* Treaty has been found insufficient for that End, how can this assigned in the present Treaty be said to be more than sufficient, which falls considerably short of the former? For should the *States* at the Peace be put in Possession not only of all the Towns specified in the *Preliminaries* of 1709, but likewise of all that may be farther claimed by Virtue of the *Barrier-Treaty*; yet *Cambray* (which is owned by every one to be a Place of the greatest Importance,) with *Dunkirk*, St. *Omers*, and several Towns of less Consequence, would remain to the *French*, more than were left to them by the *Pyrenean* Treaty; not to mention *Franche Comté*: So that the *Pyrenean* Barrier was much stronger than that granted by the present Treaty, even tho we take in *Valenciennes*, and all the Towns conquered from *France* since 1709.

I may therefore be allowed to conclude, that this *Barrier* is far from being more than is necessary; and that Any which falls short of this, cannot possibly be thought sufficient for the Preservation of the *Netherlands.*

But if this be so, the only Meaning of the Clamours that have been raised by the Emissaries of *France* against this *Barrier* as too extensive, must be to prepare us to expect a *worse*; and to reconcile us, if possible, to the *French* Plan of Peace, by which *Lisle*, *Tournay*, and some third Town yet unknown, are to be left in the Hands of *France*; which would render all the *rest* of the *Barrier insignificant*, and make it as weak and insecure as That stipulated by the Treaties of *Nimeguen* and *Ryswick*; which I name together, as being Both equally bad with Respect to the *Netherlands*; and Both the fartheſt removed from the Standard of the *Pyrenean* Treaty, to which *at least* (as has been observed before,) King *Charles* IId's Parliament thought it absolutely necessary to reduce the Power of *France.*

A Scheme of the Principal Towns in the Netherlands, *left to* France *by several successive Treaties.*

That the Reader may at one View see the several Steps, by which *France* has been enlarging her Acquisitions in the *Netherlands* for these last 50 Years; and compare the several Treaties by which those Acquisitions have been confirmed to her, with the *Barrier-Treaty* on one Hand, and with the present *French* Plan of Peace on the other; I shall subjoin a *Scheme* of the Principal Towns in

n the *Netherlands*, left to *France* by its several Treaties with the Crown of *Spain*, from the *Pyrenean* down to the present Proposals of Peace; mitting only that of the 20 Years Truce, beause all that was then given up to *France*, was estored to *Spain* by the Treaty of *Ryswick*, which reduced things to the very same Foot pon which they were left by that of *Nimeuen*.

By the Pyrenean *Treaty* 1659.	*By the Treaty of* Aix 1668.	*By the Treaties* Nimeguen 167 Ryſwick 1697
All Artois, *except* Aire. St. Omer.	All Artois, *except* Aire. St. Omer.	All Artois.
In *Flanders.*		
Gravelines, l'Eclufe, Les Forts Philippes, Hannuin, Bourbourg.	Gravelines, &c. *to* Bourbourg.	Gravelines, &c. *to* Bourbourg.
	Dunkirk (bought of the Engliſh.)	Dunkirk.
	Berg St. Winoc.	Berg St. Winoc.
	Douay with Ft Scarpe.	Douay with Ft Scarp
	Tournay, Liſle.	Tournay, Liſle.
	Armentieres.	Armentieres.
	Oudenarde.	Caſſel.
	Courtray.	Menin (ſince fortified i the room of Courtray
	Furnes.	Furnes.
		Ypres *with its Dependencies.*
In *Haynault.*		
Mariembourg, Philippeville, Avenes, Landrecy	Mariembourg, &c. *to* Landrecy.	Mariembourg, &c. Landrecy.
Quenoy.	Quenoy.	Quenoy.
	Binch, Aeth,	Valenciennes.
	Charleroy (in Namur.)	Bouchain, Bavay.
		Maubeuge; & Condè not fortified in 1678.
		Cambray.
In *Luxemburg.*		
Thionville Montmedi, Damvilliers, Yvoix, Chavancy, Marville.	Thionville, &c.	Thionville, &c.

By the Barrier-Treaty 1709.	*By the* French *Plan of Peace* 1712.
All Artois, *except* Aire. Bethune, St. Venant.	All Artois.
Gravelines, &c. *to* Bourbourg.	Gravelines, &c. *to* Bourbourg.
Dunkirk (to be demolished by the Preliminaries.)	Dunkirk (to be demolished)
Berg St. Winoc.	Berg St. Winoc.
	Douay with Fort Scarpe.
	Tournay, Lisle.
	Armentieres.
	Cassel.
	The Option of some 3d Town not yet specified.
Mariembourg, &c. *to* Landrecy.	Mariembourg, &c. *to* Landrecy.
	Quenoy.
	Valenciennes.
Bavay.	Bouchain, Bavay.
	Maubeuge *and* Condè *are said to be demanded by the* French *at present.*
Cambray.	Cambray.
Thionville, &c.	Thionville, &c.

The Reader cannot but observe, from comparing these Schemes, that as the Barrier settled in the present Treaty approaches the nearest to the *Pyrenean*, (which tho' really not strong enough, yet has always been the Aim of the Allies;) so the Barrier proposed by the *French* Plan of Peace, approaches very near to that of *Nimeguen*; of which Treaty it is sufficient to observe, That the Lord Chancellor *Finch* told the Parliament from King *Charles*, *It was as ill a one for the* States *and the rest of* Christendom, *as their Enemies could wish*: And the Event soon confirmed what he said, to be true; the Two last Wars having been almost entirely owing to the vast Accession of Strength which was left to *France* by that Treaty. It is obvious therefore, that any Barrier, less than that settled in the present Treaty, will leave the *Netherlands* exposed, and thereby involve *England* in all the Calamities of a *New War*, or in a State of *Dependency upon France*, more ruinous than War it self.

That the Defence of the Barrier ought to be committed to the States.

2. But it is not a strong Barrier alone that will secure us against *France*, unless it be also *well defended*; which (as I shall shew in the *next* place) *can only be done by committing the Defence of it to the STATES.*

That the Barrier cannot be preserved by Treaties with France.

All the Security a Country can have against a powerful Enemy, is either *Treaties with him*, or *defensive Alliances against him*, or *a real Strength in Readiness to oppose him on occasion*. But the Two first of these, the Event has sufficiently shewn, are rather *Nominal* than *Real Securities*. No Treaties, we are too well assured, can bind *France*, be they never so solemn; witness all that have been made these 50 Years. They are all but mere *Paper-Securities*, which are of

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no Proof against his Cannon, whenever it is his Pleasure to have recourse to *that Ratio ultima.* He breaks his Faith, before the Ink is dry by which it is pledged; and when he gives his Word, it is because he means to give nothing else. Of which I shall single out one flaming Instance. In 1667, when he invaded the *Netherlands* in the pretended Right of his Queen; at the time that he was actually setting out at the Head of his Army, he charged the *Spanish* Ambassador, who was then returning to *Madrid*, to engage his Faith and Word to the Queen, that he would live in the strictest Friendship with her; and his Armies had actually begun Hostilities, when his Ambassador the Archbishop of *Embrun*, by his Order, gave the *Spanish* Court the strongest Assurances of his sincere Intention to keep the Peace. This Invasion shewed that no *Word*, no *Oath*, no *Treaty*, no *Renunciation*, tho' passed with the utmost Solemnity, and strengthned by repeated Assurances, could tie down his Ambition. And all his Conduct since, has been of a Piece with this Action; so very little is his Faith to be depended on.

Nor by defensive Alliances against her, without a Standing Force sufficient to oppose any sudden Invasion.

As for *defensive Alliances* and Guaranties, Experience has likewise shewn that they alone, without a standing Force sufficient to oppose any sudden Invasion, are by no means able to secure the *Netherlands* against the Power and Ambition of *France*, who is always at hand with a numerous Army, and upon the Watch to invade them. For besides that Alliances are very hard to be brought from Paper into Action, from the Closet into the Field; and when there, seldom act with the same Life and Vigor, the same Steddiness and

Unanimity, as Forces subject but to one Prince, animated with one Spirit, and pursuing one Uniform Interest; they are liable to be broken and disunited by Bribes and Pensions rightly applied. *France*, who is perfectly skilled in making use of all these Advantages, seeing the naked and defenceless Condition of the *Netherlands*, has by sudden Invasions over-run the greatest part of those Countries, before the Princes engaged in their Defence could assemble their scattered Forces to protect them; and the first Successes usually gave her such Advantages, that the Confederates had enough to do to defend what was left; and their Attempts commonly ended in some Treaty, that gave *France* a Title to the greatest and most valuable part of her unjust Acquisitions; and by expunging, in some measure, the Memory of former Injuries, left her at liberty to set out upon a new Score and a still more advantageous Foot. How insignificant to the great Ends proposed by it, was the Famous *Triple Alliance*? It was at first looked upon as an invincible Barrier to the *Netherlands*, and an effectual Check to the Power of *France*, at least to its Encroachments on that side: But how long did these Expectations last? Or what did this mighty Alliance end in? Why, it produced the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, which divested the *Netherlands* of one half of the Barrier left by the *Pyrenean* Treaty. But this was far from satisfying the Ambition of *France*; for as soon as she had taken Breath, and strengthned her self with the Seizure of *Lorain* in the midst of Peace, she fell upon the *United Provinces* with the whole Weight of her Arms, assigning no other Reason but that she was *dissatisfied*

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with their Conduct; hoping to secure the Conquest of the *Netherlands* by the previous Reduction of *Holland*. In this most destitute Condition of the *States*, she found means to draw off the Elector of *Brandenburg* from their Alliance; and when the *Spaniards* at last arm'd in their Defence, she gladly laid hold of that Opportunity of seizing *Franche-Comte*, and most of the strong Towns of the *Netherlands*, which were afterwards confirmed to her by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*. This Treaty was concluded under the Mediation and Guaranty of *Great Britain*; and yet so far was That from being any Security to the *Netherlands*, that *France* soon after seizing on several Places under the Notion of Dependencies, ravaged the whole Country with Military Execution, and after a Year's Blockade, at last besieged and took *Luxemburgh*, which was yielded to her by the 20 Years Truce. From all these Instances, I hope, it appears that Guaranties and *Defensive Alliances alone* are by no means sufficient to secure the *Netherlands* against the Attempts of such a Power as that of *France*; but that the Whole of those Countries must be lost by degrees, while every Invasion pares off some part of them; unless to the Alliances made for their Preservation, a standing real Force be superadded. But this is no ways to be had, but first by providing a *good Barrier*, and then by *trusting the Defence of it to the Dutch*.

That the Barrier can be defended by none but the States.

That if a Good Barrier be committed to Them, it will be well defended, needs no Proof; it is allowed on all hands: All therefore that I am to show, is, that it can be done no other way: If it could, it must be by the House of *Austria*, or by *England*.

But

Not by the House of Austria.

But as for the House of *Austria*; that they either *cannot*, or *will not*, effectually provide for the Defence of the *Netherlands*, needs, I think, no better Proof, than that for so many Years past they *have not*. Ever since the *Pyrenean-Treaty*, they seem to have left the Defence of those Provinces upon those they think most concerned in their Preservation, *viz. England* and *Holland*. Whether this is want of Will or Power in them, is not material; but in Fact it is true, that they have not in any Degree provided well for the Defence of them: They have left them without a Sufficiency of Men, Money, or Magazines; and by that means, their best Towns have made such a poor Defence, that the Whole has been in danger of being lost in the short space of Two or Three Campaigns. The Enemy has been always at the Gates, before they have begun to be in a Posture to receive him. And what Course have they then taken? Why, their Ambassadors in *England* and *Holland* have made pressing Instances for Help; represented the Greatness of their Danger; the Interest We and the *Dutch* had in it; and if we would not assist them, with a Menacing Air they told us plainly, that they must consider what they had to do, and make in time a good Bargain with *France*, for the Sale or Exchange of those Provinces for other Countries more convenient on the side of *Spain*, rather than suffer them to be lost for want of Help from their Allies. This has been the constant Language of the *Spanish* Court, whenever these Provinces have been threatned with a War from *France*. And Sir *William Temple*, in several Places of his Letters, expresses his Apprehensions of their falling

falling into some Agreement with *France* for them; seeing such continual Wars entailed upon them, and their Neighbours unwilling to share so far in their Dangers, as perhaps, *says he*, it were the Interest of *England* and *Holland* to do: for that there was a considerable Party in the *Spanish* Court, who were for making the best Peace they could with *France*, by a Cession of *Flanders* in Exchange for other Provinces toward *Spain*, and of some other Pretensions. And he owns, if he were in their Council, he should be of the same Mind himself. For whatever Notion some People have conceived of the great Revenues of these Provinces, they were a perpetual Drain to the Court of *Madrid*; as shall be shewn at large, when I come to consider that Part of the Treaty that relates to the *Revenues*. But the Thing speaks it self: and whoever considers the Misery and Poverty of a Country, that has been for so many Years a perpetual Theatre of War; and the prodigious Expence which must necessarily attend the Defence of Places so much exposed; will easily believe, that *their own Revenues* are by no means sufficient to answer such a Charge. Considering therefore the Low Condition to which the Affairs of *Spain* have been long reduced, there may very well be a great deal of Truth, when they complain, that the Defence of those Provinces is too great a Burthen for them; and that therefore they must either be left without Defence, or others must come into a large Share of it. But if the Crown of *Spain* has not been able to defend the *Netherlands* for Half an Age past, it is certainly less able now. And therefore, if that Crown should be settled on the *Emperor*,

ror, there is as little to be expected from Him in this Respect as from his Predecessors; and still a great deal less, if those who seem concerned that he should have this small Portion, this *Burthen* of the *Spanish Monarchy*, have so little Regard either to his or their own Interests, as to give that Monarchy away from him. But were the House of *Austria* in never so flourishing a Condition, it is not to be supposed they would be at any great Expence for the Defence of the *Netherlands*, which have been and must be a dead Weight upon their Hands; they would certainly chuse rather to employ their Wealth in Securing and Fortifying their Territories in *Italy* and *Hungary*; well knowing that the Maritime Powers can never stand by and see the *Low-Countries* fall into the Hands of *France*: and that tho' it should be the misfortune of one or both of them, to be seized with sudden Fits of *Folly and Madness*, which may make them for some short time mistake their true Interest in this Particular; yet the Preservation of *Britain* and *Holland* does so entirely depend upon keeping those Provinces out of the Hands of *France*, that the Progress of the *French* Arms in those Parts, will sooner or later always bring them to their Senses, and engage them at last to come with their whole Strength to their Rescue: and by this means, the House of *Austria* are not only sure of our Assistance in all its Quarrels with *France*, but even (as has been observed above) of having it upon their own Terms. And as the Behaviour of Queen *Elizabeth* throughout the whole Course of her Reign, together with the Uneasiness *England* expressed during the Reign of King *Charles* IId, at *France*'s extend-

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ing its Conquests in the *Netherlands*, and the vast Expence of Blood and Treasure that we and the *States* have been at for the Recovery of them, throughout the whole Course of this and the last War, will always be sufficient Proofs that the House of *Austria* judges right in relation both to *England* and *Holland* in this Particular; so they must be standing Reasons for us never to trust or rely upon that House for the Defence of those Provinces.

Nor by Troops lent them for the Defence of the Barrier.

There was indeed *one Expedient* tryed at the End of the last War, by which it was hoped those Provinces would be in a better Condition to resist the Arms of *France*; and That was the *lending Troops* to *Spain* to Garison the Frontier Towns. The late King having, during the last War, by his Credit and Interest at the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, obtain'd the Government of the *Low-Countries* for the Elector of *Bavaria*; prevailed with the *States* after the Peace at *Ryswick*, to lend the King of *Spain* 20 Battallions towards Garisoning the small Barrier left the *Netherlands* by that Treaty. The Elector of *Bavaria*'s Character, the great Figure he had made, and the Zeal he had all along shown for the Common Cause, joined with the great Territories he possessed in *Germany*, which were looked upon as sufficient Pledges of his Fidelity to the Empire, and of his steddy Adherence to the Interest of the Allies; induced the *States* to comply with this Proposal. But this Scheme was so far from securing the *Netherlands* against *France*, that upon the Death of the late King of *Spain*, the whole Country, and with it the *Dutch* Troops themselves, were betrayed into the Hands of *France*; and the *States* found themselves by this

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one Stroke brought to the very Brink of Ruin; the Enemy being in full Possession of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and consequently at their Door, and at the same time Master of great Part of their best Infantry. The Danger this exposed them to, will I presume make them have very little Inclination to try the same Experiment again, and suffer a Body of their best Forces to be at the Mercy of a Governor who is under any other Master.

Nor by England. And there is as little Reason to think that *England* will, either upon this or any other Foot, charge it self with the Defence of those Countries; They will neither advance Money to *Spain* without Security, nor be willing the Crown should take Cautionary Towns, tho' to have them in Sovereignty for it, since that can't be done without an Army. For, the same Reasons that make the Nation jealous of a Standing Army at Home in Time of Peace, will make them equally jealous of the Prince's having one within Call; as a Body of Troops in the *Netherlands* would be; that being equally dangerous to their Liberties, or rather more, if they are paid by *Spain*. For That enables the Crown to keep Troops without depending on the Parliament for their Subsistence; which at Home it can't do; and therefore Troops at Home are more within the Nation's Influence, and they have less to apprehend from them. It is not therefore to be thought that *England* would so far hazard its Liberty, as on any Scheme to charge it self with the Defence of the Barrier in the *Netherlands*. The way that would be most effectual, the Nation would least like: And if they would consent that a Body of their Forces should be canton'd out into several

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Garisons in Conjunction with other Troops; this would only make our Assistance less significant, and still expose us to the same Danger of having a Standing Army entail'd upon us in Time of Peace.

In short, it is vain for these Provinces to look for sufficient and effectual Help either from *England*, or the House of *Austria*; they must therefore have Recourse to *Holland*; for there is no Fourth Power than can in any tolerable Degree protect them. But the *Dutch* are both *willing* and *able* to do it; their Nearness to these Provinces makes it both their Interest to defend them, and places it within their Power, if the necessary Means of doing it be put into their Hands; that is, if they are allowed a free and safe Communication with their Garisons, and a reasonable Proportion out of the Revenues of the Country towards answering so great a Charge. For, as I shall shew in the *Third* place,

3. *For the Defence of a good Barrier in the Hands of the States, it is necessary that they should have a free and safe Communication with it, and reasonable that the Barrier Country should contribute towards the Charge of it.*

That for the Defence of the Barrier in the Hands of the States, it is necessary they should have a safe and free Communication with it.

As to the *First* Part of this Proposition, it seems to be self-evident; if the *End* be necessary, the *Means* in order to it must be necessary also. If the Security of *England* and *Holland* require that the Barrier should be *well defended*, they equally require that those upon whom the Defence of it lieth, should have a *free and safe Communication with it*; since it is otherwise impossible they should effectually defend it. It is therefore necessary that not only the *Frontier-Towns* should be garison'd by the *Dutch*, but

but likewise those *through which* they are to preserve this necessary *Communication*, and without which the Defence of the Towns where they have Garisons, will in truth no more be in their Power, than if they had not a Man in them. For they can neither furnish them with Provisions, Ammunition, Artillery, Materials for Fortification, and such other Necessaries as the Usage of War requires; nor give them any Succour in Cases of Extremity. The Command therefore of the Barrier, will in effect be absolutely in the Hands of those, who have the Command of the *Communication* between *Holland* and the Barrier; and not only so, but even the Fate of the *Dutch* Garisons themselves would likewise in a great Measure be in their Power: And thus the *States*, instead of having the Defence of the Barrier in their own Hands, would have contrived a Scheme for putting a great Part of their National standing Force under the Power and Discretion of another Prince.

The Objection, that the Towns of Communication will remain in the Hands of an Ally, considered.

It is very trifling to pretend, that if these Countries are possessed by the *Emperor*, the *Dutch* may be always sure of a free Communication with the Barrier. For the *States* ought not, by the Rules of common Prudence and Reason, to put so great a Part of their National Force entirely in the Power and at the Discretion of any Ally, tho' he should declare in never so solemn a Manner their Interest to be inseparable from his own. It is possible that a Quarrel may in future Times arise, between the *States* and those who may have the Sovereignty of these Countries; and more possible it is, considering the Inclinations of the Natives towards the *French*, and their irreconcilable Aversion to the

the *Dutch*, that a Governor may be corrupted by *France*. What has been, may be; And what a Condition would the *States* be in, if, when they have repaired the Frontier-Towns of the *Netherlands* at a vast Expence, and the greatest Part of their Troops and Military Stores are lodged in them, their Communication should be interrupted by a perfidious Governor, or the Places necessary to it be delivered up to *France*? This would be ruining the *States* at one Blow, or rather without a Blow. And they must have a very mean Opinion of their Prudence, who can think them capable of acting so weak a Part, especially having been once betrayed in this manner already. Neither is it Treachery or Perfidiousness only, they are concerned to guard against; (tho' when they have so much at Stake, no Caution in that Respect can be too great;) but when the Towns of *Communication* are in their own Hands, they can be surer of their being well defended against all Attempts to surprize or take them, than they can be if they are left in any other Hands. If a *Flemish* or *Spanish* Garison would defend well the Towns of *Communication*, so they might those of the *Barrier*; But it is certain they never have defended the Last well, and thence it is reasonable to conclude they never will the other. If the Ill Condition of the Fortifications; if the want of sufficient Magazines and good Engineers in the Town; or of Experience, Courage, and Fidelity in the Commander; or of Pay, Discipline, or Numbers in the Garison; if any of these Defects have for many Years occasion'd the best Towns in the *Netherlands* to be lost, after a weak and short Resistance; why

should we think that some or other of the same Causes will not still concur to the Loss of the less exposed Towns, while under the same Direction and in the same Hands? It would therefore be the utmost Imprudence in the *States* ever to undertake the Defence of the Barrier, without having at the same time a Liberty granted them of putting their own Garisons into such Places as are necessary for preserving their *Communication* with it; and consequently into *Ghent* and *Dendermonde*, which are the Keys of the *Schelde* and *Lys*, and of all the Towns and Canals in the Neighbourhood of those Two Rivers, through which the *Communication* between *Holland* and *Flanders* must necessarily pass. Of what Consequence these Towns are for this End, appears plainly from the Stress the *French* have laid upon *keeping* them, and the *Allies* upon *taking* them, during the present War. As for *Dendermonde*, the Duke of *Marlborough* found it impracticable this War to push his Conquests in *Flanders*, till he had first secured this Place by a Blockade, and afterwards taken it. And as for *Ghent*; the *French*, who had gotten Possession of it by Treachery in 1708, chose rather to leave their own Country exposed to a Victorious Army, than to abandon that one Place: And the *Allies* were so sensible of the Necessity of retaking it, that they ventured upon a Siege after a Campaign of the greatest Action and Fatigue, in the Depth of a Winter more than ordinarily severe, rather than they would leave so important a Post in the Hands of the Enemy. All which evidently shews, that these Places are of the last Consequence for preserving a free *Communication* between *Holland* and *Flanders*;

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and therefore in Reality as necessary to the *Dutch*, as any Places in the whole Barrier. And whereas it has been objected, that they may be made use of to the Prejudice of *Our Trade*; the Reader may depend upon having that Difficulty fully answered under my *Fifth* Head.

I come now to the *Second* Part of this Proposition; *viz. That it is reasonable the Country of the Barrier should contribute to the Maintenance of it.*

That it is reasonable that the Country of the Barrier should contribute towards the Charge of maintaining it.

This is no more than it *would* do, whoever had the keeping of it; no more than it *did* do, when it was very *ill defended*: And can any body give a Reason, why it should not contribute as much to be *better defended*? Can those who are really concerned for the Safety of the *Netherlands*, be willing the whole Revennes should be misapplied to feed the Luxury or Avarice of a Governor, rather than any Share of them should be employed in their Preservation? Is it reasonable the *Dutch* should be admitted into the burthensome Part of the Defence only, and be wholly excluded from any Part of those Revennes which have ever been appropriated to that Service? Will not the Sovereign of those Provinces share in the Advantages of the Barrier; and ought he not equally to share in the Expence? Is it worth nothing, to have the *Netherlands* rescued from the Miseries and Oppressions of perpetual War? to have so rich and fertile a Country restored to its natural flourishing Condition, and effectually secured, for a *Part* of those Revenues only, which his Predecessors were obliged to sacrifice *entire*, with large Additions

out of their own Coffers, without being able to put them in a tolerable Posture of Defence? But we are told it is reasonable the *Dutch* should bear the Expence, because the Barrier is designed for *their* Security. But first, the *Netherlands* (as I have observed before) partake in the Security, as well as the *Dutch*; and ought therefore to partake in the Expence: Besides, this way of arguing would draw *England* into Part of the Charge, since *we too* find our Advantages in the Barrier, and have as good Grounds (all things considered) to call it *our own*, as the *Dutch*. *England* therefore has Reason to be pleased, that any effectual Method can be found for securing the *Netherlands*, without *her* taking any Part of the Burthen upon her own Shoulders; and ought to assist towards obtaining such Terms for the *States*, as may enable them to do with Ease to themselves, what she would give a great deal towards, rather than it should be left undone. Neither can this great Concern to exclude the *States* from the *Revenues*, possibly arise from any other Cause than a Jealousy we have conceived, that they may enrich themselves by them: But as That must depend entirely on the Proportion assign'd them, I leave it to be considered under my *Fifth* Head; where I shall prove past all Contradiction, that the *Revenues* allotted them by the Treaty, fall very short of what must necessarily be expended on the Defence of the Barrier. Since therefore we our selves are so far from being any ways prejudiced by their receiving those Revenues, that we shall in all Probability be greater Savers by it than they themselves, who must add considerable Sums of their own, whilst we shall

ſhall enjoy the Benefit of their Gariſons for nothing; I ſuppoſe this Conſideration will go a great way towards reconciling thoſe, who would be thought at leaſt as careful to ſave the Nation's *Purſe* as its *Honour*. And provided we our ſelves are no Sufferers, we ſhall not be ſuſpected to be over-ſolicitous for the Intereſts of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; notwithſtanding the inconſiſtent Zeal that ſome of the Libellers affect upon this Occaſion. Let the Gentlemen, who are ſo tender of invading the Rights of the Emperor in the *Netherlands*, ſhew themſelves in earneſt by aſſerting his Title to *Spain* and the *Indies*; and then we ſhall believe they are ſincere in what they ſay. But that no Injury is done the Emperor, will appear by ſhewing in the *Fourth* Place,

4. *That the* Dutch *had a Right to a ſufficient Barrier, and to have themſelves the Defence of it; and that this Right was acknowledged and agreed to by the Allies; previous to the* Barrier-Treaty.

That the Dutch *had a Right to a ſufficient Barrier, acknowledged by the Allies, previous to the* Barrier-Treaty.

I might ſhew, That the *Dutch* have acquired a good Right to the Barrier of the *Netherlands*, by all they have done and ſuffered for Forty Years together in Defence of them; which has coſt them more than the whole Country is worth, if it were to be ſold: That this Barrier hath been the Foundation of all the Treaties relating to Peace or War, that the *States* have made with *France* or *England*, or *Spain*, ever ſince the Invaſion of the *Netherlands* by *France*, in 1667: That it was This Barrier brought on them the terrible War of 1672: That the King of *France*, at the End of that War, gave up the Places he reſtored in the *Netherlands*, upon *Their* account; becauſe *They*

insisted on them, as necessary to *their* Security: That it was to *Them* he gave the Barrier: That it was *They* procured the King of *Spain* the Restitution of the Places taken by *France*: That the Ministers of *Spain* have often called upon the *States* to defend *their* Barrier in the *Netherlands*; and have pleaded it as a sort of Merit to *them*, that for *their* sakes the Crown of *Spain* would persist in defending the *Netherlands*, even tho' it exhausted all its Treasures.

That they had such a Right by the Grand Alliance, *both of having a sufficient Barrier, and of having the Defence of it themselves.*

But it is not very material whether they had acquired a Right to a Barrier *formerly*, or not: That they had a Right to a good one by the *Grand Alliance*, is past Dispute; And it is a manifest Violation of that Treaty, to make a Peace, of which such a Barrier is not one of the Conditions; That having been the Principal Motive that engaged them in the present War, and it being expressly provided by the 8th Article, that no Peace shall be made till their Security (which is declared to be the having the *Spanish Netherlands* for a Barrier between *France* and them) be first obtained. And this is a Treaty not with *England* only, but to which the then Emperor was himself a Party; and therefore whatever the *States* have a Right to by this Treaty, it is a Right the House of *Austria* have themselves consented and agreed to. The first Part of this Proposition will not perhaps be disputed; it will be allowed me that the *Dutch* have a Right to a Barrier, but not to have the Defence of it in their own hands. There will be no great Difficulty to grant their *Right*, provided it be rendred insignificant; as Experience has assured us it will be, if the keeping of it be committed to any

Hands

Hands but their own. It is pretended, the *States* have no Right to a Barrier in any other Sense, but that the *Netherlands* should be in some other Hands than those of *France*; that so *France* may be kept at a distance from them: That the *Netherlands* were formerly a Barrier to them in no Sense but this, and therefore ought to be so in no other now. And this they say is plain from the very Words of the *Grand Alliance*, *Art.* 5. in which it is stipulated, "That the Allies shall use their utmost "Endeavours to recover the *Spanish Low-* "*Countries*, that they may be a Fence and "Rampart, commonly called a *Barrier*, to re- "move and separate *France* from *Holland*, for "the Security of the *States-General*, *AS* they "have served in all Times, (*QUEMADMO-* "*DUM ab omni Tempore inservierunt*,) until "they were seized by the *most Christian King*. It is not very surprizing, that those who have falsifyed the most material Clauses in this Treaty that concern *England*, by a wrong Translation; should lay so much stress upon that single Word *quemadmodum*, or the Particle *as*, as to think it of sufficient Force to destroy the Right of the *States* to defend their Barrier. But that this is a very *false* Interpretation of this Particle, and that it was not intended to settle in this Article any Thing relating to *the Manner* in which the *Netherlands* were to serve as a *Barrier* to the *States*; is evident beyond all Dispute, from the Last Clause of the Ninth Article, in which it is stipulated, that "when a "Peace shall be made, the Confederates, among "other Things, shall at the same time agree "among themselves, *in what MANNER* "the *States* shall be secured by the aforesaid

"Fence or Barrier; *Inter se convenient de MO-*
"*DO QUO Domini Ordines Generales per Obicem*
"*antedictum, vulgò* Barriere, *securi reddentur*: And in the *French*, which is equally an Original with the *Latin*; "*Ils conviendront pareillement*
"*DES MOYENS propres a mettre en seurete les*
"*Seigneurs Etats Generaux par la Barriere Susmen-*
"*tionnée.* Now this Clause in the *Ninth* Article would be Superfluous and Senseless, if the Point were already settled by the *Fifth*. Which makes it very plain, that the Meaning of those Words in the Fifth Article, is only this: That *AS* the *Low-Countries* have been in all Times past a Barrier for the *States* against *France*, *so* the Confederates stipulate to endeavour their Recovery, that they still may be so for all times to come. But as to the particular *Manner* in which this Barrier may most effectually secure them, nothing is determin'd with respect to that. It is by the Ninth Article expresly reserved to be settled among the Confederates at the Negotiations of Peace. Not that it was intended by this Article, to leave it as a Matter to be disputed among the Allies, whether the *States should* themselves have the Possession of their Barrier; but to regulate the *Manner* in which the Possession should be settled in them; what Towns should be included in the Barrier; how their Communication should be preserved; what Garisons they should keep; what Powers and Revenues they should enjoy; in short, in what Manner and Method this Barrier should be possessed; which was left to be settled by a particular Treaty, at the Conclusion of the War. But whether the *States should* be suffered to keep Possession of their Barrier *themselves*; to leave this to the decision of the

Allies

Allies at a General Peace, neither was (as I shall prove) nor could be the Intention of this, nor of any other Article in the *Grand-Alliance*; much less was it there determin'd against them, that they should not have the Possession of their Barrier, and that the *Netherlands* should be *no otherwise* a Security to them than they had been before.

As appears from the Design and End of the Grand Alliance.

This will be made very evident, by considering the *Design and End* of the *Grand Alliance*, for which the Parties to it engaged in the present War; and the *Propositions*, which *Holland* made to *France* to prevent the War. First, as to the *Grand Alliance*, it was not made with any King of *Spain* in Possession, nor any acknowledged or declared King, nor with any Son of the then Emperor, but with the Emperor himself, who had indeed Good and Just Pretensions to the *Spanish Monarchy*; but the Duke of *Anjou* had gotten Possession, and both *England* and *Holland* had acknowledged him in that Quality. And the Allies then had little Reason to hope for so successful a War, as should enable them to demand the Restitution of the whole Monarchy. Here is therefore no King of *Spain* in view, for whom the *Netherlands* are to be recovered as a Part of the *Spanish Monarchy*. The Treaty is between the *Maritime Powers* and the *Emperor*: And tho' by the General Words, *Satisfaction* and *Security*, they are at liberty to extend their Demands as far as Justice and their Success should enable them; yet what they stipulate for in express Words, is only so much as was absolutely necessary to prevent the imminent Dangers the Parties contracting were in from the Union of the Crown of *France* with that of *Spain*. In

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short, all they stipulate for, except in relation to Commerce, is, that the *Netherlands* shall be recovered, not for the *Emperor*, nor for any King of *Spain*, but to be *a Barrier to the States*, for the Security both of them and *England*; and that *Milan*, &c. shall be recovered, not to remain as a Part of the *Spanish Monarchy*, or as the Emperor was King of *Spain*, *but as a Fief of the Empire, and as contributing to the Security of his Imperial Majesties Hereditary Countries.* So that the *Maritime Powers* are by this Treaty to endeavour the Recovery of *Milan*, &c. for the Emperor: and the Emperor is to do the same on his Part for the Recovery of the *Low-Countries* for Them; that the *Maritime Powers*, and particularly the *States*, who are a Barrier to *England*, may have them for their Barrier. For tho' it be called *a Barrier for the States*, as lying upon the Continent between them and *France*, yet does *England* also find in it its Security; and therefore the Language that runs through the whole Treaty is, * *The obtaining a particular and sufficient Security for the* Kingdoms *and* Provinces, *&c. of the King of* Great-Britain, *and the* States-General. To see that this was the Design and End of the *Grand-Alliance*, that the *Netherlands* were to be recovered for a Barrier to the *States*, and not to be given to any King of *Spain*; we need only read the whole Fifth Article, which is as follows: "The "Confederates, in order to procure the afore-"said *Satisfaction* and *Security*, (*Satisfaction* for the Emperor, and *Security* to the Kingdom of *England* and Provinces of the *States*,) "shall, among other Things, use their ut-"most Endeavours to recover the *Spanish Ne-"therlands*, that they may be *a Barrier* (*Obey*

* *See Art.* 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12.

"&c.

"& repagulum vulgò dictum Barriere) to remove "and separate France from Holland, for the "Security of the Lords the States-General, as "they have been in all times, till his most Christian Majesty lately seized them: As likewise "the Dutchy of Milan, with its Dependencies, "as a Fief of the Empire, and serving to the Se-"curity of his Imperial Majesties Hereditary Pro-"vinces; and, with that, the Kingdoms of "Naples and Sicily also, and the Lands and "Islands upon the Coast of Tuscany in the Me-"diterranean, which belong to the Crown of "Spain, and may be of the same Use (with re-"spect to the Emperor,) and will also be of "Advantage to the Navigation and Commerce of "the Subjects of the King of Great-Britain, and "of the United Provinces. What can be plain-er, than that by this Article the *Netherlands* are to be recovered for a Barrier to the *States*: and *Milan*, &c. for the Satisfaction and Security of the Emperor? This was the Principal, if not the Only End of the Recovery of the *Netherlands*. Nor could it indeed be otherwise; for those Provinces were to be taken from a King of *Spain* in Possession, and no other in the Treaty is named, or so much as supposed. And therefore, if the *Netherlands* were to be a Barrier to the *States*, it was also supposed they should have the *keeping* of that Barrier *themselves*. But because the Recovery of the Whole, or any Part of those Countries, depended entirely upon the Success of the War; neither the Towns which were to form their Barrier, could be then specify'd; nor the Regulations under which they were to have the Possession of them, adjusted; this being a Thing of a very complicated Nature; and, *England* and the

Emperor

Emperor being interested in it as well as the *States*, it was left to be settled by common Consent at the End of the War, when the Event should shew what Towns they had the disposal of, and what not. For to have regulated a Barrier that was to be conquered by Force of Arms, before they had so much as taken up Arms, or knew for certain the Parts it was to consist of, must have exposed them to Contempt, in case the Event had not answered their Expectation; and would have been at best no better than building Castles in the Air. Therefore, the Places being not particularly specifyed in the *Grand Alliance*, is no Argument that it was not the Design of the Allies to put them into the *Hands of the States*. On the contrary, that this was *the proper means of securing them by their Barrier*, intended in the Ninth Article; must be allowed by any one, that will consider in what *manner* the *States* had demanded a Barrier for their Security, *previous* to the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*. The Deputies of the *States*, in Concert with the *British* Ministers, gave in a Paper of *Proposals* to the Count *d'Avaux*, the *French* Ambassador at the *Hague*, the 22d Day of *March*, N. S. 1701, about Six Months before the *Grand-Alliance* was formed; which were as follows.

And from the Proposals made by the Deputies of the States, to the Count d'Avaux, *in* 1701, *which shew the Sense of* England *and the* States *concerning this Matter*, previously to the Grand Alliance.

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A MEMORIAL OF THE

Proposals made by the Deputies of the States to the Count *d'Avaux*, Ambassador Extraordinary of the King of *France*, at the *Hague*, March 22. *N. S.* 1701.

[*Recherche modeste des Causes de la presente Guerre*, p. 51.]

WHEREAS *His Majesty the King of* Great-Britain, *and the Lords the* States-General *of the United Provinces of the* Low-Countries, *did, on the* 25*th of* March, *in the Year* 1700, *conclude a Treaty of Partition with His most Christian Majesty, to prevent the Troubles and Inconveniences which might arise on the Subject of the Succession of the last King of* Spain, *in case he happened to die without Issue: And whereas among Others, the Principal Aim of the High Contracters in this Affair was to preserve the General Peace and Tranquility of* Europe, *and to strengthen the particular Security of this State: It is evident, that although His most Christian Majesty has thought fit to accept the Will of the late King of* Spain, *setting aside the Treaty of Partition; yet Their High Mightinesses ought not to lose the Effect of the said Treaty; but the Object of the said Treaty, namely the General*

Peace

Peace and Tranquillity, and their own particular Safety, ought to be secured to them, at least by some Equivalent, or other Means.

I. *Upon this Foundation their High-Mightinesses demand, That for the Preservation* of the General Peace and Tranquillity, *in which their own particular Security does in great measure consist, a reasonable Contentment and Satisfaction shall be given to his Imperial Majesty for his Pretensions to the* Spanish *Succession, which were regulated by the Treaty of Partition; And that his Imperial Majesty shall be admitted and included in the Treaty, that his Majesty of* Great-Britain *and Their High-Mightinesses shall make with Their most Christian and Catholick Majesties; and that accordingly he shall be invited to enter into the present Negotiation.*

II. *That His most Christian Majesty, in a certain limited Time, as short as can be agreed upon, shall withdraw all his Troops out of the* Spanish Netherlands, *without leaving any of them behind; and that he shall not be permitted ever to send them thither again; but that for the future, within the said* Spanish Netherlands, *(excepting in the Places of Security, of which mention shall be made in the following Article,) no Troops shall be kept but only* Spanish, Walloon, *or Natives of his Catholick Majesty's* Low-Countries, *belonging peculiarly to him, under his Oath and Pay; and none of the Troops of his most Christian Majesty, directly nor indirectly: But if the King of* Spain *should desire any Troops of the King of* Great-Britain, *or of Their High-Mightinesses, for the Defence of the* Low-Countries; *they shall be permitted to send them thither.*

III. *That*

III. *That for the particular Security of this State, the Towns, Places and Forts, of* Venlo, Ruremonde, Stevenswaert, Luxembourg, Namur, Charleroy, Mons, *Dendermonde,* Damme, *and* St. Dhonas, *shall be yielded up and committed* to the Keeping of their High-Mightinesses, exclusive of all others; *together with their Castles, Citadels, and all the Forts and Works belonging to them, each in the State it is in at present; with liberty therein to put and keep such Garisons as they shall think fit, whether their own, or belonging to such of their Allies as they shall think fit to request thereunto; And that neither* France *nor* Spain *shall be allowed to put the least Garison into those Places;* nor to build behind or round about *the said Towns, Castles, Places and Fortresses, any Forts, Lines or Works; nor to do any thing whatsoever, which may be prejudicial to the Keeping of the said Towns, Castles, Places and Fortresses, and hinder the Effect of it.*

IV. *That their High-Mightinesses shall be allowed* to augment, lessen, and change their Garisons *in the said Towns, Castles, Places and Fortresses, whensoever, and as often as, they shall think fit; as also to send thither Provisions, Ammunition, Arms, Materials for the Fortifications, and every thing in general that may be* convenient *and necessary for the Service of the Garisons and Fortifications; That the Passage for the Transport of all these things, as well as for that of the Garisons, as well going as coming, shall be at all times* free *and open through the Lands and over the Rivers of his Catholick Majesty's Territory, without* any Lett or Molestation *directly or indirectly.*

V. *That their High-Mightinesses shall have the* full Command and Authority *over the Towns, Places, Castles and Fortresses, where they shall have*

their

their Garisons; and shall put therein such Governors and Commandants as they shall think fit, without prejudice to the other Rights, and to the Revenues of the King of Spain, *over and in the said Towns and Places.*

VI. *That farther, their High-Mightinesses shall have the liberty to fortify and repair the Fortifications of the said Towns, Places, Castles and Fortresses, in such manner as they shall think fit; and in general, to do every thing that they shall find necessary for their Defence.*

VII. *That no Kingdoms, Provinces, Towns, Lands or Places belonging to the Crown of* Spain, *whether within* Europe *or without; and particularly no Towns or Lands of the* Spanish Low-Countries, *shall be capable of being yielded or transferred, or of devolving or coming to the Crown of* France, *either by Donation, Purchase, Exchange, Contract of Marriage, Succession by Will, or* ab-Intestato, *or by any other Title whatsoever; and that they shall not be capable of being submitted to the Power or Authority of the most Christian King in any manner.*

VIII. *That* in the Kingdoms and States of the King of *Spain*, as well in as out of *Europe*; *and consequently in the* Spanish Netherlands; *the Subjects and Inhabitants of the United Provinces shall continue in the Enjoyment of all the Privileges, Rights, Franchises, and other Advantages, as well with regard to their Navigation and Commerce, the free Use of Ports, as all other Matters, in the same manner as they heretofore enjoyed, or ought to have enjoyed them; and that accordingly all things, of what kind soever, excepting what shall be otherwise*

wise agreed on by the Treaty that is to be made, shall be left in the State they were in at the Time of the Death of the late King of Spain, *last deceased.*

IX. *That* the Treaty between the Crown of *Spain* and their High-Mightinesses, concluded at *Munster in* 1648,; *as also all the other Treaties and Conventions between* Spain *and this* State; shall be renewed, *or held for renewed, in such manner as shall be agreed on by common Consent, as far as they shall not be altered by the Treaty that is to be made.*

X. *Moreover, that the Subjects and Inhabitants of the United Provinces* shall enjoy *in all the Kingdoms, Territories, Cities, Places, Bays and Harbours of the Crown of* Spain, *in and out of* Europe, *the* same Privileges, *Rights and Franchises, as also all the Immunities and Advantages, which the Subjects of his most Christian Majesty* or other Princes *and Potentates* do enjoy, or which shall be granted them, and which they shall enjoy for the future.

XI. *That their Majesties the Kings of* France *and* Spain *shall solemnly promise for Themselves and for their Successors, the exact Observance of all these Points in general, and of every one of them in particular.*

XII. *That the Treaty to be made on this Subject shall be Guaranted by such Kings, Princes and Potentates, as one or the other of the High Contracters shall request thereunto, and That in the strongest manner they shall think convenient.*

XIII. *The Whole with a Reservation of Power to enlarge these Points in the Negotiation, as much as*

shall be found necessary for the Illustration of their true Sense and Meaning; as also to prevent all manner of Disputes. Done at the Hague *the 22d of* March 1701, *in the Name of the Deputies of their High-Mightinesses.*

Signed, *Fagel.*

In these *Propositions*, which shew the Sense of the *States* and *England* too, *previously* to the *Grand Alliance*, and which were the Plan of the first Project for a Barrier-Treaty; we see plainly that the *States*, at a time when they would have been content to sit down with Any Terms to prevent a War under such great Disadvantages, yet insisted to have the Towns that were to compose their Barrier *put into their own Hands*, (*on cedera & confiera* a leur garde privative, *les Villes, Places*, &c.) to have *the sole Military Command*, and to *enjoy a free and open Communication with them*, without the least Permission to *France* or *Spain* to intermeddle in any thing that related to the Defence of them; tho' with a Reserve to all the other Rights of the King of *Spain* in the said Places. But if the *States* in that Juncture chose to break with *France*, rather than not have the Security they asked; it can't be imagin'd they could mean or would be content with less, to preserve *the Barrier* that was to be the Purchase of so hazardous a War. And therefore when it is stipulated in *the Grand Alliance*, (a Treaty subsequent to these Proposals,) *that a Barrier should be recovered in the* Netherlands *for their Security*, *and that proper Means should be agreed upon among the Allies for securing them by that Barrier*; it can be understood in no other Sense, than that they should have the *Defence*

fence of it *themselves*. And accordingly, by virtue of these Articles of the *Grand Alliance*, as soon as the Allies had made any Impression in *Flanders*, and recovered any Place of Strength from the *French*, it was immediately put into the Hands of the *States*, to be garison'd by their Troops. And tho' upon the Revolution that happened in these Provinces upon the total Defeat of the *French* at *Ramellies*, the Civil Government of the *Netherlands* was administred by the *Queen* and the *States* jointly; yet, in all the strong Towns that have been taken, the *Dutch* have been allowed, with the Consent of Her Majesty and the *Emperor*, to exercise the whole Command, Civil as well as Military. And since it would have been impossible by the Barrier-Treaty to have made any Alteration in this Disposition during the War, without introducing the greatest Disorder and Confusion; Things are yet left on the same Foot, upon which they stood before the making of this Treaty. So that no one is to judge from the Powers they are suffered to exercise at present, of what they are to exercise after the Peace; at which time they will be restrained entirely to the *Military Command*, pursuant to this Treaty. Which I mention by the bye, to prevent some great Mistakes which may be made for want of this Observation. And it was upon a Presumption of this Right, that the *States* were at the whole Expence of the Sieges of those Places.

But what puts it past Dispute that this was looked upon by the Allies as the Sense and Intention of the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*, is what was stipulated in the famous Preliminary Articles of 1709, with the Consent of *England* and the Emperor, as well as *Holland*. If

those Powers that made a Treaty, are the properest Judges of their own Meaning and Design in making it; here we have all the Parties to the *Grand Alliance* declaring it to be *the Intention of that Treaty, that the* States *should put Garisons in the Places of their Barrier.* For Proof of which, I shall insert the whole 22d Article relating to the Barrier.

ARTICLE XXII.

And from the 22d and 23d Articles of the Preliminaries of 1709, subsequent to the Grand Alliance.

AND *as to the Lords the* States-General, *his Majesty shall yield and make over* to them *in the most express Terms that shall be judged proper, the Place of* Furnes, *with the* Furner-Ambagt *or District belonging to the same, (the Fort of* Knocque *being therein included;)* Menin *with its Verge,* Ypres *with its Chatellanie and Dependencies, which henceforward shall be* Bailleul, Warneton, Comines, Warwick, Poperinguen, *and what depends on the Places above-mentioned, (the Town and Chatellanie of* Cassel *remaining to his most Christian Majesty,)* Lisle *with its Chatellanie, (the Town and Government of* Douay *excepted,)* Tournay, Condè *and* Maubeuge, *with all their Dependencies; The whole in such Condition as the said Places are in at present, and particularly with the Cannon, Artillery and Ammunition of War therein, to serve with the rest of the* Spanish Netherlands *for the Barrier of the said Lords the States-General;* upon which they may agree with the said King *Charles,* ACCORDING TO THE TENOR OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE, as well with regard to the Garisons which the said Lords the *States-General* shall maintain therein, as to all other Things in the *Spanish Netherlands; and particularly as to their having in Property and Sove-*

Sovereignty the Upper Quarter of Guelderland, *according to the 52d Article of the Treaty of* Munster *in the Year* 1648; *as from Time to Time they shall think fit. But 'tis to be understood, that if there is a general Magazine in* Tournay, *the Quantity and Quality of the Artillery and Ammunition to be left in the said Place, shall be agreed upon.*

And by the *Twenty Third Article* it is agreed, That his Most *Christian* Majesty shall also deliver up [to them,] all the Towns and Forts which he shall have possessed himself of in the *Spanish Netherlands.*

ARTICLE XXIII.

HIS *most Christian Majesty shall also deliver up all the Towns, Forts and Places, which he shall have possessed himself of in the* Spanish Netherlands, *in the Condition they are now in, with their Cannon, Artillery and Warlike Stores. But 'tis understood that if since the Troops of the most Christian King entred* Namur, *any Magazine has been erected, or Stores of Artillery and Ammunition laid up in that Town and Castle more than for their Defence, they shall be removed by the Officers of his most Christian Majesty,* in Concert with those of the States-General, *at the Time of Evacuation, which shall not on this Account be retarded, but shall be done within the Time that shall be limited; the Whole on this express Condition, that the* Roman Catholick *Religion shall be maintained in all the said Places to be delivered up, and in their Dependencies, in the same manner as 'tis now established there,* except that the Garisons of the *States* may exercise their own Religion as well in the Places yield-

ed and made over for enlarging the Barrie as IN THE PLACES OF THE *SPANISH NETHERLANDS* THAT ARE TO BE RESTORED.

The Words [*to them*] are not indeed expressed in this Article; But that it is so to be understood, is evident both from the *Order* of the Article, and the *Words* of it. For this Article is one of those, in which are regulated the Pretensions of *the States*, which begin with the 22d, and continue through all that follow to the 25th inclusively. And the *Words* of the last Clause leave no room to doubt, but that these Towns also were to be surrendred *to the States*. For therein it is stipulated, that *the Garisons of the STATES may exercise their own Religion as well in the Places yielded and made over for enlarging the Barrier, as in the Places of the* Spanish Netherlands *that are to be restored.* And a little before, the Magazines at *Namur* are to be removed by the Officers of his most *Christian* Majesty, *in Concert with those of the States General.*

By these Two Articles of the *Preliminary Treaty*, (to say nothing at present concerning *Huy*, *Liege*, and *Bonn*,) we see the Right of the *States* to the Possession of their Barrier, not only acknowledged and allowed as conformable to the *Intention* of the *Grand Alliance*, but actually granted and confirmed to them in *Execution of that Treaty*, by the Powers that were Parties to it. Nor is it any weakning to this Argument, that the *Preliminary Treaty* was, by the *French* King's Refusal to sign it, rendred ineffectual. For though that be true, so far

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as it relates to *France*; yet it is well known that the Ministers of the Allies signed it, and that their Principals approved what they did; and therefore it can't but be thought in Reason and Equity obligatory upon them, as far as the Stipulations in it relate to themselves only. But let it be as void as the Friends of *France* can wish it, yet sure it will be allowed that it does at least contain the Sense of the Allies at that time; and that it is a good Evidence to prove that *England* and the Emperor did then consent that the *States* should have *themselves* the *keeping* of their Barrier, pursuant to the Right they claimed by Virtue of the *Grand Alliance*, and which by Virtue of that Alliance they had actually exercised and enjoyed to that time as well as since. Nor have the Imperial Court by any Declaration on their part, ever weakned the Force of these *Preliminaries*, but on the contrary have always pressed the Allies to insist upon them, and to treat with *France* on no other Foot.

From all which I infer, That whether we look *backward* or *forward*, whether to the *Propositions made by the* States *to* France *before the Grand Alliance*, or to *that Alliance it self*, or to what has been *since* done in Pursuance and Execution of it; 'tis every way very plain, that the *States* at the making of that Alliance, intended to have the Barrier in *their own Possession*, and were understood to intend so by the rest of the Allies; that they have by Virtue of that Alliance, and by the Preliminary Articles, (which, as far as they relate to this Matter, are founded upon it,) *an undoubted Right to their Barrier, and to have Themselves the*

Defence of it; that this Right was allowed and confirmed to them by England *and the* Emperor; *and all This, previous to the Barrier Treaty.*

That the States having a Barrier pursuant to the present Treaty, is far from exposing US to any Danger from Them.

5. I come now in the *Fifth* Place to shew, That their having a Barrier pursuant to this Right, and conformable to the present Treaty, is far from exposing *Us* to any sort of *Danger* from *them.*

All the *Danger* that can possibly be apprehended, or that has ever been suggested by the Enemies of this Treaty, is reducible to these *Two* Heads: Either that the *Dutch* by Virtue of *their Barrier*, may obstruct *our Trade to the Netherlands*; or, by the Number of *Towns* and Largeness of the *Revenues*, may gain such an Accession of *Strength*, as may make them *formidable Neighbours and dangerous Rivals to our Commerce in general.* Which Apprehensions I shall prove to be altogether groundless and unreasonable, by shewing,

1*st*, That their *Barrier* is granted them under such *Regulations* and *Restrictions*, that they cannot attempt any thing to the Prejudice of our *Trade*, without a direct *Violation* of the Treaty, and an open *Rupture* with us.

2. That after the *Barrier* is put into their Hands, *our Friendship* will become so absolutely *necessary* to them, that it will be more *their Interest* than ever, to *avoid* coming to a *Rupture* with us.

3. That supposing they should be so imprudent as to come to a Rupture with us, their *Barrier* would be so far from contributing to make them *more rich or formidable*, that it would rather

rather *Exhaust* and *Weaken* them *WITH RESPECT TO ENGLAND.*

That their Barrier is granted them under such Regulations and Restrictions, that they cannot attempt any thing to the prejudice of Our Trade, without a direct Violation of the Treaty, and an open Rupture with us.

1. I am to shew, that their *Barrier* is granted them under such *Regulations* and *Restrictions*, that they cannot attempt any thing to the Prejudice of *our Trade*, without a direct *Violation of the Treaty*, and an *open Rupture with us*. This is so evident from the Words of the Treaty, that I can't but imagine, the most inaccurate Reader must have observed, that greater Care could not well have been taken, nor stronger and plainer Words used, for *tying up the States* from making the least *Encroachment on our Trade.*

That they are to have only the Military Command in the Barrier-Towns, without any Power of imposing Duties, prohibiting Trade, or making any Orders relating to Commerce.

The *Sixth Article* specifies all the *Places* where they are to have Garisons; and the *Ninth* regulates the *Power* they are to exercise in all the Places specify'd in the *Sixth*: Which Power extends no farther than to the *Military Command*; to the putting in of such Governors, Commandants, Majors, and other Officers as they shall think fit; who are not to be subject to any other Orders, in what relates to the Security of the said Places, and to the Military Command, but solely and peculiarly to those of their *High Mightinesses*; without prejudice however to the *Rights and Liberties*, as well Ecclesiastical as Political, of King *Charles* IIId; So that the *Sovereignty and Civil Administration* of all the Towns and Dependencies of the Barrier, is entirely reserved to King *Charles* IIId. The *Dutch* are totally excluded from

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any Power of this kind, and restrained purely to the *Military Command*. Consequently, they can neither *impose Duties* nor *take them off*; neither *open* nor *prohibit Trade*; neither exclude *our Manufactures*, nor force the Consumption of *their own*; nor make any *Order*, or exert any sort of Power relating to *Commerce*, without a plain Infringement of the *Ninth Article*.

That they are bound by the Treaty to assist Her Majesty, in case any others should attempt to put our Trade on a worse Foot than that of the Nations the most favoured.

But this is not all: They are so far from having any Power left them to prejudice our Trade *themselves*, that they are bound to *assist* Her Majesty, if at any time any Attempt should be made by *others* to put our Trade in those Parts on a worse Foot than that of the Nations the most favoured. For in the *Fifteenth Article* it is stipulated, "that they shall *take care* "in Conjunction with Her Majesty, that the "Subjects of *Great-Britain*, and those of their "*High Mightinesses*, shall be treated in the *Spanish* "*Low-Countries*, as well as in *Spain*, the King-"doms and States belonging thereunto, equal-"ly, and, as well the one as the other, as fa-"vourably as the Nation the most favoured". I can't see how 'tis possible to insert Words plainer or stronger, for *securing our Commerce*; or how it can with any Justice be pretended, that this Treaty wants to be farther explained on the Head of *Trade*.

A Solemn Declaration of the States *upon this Subject.*

I shall therefore enlarge no farther on this Particular, but only subjoin the Solemn and Positive Declaration made by the *States* on this Subject, in their Letter to Her Majesty of the 19th of *February*, 1712, *N. S.* In which they tell Her, that "having learn'd, that the prin-"cipal Exceptions taken to the said Treaty, "were, that it might prove *prejudicial to the* "*Commerce of Her Majesty's Subjects* in the *Spa-*

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"*nish Netherlands*; and that some had entertain'd an Ill-grounded and Erroneous Opinion, that the *States* might possibly design to take Advantage by it to make themselves Masters of the said *Spanish Netherlands*; their *High Mightinesses* did declare positively, and by this Letter do voluntarily repeat it, that it never was their Intention, nor ever will be, to make use of their said Treaty, or of their Garisons in the Fortified Places of the Country, to prejudice in any manner the *Commerce* of Her Majesty's Subjects; but that their Opinion is, that whatever relates to Navigation and *Commerce* there, ought to be settled on *an Entire Equality*, that so Her Majesties Subjects may not be charged with *Higher Duties* of Importation or Exportation than Theirs, to the end *Commerce* may be carried on there by both Nations *on an equal Foot*. That their *High Mightinesses* did declare, and do declare again by this Letter, that they never had a Thought, nor have now, of making themselves *Masters* of the *Spanish Netherlands*, in *Whole* or in *Part*; contenting themselves to have Garisons in the Places mentioned in the *Sixth Article*, *&c.*

But still it will be objected, that tho' this Treaty gives them no *Right*, yet it gives them the *Power* to obstruct our Trade whenever they think fit; and therefore, that at least in case of a *Rupture* with them, we may expect to have our whole *Commerce* with the *Netherlands* cut off. To this I answer, that even in case of a Rupture they cannot obstruct our Trade, with-

That even in case of a Rupture with us, the States *cannot obstruct our Trade in the* Netherlands, *without breaking at the same time with the Emperor also.*

without invading the Rights of King *Charles*, and breaking with *him as well as with us* : for he will always be so much concerned in point of Interest, to maintain his own Sovereignty, and to protect our Trade to his Dominions, (upon which so great a Part of the Revenues of that Country depends,) that 'tis impossible he should sit still under any Invasion of the one or Molestation of the other. And few, I believe, understand so little of the Constitution of *Holland*, or have so mean an Opinion of their Prudence, as to think, that for the sake of incommoding that single Branch of our Trade, they would be so mad as to draw a new Enemy upon themselves at such a time, and to carry on a War at once against the *Emperor* and *England*; which must not only cost them much more than the whole Trade of the *Netherlands* is worth, but throw them unavoidably into the Hands of *France*, (who has the Conquest of the *Netherlands* too much at heart, to be only an idle Spectator in case of such a War;) and would therefore probably end, not only in the Loss of their Barrier, but in the utter Ruin of their Republick.

That, if the Fear of obstructing our Trade, is an Objection against trusting the strong Towns of the Netherlands *in the Hands of the* States, *it is a stronger Objection against trusting them in any other Hands whatsoever.*

But this Objection, if it proves any thing, proves a great deal too much for the Purpose of those that bring it. For if the strong Towns of the *Netherlands* are not to be trusted in the Hands of the *Dutch*, because that in case of a Rupture they may be turned against us; they certainly ought not, by much better Reason, to be trusted in the Hands of *any Power that is less concerned to preserve a good Understanding with us* than the *Dutch* are; that is, they ought to be trusted

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in no *Hands at all.* For though we turn our Eyes all over *Europe*, we shall find no Power so many Ways engaged by all the strongest Ties of Interest to cultivate a strict Friendship with *England*, as the *Dutch* will be, especially after this Barrier is put into their Hands; (as I shall shew more fully by and by.) If therefore there were any Force in this Objection, we ought not to contend to have the Fortified Places of the *Netherlands* secured by strong Garisons, but should insist on their being dismantled and laid open; since whatever Objection lies against the *Dutch*, will hold rather stronger against the Garisons of any other Nation. But if (as I shall prove in its Place) it will be the Interest of the *States* more than ever, to avoid giving us the least Umbrage or Distaste, after once the Barrier is committed to their Defence; then we have as strong Assurance as the Nature of the Thing will admit, that the Fortified Places of the Barrier will be rather less likely to be made use of to the Prejudice of our *Trade* by *Them*, than they would be by *any Other* Friend or Ally of *Britain* whatsoever, into whose Hands they could be put.

Concerning the Representation of the English *Merchants at* Bruges.

But before I dismiss this Head, it will be proper to take notice of a certain Representation of the *English* Merchants at *Bruges*, which has been lately printed and dispersed; and which is said, in the Preface of the Libel to which it is annexed, *to signify the Inconveniencies which those Merchants already felt, and further apprehended from this* Barrier-Treaty. And in the Title it is again called, *The Representation of the* English *Merchants at* Bruges, *relating to the* Barrier-Treaty. Yet by the Substance of it, it appears plainly to have been drawn up only as *an*

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Information in general, what Conditions of Trade to France and the *Netherlands*, were proper to be insisted on at the Treaty of Peace. The Date of it, is *for some Reason or other* suppressed: However it is certain, that it was made at a time when only the *Name* of the *Barrier-Treaty* had been heard of in *Flanders*, but the *Nature and Conditions of it* were not at all understood. For instead of containing any real Complaint against the Treaty, it shews that they had been led into false Fears, by being misinformed as to the Substance of it; and that they desired nothing more of Her Majesty for the Security of their Trade, than what was ready stipulated to their Hands in the *Barrier-Treaty*, tho' they were not at that time acquainted with it. That the Reader may the better judge of the Truth of what I affirm, I shall insert the whole Representation as it stands Printed at the End of the *Remarks on the Barrier-Treaty*.

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The Representation *of the* English *Merchants at* Bruges *relating to the* Barrier-Treaty.

David White, *and other Merchants, Her Majesty's Subjects residing at* Bruges *and other Towns in* Flanders, *crave Leave humbly to represent,*

THAT whereas the Cities of Lisle, Tournay, Menin, Douay, *and other new Conquests in* Flanders *and* Artois, *taken from the* French *this War by the united Forces of Her Majesty and Her Allies, are now become ENTIRELY* under the Government of the States-General; *and that we Her Majesty's Subjects may be made liable to such* Duties and Impositions on Trade, *as the said* States-General *shall think fit to* Impose *on us: We humbly hope and conceive, That it is Her Majesty's Intention and Design that the Trade of Her Dominions and Subjects, which is carried on with these new Conquests, may be on* an equal Foot *with that of the Subjects and Dominions of the States-General, and not be liable to any new Duty, when transported from the* Spanish Netherlands *to the said new Conquests; as, to our great Surprize, is exacted from us on the following Goods,* viz. *Butter, Tallow, Salmon, Hides, Beef, and all other Product of Her Majesty's Dominions, which we import at* Ostend, *and there pay the Duty of Entry to the King of* Spain, *and consequently ought not to be liable to any new Duty, when they carry the same Goods, and all others from their Dominions, by a Free Pass or* Transire, *to the said new Conquests: And we are under Apprehension that if the said new*

Conquests

Conquests be settled or given ENTIRELY into the Possession of the States-General for their Barrier, (as we are made believe *by a Treaty lately made by Her Majesty's Ambassador, the Lord Viscount* Townshend, *at the* Hague,) *that the said States-General may also soon* declare all Goods and Merchandises which are Contraband in their Provinces, to be also Contraband or Prohibited in these New Conquests, or new Barrier; *by which Her Majesty's Subjects will be deprived of the Sale and Consumption of the following Products of Her Majesty's Dominions, which are, and have long been, declared Contraband in the* United Provinces; *such as* English *and* Scotch *Salt, Malt-Spirits or Corn-Brandy, and all other Sorts of Distilled* English *Spirits, Whale and Rape Oyl,* &c. *It is therefore* humbly conceived, *that Her Majesty, out of Her great Care and gracious Concern for the Benefit of Her Subjects and Dominions, may be pleased to direct, by a Treaty of Commerce or some other way, that their Trade may be put* on an equal Foot *in all the* Spanish Netherlands, *and the new Conquests or Barrier,* with the Subjects of *Holland, by paying no other Duty than that of Importation to the King of* Spain; *and by a Provision, that no Product of Her Majesty's Dominions shall ever be declared Contraband in these new Conquests, except such Goods as were esteemed Contraband before the Death of* Charles II. *King of* Spain. *And it is also humbly prayed, That the Product and Manufacture of the New Conquests may also be Exported without paying any new Duty, besides that of Exportation at* Ostend, *which was always paid to the King of* Spain; *it being impossible for any Nation in* Europe *to Assort an entire Cargo for the* Spanish West-Indies, *without a considerable Quantity of several of the Manufactures of* Lisle, *such as Caradoros, Cajant, Picoses, Boratten, and many other Goods,* &c.

The

The chief Things to be demanded of France *are; to be exempted from Tonnage; to have a Liberty of Importing Herrings and all other Fish to* France, *on the same Terms as the* Dutch *do, and as was agreed by them at the Treaty of Commerce immediately after the Treaty of Peace at* Ryswick. *The enlarging Her Majesty's Plantations in* America, *&c. is naturally recommended.*

That this Representation, instead of condemning the Barrier-Treaty, it really a Petition in its behalf.

Now if the Reader will reflect on what has been quoted above, out of the 9th and 15th Articles of the Treaty; by the first of which, the *States* are excluded from any share in the Civil Government, and consequently from all Power of *imposing Duties* of any kind; and by the latter, are obliged to preserve the Trade of both Nations *on an equal Foot*: and if he will call to Mind the Declaration lately made by the *States* themselves on this Subject, in their Letter to Her Majesty; I can't but suppose that he will acknowledge this Representation to proceed on a *Mistake of the Terms of the Barrier-Treaty*; and to be so far from condemning it, that it is in reality a *Petition in its behalf.* For by it the *English* Merchants in *Flanders* apply to Her Majesty, not to have the Barrier taken out of the Hands of the *Dutch*, (for That, they know, would be in effect Restoring it to the *French*; and, instead of Easing their Commerce, would end in the total Ruin of it;) but they only desire to have their Trade secured in such a manner, and put upon such a Foot, as is actually provided by the Barrier-Treaty.

The Complaint of the Merchants, about the exacting Duties of Import and Export, consider'd.

They complain indeed, that Duties of Import and Export had been exacted of Her Majesties Subjects in some of the Barrier-Towns, over and above the Royal Duties paid at *Ostend*; which the Merchants plainly attribute to those Towns being become *Entirely under the Government of the* States General. But when, and in what manner those Places became *entirely* under the Possession of the *States-General*, and upon what Considerations it was found necessary to leave them so during the War, has been examined * above. And it cannot any ways be pretended, that *this Treaty* was the *Cause* of those Hardships; since it is contrived in the strongest Terms possible, to secure Her Majesties Subjects from any sort of Inequality or Oppression. If therefore the *States had* at any time put us under the unjustifiable Hardships complain'd of in this Representation, and had *persisted* in so doing; it is not to be doubted, but that we should have heard of fresher and stronger, as well as more Authentick Complaints on so important a Subject. The reiterated Representations of the Merchants in *Flanders*, with Her Majesties repeated Instances to have this Grievance removed, and the *States* positive Refusal to comply, would hardly have failed to be produced at a time when Complaints of any kind against the *Dutch* are so carefully sought and so greedily received. The *States* themselves would have had more regard to common Honesty and Truth, than to have endeavoured to impose on Her Majesty by the Publick and Voluntary Declaration above-cited, when their Practice in the *Netherlands* might

* See above P. 99.

might so soon have been brought in Evidence against the Truth of their Letter.

The Distinction made by some, between the newly conquer'd Barrier-Towns *and the* Spanish Netherlands, *proved to be groundless.*

Some indeed, out of the abundance of their good Will to this Treaty, have been at the pains to coin a Distinction, which, if founded in Truth, would warrant any Hardship of this kind that the *States* should think fit to impose on Her Majesties Subjects. The Towns and Places of the Barrier, that were not in the Possession of the late King of *Spain* at the time of his Death, but have been conquered from *France* in the present War, constitute (if we will believe these Gentlemen) a distinct Country from the *Spanish Netherlands*: and consequently, any Equality of Trade stipulated within the latter, cannot, they say, be construed to extend to the former. There ought therefore, according to Them, to have been a particular Regulation made in this Treaty, for our Trade that passes through the *Spanish Netherlands* to these new conquered Towns. But I shall shew, that there is not the least ground for any such Distinction, neither in this Treaty, nor in any other, where the *Spanish Netherlands* and the *Barrier* have yet been named; all the Towns, Places, and Forts, intended for the Barrier, whether in the Possession of the late King of *Spain* at the time of his Death, or conquer'd from *France* since, being comprehended under the general and ancient Appellation of the *Spanish Netherlands*. In the Fifth Article of the *Grand-Alliance* it is said, that the Allies shall use their utmost Endeavours to recover and conquer the *Spanish Netherlands* for a *Barrier* to the *States*. In the 22d Article of the *Preliminary-Treaty*, where the Towns are specify'd that were to

be yielded by *France*, and were not in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of the late King *Charles*, it is said, "That "*those Towns are to serve*, with *the rest of the* "*Spanish Netherlands*, for a Barrier to the *States*, "*upon which they may agree with the said King* "Charles, as well with regard to the Garisons which the said Lords the *States-General* "shall maintain *therein*, as to all other things "*in the Spanish Netherlands*." By which it is manifest, that those Towns were look'd upon as a Part of the *Spanish Netherlands*, to which they did all originally belong, and are all to be re-united at the Peace. And as for the *Barrier-Treaty*, the whole Style and Tenor of it will still make this more plain. In the Sixth Article, all the Towns and Forts where the *States* are to have Garisons, as well those that were not, as those that were in the Hands of the late King of *Spain* at the time of his Death, are put upon the same Foot, and named promiscuously without any sort *of Difference or Distinction*. And in the Ninth Article, which expresses what Power is left to *Them*, and what is reserved to King *Charles*, in all the Places recited in the Sixth, the *States* have only the Military Command; all Ecclesiastical and Civil Power being equally reserved to him in those Towns that were not in the Possession of the late King of *Spain*, and in those that were. And tho' by the Eleventh Article, the Revenues of that Part of the Barrier, which the Crown of *Spain* was not possessed of at the Death of the late King, are to be left to the *States* towards the Maintenance of their Barrier; yet the *States* have no Power

conveyed

conveyed to them by this Article, but that of receiving the Revenues for the Uses therein mentioned; no other Part of the Sovereignty in Civil or Ecclesiastical Affairs, reserved to King *Charles* by the Ninth Article, being transferr'd to them by this. In the Twelfth Article it is stipulated, that no Town of *the Spanish Netherlands* shall ever devolve to the Crown of *France*; where the Words *Spanish Netherlands* plainly denote the whole Barrier. For no one can be so absurd as to imagine, that the *States* intended to limit this Provision to those Towns only, that were in the Hands of the late King of *Spain* at the time of his Death, while they left the far stronger Part of their Barrier capable of being re-united to the Crown of *France*. But there is the less Reason to enlarge on these Particulars, since the Distinction I am arguing against is manifestly contrary to the very Foundation of this Treaty; which is no more than this, that the whole *Spanish Netherlands*, together with the rest of that Monarchy, being to be restored to King *Charles* the IIId at a Peace; and the *States* having by their Treaties, a Right to a sufficient Barrier in the said *Netherlands*, and to have the Defence of it put into their own Hands; the Queen agrees and settles with them in this Treaty, the Conditions and Regulations under which they are to have the said Barrier; promising at the same time to use her good Offices with King *Charles*, that all the Terms specify'd in this Treaty may be inserted in the Convention to be made for that Purpose between King *Charles* and the *States*.

And consequently the Inference *built on that Distinction*; viz. *that sufficient Care has not been taken to preserve the Equality of Trade throughout the whole Barrier.*

If therefore it be evident from the Style and Tenor of all these Treaties, that there is no ground for this Distinction between the *Barrier-Towns* and the Towns of the *Spanish Netherlands*; there is neither Sense nor Justice in affirming, that sufficient Care has not been taken to preserve the Equality of Trade throughout the *whole Barrier*; when it is as plain as Words can make it, that Care has been taken to preserve it throughout *the Netherlands*, under which I have demonstrated that the *whole Barrier* is included.

Notwithstanding these Objections therefore, it is incontestably proved, that the *Dutch* cannot by Virtue of their Barrier attempt any thing to the *Prejudice of our Trade*, without a direct *Violation of the Treaty*, and an *open Rupture* with us. But that this will never be the Case, we have the strongest Moral Assurance; as I shall shew in the *next* Place, by proving,

2. That when once *the Barrier* is put into their Hands, *our Friendship* will become so *absolutely necessary* to them, that it will be *more their Interest than ever*, to *avoid* coming to *a Rupture* with us.

That when the Barrier is once put into the Hands of the States, *it will be more their Interest than ever, to avoid breaking with Us.*

Whoever will look back on the past Conduct of the *States*, will find that they have always courted our Friendship, and esteemed it as their greatest Security. "The very Frame "and Constitution of their Government, *as Sir* William Temple *observes*, is made for Rest, "and not for Motion. Their first Interest is "to

"to continue the Peace, while it may be done "with Safety; and when that fails, the next "is to open a War in Favour of *Spain*, and in "Conjunction with *Us*; and the greatest they "have in the World, is to preserve and in-"crease their *Alliance* with *Us*." Accordingly they have never been the Aggressors in any War particularly with *England*. Our Quarrels with them in 1665, and 1672, were grounded on the private Complaints of Merchants, and the Punctilio of the Flag; which Disputes might easily have been compromised, had we not been instigated, or rather bought by the Common Enemy to break with them upon any Terms, that he might have the Advantage of wearing out the Two Naval Powers against one another, and establishing himself on the Ruins of Both. The Eagerness they expressed in joyning with *England* in the *Triple Alliance*, drew upon them the whole Weight of the *French* Arms, and was very near ending in the utter Extirpation of their Republick: And their whole Behaviour ever since the Revolution, shews it to be a standing Maxim of their Government, never to abandon the Friendship and Interest of *England*, unless *England* first abandons its own; unless our Friendship cannot be had but upon such Terms, as would expose them to the Ruin it was designed to prevent. This has been the constant and uninterrupted Sense of *Holland*, from the first Foundation of their State: And I shall shew, that their having *a Barrier pursuant to this Treaty*, will make it *more* their Interest than ever, to adhere to *England*, and to rely upon our Support.

Because by their undertaking the Defence of the Netherlands, *the Resentment of the Crown of* France *will be entailed on them for ever.*

The Kings of *France*, if we may judge of their future Conduct by the whole Tenor of their past Behaviour, will never lay aside their ancient and hereditary Project of Uniting the *Netherlands* to their Dominions; The Reasons that have induced them steddily to pursue this End, being such as from the Nature of them must always subsist: From whence it necessarily follows, that they must be constant Enemies to those who have openly taken upon them the Protection and Defence of those Countries. In former Times, by the Favour of certain Conjunctures, the King of *France* has found Opportunities to make the *Dutch* believe, that their Interests were in some Measure reconcilable with his; but now all Possibility of a lasting Friendship and Confidence between the Two Nations, is entirely cut off. The first Step that he sets in *Flanders*, must engage them in a Rupture with him; His first Attack must be upon Them, and he cannot invade but through Their Sides. Now if this be the Case; if *Holland*, by undertaking the Defence of the Barrier, has entred the Lists against *France*, and entailed on it self the Enmity and Resentment of that Crown for ever; the Match is so very unequal, that no one can doubt but the *States* will stand in more need than ever, of the Friendship and Assistance of some Neighbouring Power. The Art of Sieges is brought to that Perfection, that the strongest Towns must fall of Course, without an Army in the Field to relieve them; and no one can imagine that the *States* will be able to furnish That Army, without the Assistance of *England*; Of which they have had sufficient Proof throughout the whole Course of this War, and too *fatal* an Instance

ſance *this laſt Campaign.* For as *England* has been the only Power in the Alliance, beſides themſelves, that has ſent any Number of Troops purely at its own Charge, for the Recovery and Defence of thoſe Countries; So we ſee, upon the withdrawing thoſe Troops, how little the joint Forces of the reſt of the Allies have been able to cover the Frontier-Towns, and to make Head againſt *France*. The committing therefore the Defence of the Barrier to the *States*, will indeed be a good Security to them againſt any *ſudden Invaſion* from *France*; but muſt at the ſame time, (if they intend to preſerve it,) make them *more dependent* with Relation to their *Friends*, and more cautious and obſervant towards thoſe by whoſe Aſſiſtance alone they can hope to *hold* it. But what a Value the *States* ſet upon our Friendſhip and Support, and how inſignificant they think the ſtrongeſt Barrier without it; can no ways better appear, than from that Steddineſs they ſhew'd in Rejecting the Specious Propoſals of *France*, made to them at the Time of the late Preliminary Treaty in 1709; by which the *French* King offer'd to give them the *Whole Netherlands* for their *Barrier*, with the *Entire Sovereignty* of them, and all the Advantages of *Trade* to the *Spaniſh* Dominions that they could deſire, if they would but enter into Separate Meaſures with him. The Intereſt therefore of *Holland*, as it has obliged them *formerly*, ſo it will *now* oblige them *more than ever*, to cultivate a ſtrict and inviolable Friendſhip with *England*, without which they cannot hope to preſerve the Barrier they have been ſo earneſtly contending for; and which has coſt *them* as well as *us*, ſo much Blood and Treaſure.

3. But

3. But because Nations are not always true to their Interest, I shall shew in the *last* Place, *that supposing they should be so imprudent as to come to a Rupture with* England, *their Barrier would be so far from contributing to make them more Rich or Formidable, that it would rather Exhaust and Weaken them with Respect to* England.

That, supposing the States *should be so imprudent as to break with* England, *their Barrier would be so far from making them more Rich or Formidable, that it would rather Exhaust and Weaken them with Respect to* England.

The Notion that has been conceived amongst Us, of the Largeness of the *Revenues* allotted them towards the Maintenance of their Barrier, is so very wide of the Truth; that I am sensible what strong Prejudices I must encounter in endeavouring to prove, that they are far short of what must necessarily be expended on the Garisons and Fortifications; and consequently that the Barrier, far from making them *Richer*, will bring a *constant Burthen and Expence* upon them. But I hope to make this appear so very clearly, that no one shall have the least Reason to apprehend that any Surplusage of these *Revenues* may be applied to the Improvement of their *Trade*, or the Increasing of their *Naval Strength*, which are the only Two Points in which it is pretended they can become Formidable to *Great Britain*.

Because the whole Revenue of the Spanish Netherlands *was never been sufficient, since the* Pyrenean *Treaty, to keep them in a tolerable Posture of Defence: And therefore much less can that Portion assigned the* States *by the Treaty, be sufficient.*

It is well known that the *whole Revenue* of the *Spanish Netherlands* ever since the *Pyrenean* Treaty, has *not been sufficient to keep them in a tolerable Posture of Defence*; that the maintaining these Provinces against the Incursions of *France*, has been such a constant *Charge* to the Crown of *Spain*, that the *Spani-*

Spaniards have often had it under Deliberation to exchange them for other Provinces nearer the Body of their Monarchy. Sir *William Temple* (as has been before observed) in several Places of his Letters expresses his Apprehension of their coming to some such Agreement with *France*, seeing such continual Wars entailed upon them: And in other Places he tells us, That while *France* continues so great Forces and Designs on Foot; tho' the Peace holds, *the Preservation of* Flanders *will cost* Spain 200,000 *Pounds a Year, besides the Revenues of the Country*; That upon the breaking out of the War in 1667, *Spain* remitted to *Flanders* about 400,000 Crowns in less than Two Months, and had Negotiated at *Amsterdam* for 900,000 more: And it is certain, that in a Treaty between *Spain* and *Holland* for preserving the Peace of *Nimeguen*, the *Spaniards* obliged themselves to remit constantly to *Flanders* 100,000 Crowns a Month; which were also paid with the greatest Exactness, as appears by the Count *de Fuensalida*'s Speech to the Deputies of the States, *March* the 12th 1681; in which he likewise insinuates, That his Master's Constancy in succouring and maintaining the *Low-Countries*, might possibly exhaust all his Treasures to no purpose, if the *States* did not contribute to their Preservation, as being the most interested in it. And the Reader may remember, that the Court of *Spain* used much the same Language to King *Charles* II. upon the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Nimeguen*; declaring that "except *England* and *Holland* "Both, contributed towards the Charge of "maintaining *Flanders* even after the Peace, *they* "*should not be in a Condition of supporting it alone*.

"and

"and must fall into other Measures. And several other ways it might be made to appear, that *Spain* has been obliged to furnish large Sums out of its own Coffers for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*; even larger, than *all the Revenues* assigned the *States* for that purpose amount to. But if the *whole Income* of that Country, with such large Additions out of the *Spanish* Treasures, was never sufficient since the *Pyrenean* Treaty, to maintain and defend the Barrier; it may reasonably be concluded, that *Part* of them only, and That so *Moderate* a one as is allotted the *States* by this Treaty, cannot be any ways proportionable to the Expence.

A Computation of the Particulars of the Revenue, and the Expence.

If we descend to *Particulars*, this Matter will be still more plain. The Town and Chatellenie of *Lisle* with the Bayliwick of *Douay*, the Town of *Orchies* and its other Dependencies, is unquestionably the richest and largest Conquest of any of those whose *Revenues* are appropriated towards the Maintenance of the Barrier. The King of *France* must also be allowed to be no unskilful Manager of *Revenues*. Yet all that he could draw from this Wealthy Precinct in time of Peace, amounted to no more than 3, or at the most 400,000 Livres a Year; whether under the Name of Aids, Domains, Fortifications, or other ordinary Imposts; excepting only the Duties of Import and Export, of which tho' an Exact Estimate cannot be made because they were included in the general Farm of the conquer'd Countries, yet they cannot be rated at more than one Third of the other Revenues; which being added to the Sum already mentioned, makes the whole Annual Product of that Chatellenie about 533,000 Livres *Flemish* Money; which is 12 *per Cent.* less

less in Value than that of *Holland*. So that the Whole, reduced into *English* Money, amounts to 42,640 Pounds, at Eleven *Dutch* Guilders to the Pound *Sterling*. Now whoever will look into the Yearly Estimates of the House of Commons, will find by a middle Computation, that the Annual Charge of every Thousand Men, whether in Field or Garison, is laid at above *Twenty Thousand Pounds*, exclusive of Transports, Ordnance, Hospitals, and other Contingencies. So that this rich Chatellenie, may be able to maintain in time of Peace a Body of 2000 Men; which is scarce one Third of what is necessary for the Garison of *Lisle* alone; over and above which, there still remain to be provided for, the Garison of *Douay*, and the Magazines and Fortifications of Both those Places. But if the *most considerable* Chatellenie of any in the Barrier, is able to raise no larger a Sum towards defraying the Charges of its Defence; I may be allowed to infer, that the *lesser* Towns and Chatellenies will prove deficient in Proportion. And when we add to these, the several Towns of the Barrier, whose Revenues are reserved to King *Charles* the IIId, and the whole Expence of which must therefore fall on the *States*; sure no one can imagine that the additional Allowance of 100,000 Pistoles a Year, is any ways answerable to the great *Charges* the *States* must be at for covering such a wide Frontier, for maintaining such numerous Garisons, for repairing and keeping so many Fortifications, ruined or damaged in the Course of a long War.

So

The States *must add a considerable Sum out of their own Revenues, towards maintaining the Barrier.*

So that there is very good Reason to conclude, that the Barrier, instead of increasing their *Riches*, will constantly require a considerable *Sum out of their own Revenue* towards its Maintenance; and, by employing their Men and Money, will leave them less at Liberty than they were before, to disturb their Neighbours, supposing they could ever so far forget their own Interest as to have a Mind to it. Their *Fleet* particularly, which has been the principal Bulwark of their Defence in all their Wars with *England*, (for we were never so mad as to think of attacking them through *Flanders*,) will receive no Addition from the Barrier; but rather be worse Mann'd and Equipped, when so many Hands and such large Sums are diverted to the Defence of the *Netherlands*, from whence they cannot be withdrawn without the Loss of the Barrier and the utmost Danger to *Holland* it self.

Thus I have made good my 5th and last Proposition, which was, *That the* States *having a Barrier pursuant to their Right acquired by former Treaties, and conformable to the Regulations of the present Treaty, is far from exposing Us to any Sort of Danger from Them.* But perhaps there was the less Occasion for me to have spent so much Time in proving this Proposition; since those who have expressed the greatest Apprehensions of this kind, and have been the forwardest in condemning the present Treaty, have however not so much as once insisted, that the Defence of the *Netherlands* should be put into *other* Hands; but on the contrary have made it a Part of their Boast and Glory, that by the present Scheme for Peace, the *States* are to have the very same Barrier as was demanded of *France* in

in 1709, excepting 2 or 3 Places only: And sure it will not be pretended, that the Safety of *Great-Britain*, or the Preservation of our *Trade*, is better consulted by the *Exception* of those 2 or 3 Places; since, though taken from the *Dutch*, they are to be put into the Hands of *France*.

The great Objection, founded on the 15th Article of the Treaty; that it is highly prejudicial to the Commerce of Great-Britain, *to submit our Trade in the* Spanish *Dominions, to an Equality with that of* Holland.

But, granting that the Barrier exposes us to no Sort of Danger from the *Dutch*, there still remains one Objection to be answered, which has been managed with the greatest Industry by the Enemies of this Treaty; and has furnished them with the most Popular Topicks of Clamour and Invective against it; which is, that the very Terms of the Treaty it self, are *highly prejudicial to the COMMERCE of* Great-Britain. This Objection is founded on the 15th Article, by which the Subjects of *England* and *Holland* are put upon an *equal Foot* in Point of *Trade* to all the *Spanish* Dominions. Against which it is objected, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to this *Equality*; but that the *British* Subjects were both *by their Treaties*, and by *constant Custom*, *distinguished* in their Trade to the *Spanish* Dominions, from *Holland* and all other Nations; till by this 15th Article, *Her Majesty* was made a *Party* to those Clauses in the Treaty of *Munster* that are most beneficial to the *Dutch*, and even a *Guarantee* to the *States* for *Privileges against Her own Subjects*. This is indeed a very heavy Charge; and therefore it was reasonable to expect it should have been well supported, and clearly proved: But on the contrary I am firmly persuaded, that upon a full and impartial Examina-

amination, there will not appear to be the least ground for any one of the Particulars whereof it consists. In order to set this Matter in a clear Light, I shall consider,

The Answer. 1. The Foot upon which the Trade between *Holland* and the *Spanish Dominions*, and that between *England* and the *same Dominions*, stood *by virtue of their respective TREATIES* with the Crown of *Spain*, from the time that the *States* were first acknowledged a free Republick by that Crown, to the breaking out of the present War. And I shall make it appear, that the Trade of each Nation has all along stood upon an *equal* Foot *by Virtue of those Treaties*; and that the one as well as the other, had a Right of being treated as favourably as the Nations the most favoured by *Spain*.

2. I shall prove, that the Subjects of *Great-Britain* have not *in FACT* been any ways distinguished in their Commerce with *Spain*, nor *by any Custom or Prescription* enjoyed greater Privileges of Trade than the *Dutch*.

3. I shall make it appear, that our Princes have been so far from not submitting to the Advantages granted the *Dutch* in the mention'd Articles of the Treaty of *Munster*, that the *Crown of England* actually *first procured* them for *the States*, and by an express Treaty became *Guarantee* for their Performance; and that Her Majesty is under no Engagement by this Article, but such as She had *previously* taken upon Her by the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*.

1. I

1. I am to consider the Foot upon which the Trade of each Nation stood *by Virtue of its Treaties with Spain*, to the breaking out of the present War; and to shew that Both had a Right of being treated *Equally*, and as favourably as the Nations the most favoured. To begin with *Holland:* The first formal Treaty, in which the United Provinces were acknowledged a Free and Independent State by *Spain*, was that of the 12 *Years Truce*, concluded at *Antwerp* the 9th of *April* 1609, between *Philip* the IIId of *Spain*, the Arch-Duke *Albert*, and the Arch-Dutchess *Isabella* (to whom the *Netherlands* were at that time made over,) on the one Part; and the *States-General* of the *United Provinces* on the other. In which, among other Regulations for the Advantage of their Trade, it is stipulated (*Art.* 4th.) "That the Subjects of the *States* shall be permitted to trade in Safety to all the Dominions of the King of *Spain* and the Arch-Duke and Dutchess, situate *in Europe*, where the Subjects *of any other Kings or Princes* the Friends or Allies of *Spain* are permitted to traffick, and to the Dominions of any Princes and States *out of Europe* that would suffer them, without any Molestation from the King of *Spain* or his Officers, to them, or to the Princes, States, or private Persons that should traffick with them." Which last Clause was purposely contrived to take in the Trade to the *Indies*, and was declared by the *Spanish* Ministers to be more than had at that time ever been granted to the Crown of *England* in its Treaties with *Spain*: See *Jeannin's*

That the Trade of England *and* Holland *to the* Spanish *Dominions, has always, by virtue of their respective Treaties with the Crown of* Spain, *stood upon an equal Foot.*

By the 12 Years Truce.

nin's Negot. Tom. 2. *p.* 394. In *Article* 6th it is stipulated, "That the Subjects and Inhabi-
" tants of the Dominions of the King of *Spain*,
" of the Arch-Duke and Dutchess, and the
" *States*, trading into one anothers Countries,
" shall not be obliged to pay greater Duties
" and Imposts, than the Subjects of the Coun-
" try, *and such of their Friends and Allies as shall*
" *be the least charged.* And *Art.* the 7th, "That
" the Subjects and Inhabitants of the Domi-
" nions of the said *States*, shall have the *same*
" *Security and Liberty* in the Dominions of the
" King of *Spain*, the Arch-Duke and Dutchess,
" *as were granted to the Subjects of the King of*
" *Great Britain* by the last Treaty of Peace
" and Secret Articles made with the Constable
" of *Castile*.

So that by this Treaty, the *States* had a Right to be treated in all the *Spanish* Dominions as favourably as *Great Britain* or the Nations the most favoured.

By the Treaty of Munster.

The next Treaty that they made with *Spain*, was That of *Munster*, concluded between *Philip* the IVth and the *United Provinces*, *January* the 30th 1648: Which, as to the Terms of it, is really little more than a Renewal of the *Treaty of Truce*; as will appear to any one that will take the Pains to compare them together: For by it their Trade is continued on the same Foot upon which it was put by the above-mentioned *Treaty of Truce*, some Particulars only being more fully explained. The most Material *Articles* in this Treaty relating to *Commerce*, are the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th.

By the 14th it is agreed, That the River *Schelde* and the Canals of *Sas*, *Swyn*, and other Mouths

Mouths of the Sea adjoining, shall be kept shut on the side of the *States*: Which is no more, than what was left to them by the 9th *Art.* of the *Treaty of Truce*; as appears by comparing That Article, with the Difficulties and Objections made against it by the Arch-Duke's Ministers, recited in *Feannin*'s Summary Narrative of the Negotiation, *Tom.* 1. *p.* 9. *The Arch-Duke and Dutchess insisted, that the Commerce of the River* (Schelde) *should be wholly free and open, without obliging the Merchants and Vessels arriving in* Zeeland *to unlade there and to change their Shipping, as the Province of* Zeeland *earnestly required they should; with a Resolution not to depart from this Demand*, &c. And Tom. 2. p. 397. *They* (the *Spanish* Ambassadors) *afterwards made mention of the Article relating to the Home-Trade*, (viz. *Art.* 9th;) *and would have persuaded us* (the Ministers of *England* and *France*,) *that it was by no means reasonable, nor what they could ever consent to, that the* Zeelanders *should continue in their Province* those High Imposts and the same Rule of levying Duties, *which they had practised in the War and during the Cessation of Arms*, in which all the Neighbouring Princes were interested as well as they; *and that, if it was resolved to continue these Exactions, they should find Means of revenging themselves; which would hurt the* Zeelanders *full as much, as the* Zeelanders *studied to hurt Them. But* we having insisted, *that no Alteration should be made in this Article; and that, the Truce being once concluded, they might confer amicably on this Head, and settle it to mutual Satisfaction; they readily answered us, That the Article, as it is at present, being left to the Discretion of the* States, they would remit nothing of it afterwards, *seeing the Treaty would remain*

in Force whether they did or no. However, notwithstanding their Arguments, the Article was let to stand; they promising themselves that it would be found necessary on each side, for the mutual Convenience of Trade, *to make some Alterations therein.*

By the *fifteenth Article* of the said Treaty of *Munster*, the Merchandizes going in and out of the Harbours of *Flanders*, are to be charged with the same Duties, as the Merchandizes going and coming along the *Schelde* and the Canals on the Side of the *States*. This is no more than an Explanation of the 6th *Art.* of the *Treaty of Truce*: For the Subjects and Inhabitants of the United Provinces being by that Article to pay no greater Duties in the Dominions of the Arch-Duke and Dutchess, than such of their Friends and Allies as should be the least charged; this Article takes Care that the *Schelde* and Canals on that Side, which are the Passages through which the *Dutch Trade* passes into the *Netherlands*, shall not be charged with greater Duties and Imposts, than the Harbours in *Flanders* through which the Trade of other Nations passed into the said *Netherlands*.

By the *sixteenth Article*, the *States* are allowed to enjoy the same Privileges and Freedom of Trade to the *Spanish* Dominions, as had been or should be granted to the *Hans-Towns*, who were at that time the People most favoured by *Spain*. This also is a Consequence of the Sixth and Seventh *Articles* of the *Treaty of Truce*.

The

The 17th *Article* of the Treaty of *Munster* repeats the Seventh of *the Truce*; by which the same Liberty and Security in the *Spanish* Dominions is granted to the *Dutch*, as the *English* obtained by the Treaty and secret Articles made with the Constable of *Castile*.

By other subsequent Treaties.

So that the Treaty of *Munster* did really give the *Dutch* no Advantages with respect to the *Spanish* Trade, but what were expressed in, or fairly deducible from the *Treaty of Truce*: Which the Reader is desired to remember, for an Use that will be made of it by and by. Pursuant to these Regulations, their *subsequent Treaties* in 1650, 1673, and 1676, refer to and confirm the *Privileges of Commerce* they had acquired by the forementioned Stipulations: And upon this Foot, *Their* Trade stood at the beginning of the present War.

And by K. James the Ist's Treaty with the Constable of Castile, and one made by K. Charles the IId, in 1667.

As for the Rights and Benefits of Trade, which *the Subjects of Great-Britain* have acquired *by vertue of Their Treaties* with the Crown of *Spain*, they are chiefly founded upon the above-mentioned Treaty made by K. *James* the Ist, with the Constable of *Castile*, and one made by K. *Charles* the IId, *May* the 13th, 1667. And by what has been already said, it is plain they cannot be greater than those stipulated to the *Dutch* by their Treaties with the same Crown. But for a further Proof of the Equality of both; it is to be observed, that as on the one Hand, the Privileges granted to *Great-Britain* and the *Hans-Towns*, have been made the general Standard of the Advantages granted to the *States*; so on the other Hand, the Privileges

granted to the *States* and the *Hanſ-Towns*, have been made the general Standard of the Advantages ſtipulated for the Subjects of *Great-Britain*: as appears by the laſt mentioned Treaty between the Two Crowns, concluded at *Madrid* the 23d of *May*, 1667. in which it is ſtipulated, (*Article* 8.) that, "As for what "may concern both the *Indies*, and any other "Part whatſoever, the Crown of *Spain* doth "grant to the Subjects of *Great-Britain*, all that "is granted to the *United Provinces* of the *Low-*"*Countries* in their Treaty of *Munſter* 1648, "Point for Point, in as full and ample Man-"ner, as if the ſame were herein particularly "inſerted; the ſame Rules being to be ob-"ſerved, whereunto the Subjects of the ſaid "*United Provinces* are obliged. And by the "38th *Article* of the ſame Treaty it is agreed "and concluded, that the Subjects of the K. "of *Great-Britain*, and the K. of *Spain*, ſhall "have and enjoy in the reſpective Lands, "Seas, *&c.* of one and the other, and in all "Places whatſoever, *the ſame Privileges* and "Securities, whether they concern their *Per-*"*ſons* or *Trade*, with all the beneficial Clauſes "and Circumſtances, which have been gran-"ted by either of the ſaid Kings to the moſt "*Chriſtian King*, the *States-General*, the *Hanſ-*"*Towns*, or any other Kingdom or State "whatſoever, in as full, ample, and beneficial "a manner, as if the ſame were particularly "mentioned and inſerted in the Treaty. And upon this Foot, *Our* Trade ſtood at the breaking out of the preſent War.

And

And we may observe by the bye, from what has been now quoted, that it is so far from being true, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to the advantageous Terms granted the *Hollanders* by the Treaty of *Munster*, that in this Treaty of 1667, it expresly stipulates for its own Subjects all the beneficial Clauses of the Treaty of *Munster* that were made in favour of the *Dutch*, and *the same Privileges and Securities* that were enjoyed by Them. But of this I shall bring much stronger Proof under my *Third* Head. In the mean time, I hope there is sufficient Reason to conclude, that Care has been constantly taken by *England* and *Holland* in their Treaties with *Spain* for above an Hundred Years, that the Subjects of each Nation should be treated, in their Trade to all the *Spanish* Dominions, *equally*; and one as well as the other, *as favourably as the People the most favoured.*

That the Trade of England *and* Holland *to the* Spanish *Dominions, has, in Fact, stood upon an equal Foot; and that there has been no Custom or Prescription to the contrary.*

2. Having thus proved, that *by virtue of our Treaties* we have no Right superior to the *Dutch*; I shall now shew that we have not, *in Fact*, been any ways distinguished in our *Commerce* with *Spain*, nor *by any Custom or Prescription* enjoyed greater Privileges of Trade than the *Dutch*. The Trade from *England* to *Spain* has been so very great and extensive, that there is hardly a considerable Merchant amongst us, that is not in some Degree acquainted with the Terms upon which we Traded to those Parts before the breaking out of the War. It might therefore reasonably have been expected, that so much

Caution would have been used, as not to assert Facts which must be own'd by every one, that has any Insight into that Trade, to be without the least Foundation. But because it cannot but be confessed, that *Great-Britain* has not *by vertue of any Treaty*, obtained more advantageous Terms of Trade to *Spain* than the *Hollanders*; it is immediately asserted, without producing one single Instance, that the *British* Subjects have, at least *by Custom and Prescription*, enjoyed greater Privileges of Trade, than the *Dutch*, or any other Nation. This Opinion has gone over the Kingdom, and taken possession with all the Advantages of the first-comer; but, upon Examination, its Title will be found as false and counterfeit as any of the former.

Both as to the Low-Countries;

For first, as to the *Low-Countries*, the *English* Merchants at *Bruges* and other Towns in *Flanders*, do not pretend, in their Representation, to any such *Custom or Practice* in their Favour; but only desire that Her Majesty, out of Her great Care and gracious Concern for the Benefit of Her Subjects, would be pleas'd to direct by a Treaty of Commerce, or some other way, that *their* Trade may be put upon *an Equal Foot in all the* Spanish Netherlands, *and in the New Conquests or Barrier, with the Subjects of* Holland.

And as to the rest of the Spanish *Dominions.*

And as to the *rest of the* Spanish *Dominions*, I challenge any Merchant that has ever liv'd or traded in *Spain*, to shew any known and allow'd *Practice*, *Custom or Usage*, by which Her Majesty's Subjects have been more favour'd in their Commerce to those Parts, than those of the *States*. To prove the contrary,

I shall

I shall take the Liberty to insert a Letter, on this Subject, communicated to me by a Friend; and written by Sir *William Hodges*; who by his long Residence in that Country, and by his great Experience in Commerce, has gained such universal Esteem and Reputation, for understanding perfectly well the *Spanish* Trade; and is known to be a Gentleman of such Honour and Integrity; that I make no doubt but what he says, relating to an Affair he is so much Master of, will carry with it an indisputable Authority, and have Weight enough clearly to decide this Question.

A Letter from Sir William Hodges, *on this Subject.*

Copy of a Letter from Sir *William Hodges*, to ——— ———, dated, *Winchester-street*, March 5, 17$^{11}_{12}$.

SIR,

NOT *being at Home when You did me the Favour to come to my House, nor well enough at present to wait upon You at your Lodgings, I write these Lines to acquaint you, that all the Time I liv'd in* Spain, *I never knew or heard of any Privilege, great or little, that the* English *had more than the* Dutch; *or of any Advantages granted by the Crown of* Spain *to the* English, Dutch *or* French, *but that the Ambassadors of the Others never left soliciting till they had got the same: And, if I don't mistake, every one of the above-mention'd Nations have an Article in their Treaties of Peace and Commerce, that whatever Privilege and Advantage one Nation hath, or at any time should be granted to it, the same should be granted to the others.*

And,

And as I believe it will appear, by comparing the Treaties of Peace and Commerce which England *and* Holland *have ever made with the Crown of* Spain, *that the Privileges were always the same to both Nations; so I never heard, nor do I think it can be made out by any known Practice, Custom or Usage, in our Trade to any Part of* Spain, *that* We *were allow'd greater Advantages than were given to the* Dutch.

As to the Customs *paid in* Spain, *especially in* Cadiz, Port St. Maries, Lucar *and* Seville; *the* Dutch *and* French, *and indeed all Nations have the Advantage of* Us; *as I think I have demonstrated in the Additional Articles, and other Papers humbly propos'd to be insisted on, whenever Her Majesty shall think fit to treat with the Crown of* Spain. *Not but that whenever the* English *import into* Spain *the Goods and Merchandises of* Holland *or* France, *they pay no more than if imported by the* Dutch *and* French; *and when these import any of the* English *Goods or Merchandises, they pay the same as if imported by the* English.

As to what you desire to know relating to the Judge-Conservator, *I must acquaint you, that the* English *and* Dutch *Nations have an* Equal *Privilege in any of their Factories, that will be at the Charge of a Salary to one that will engage to appear in Defence of their Articles of Peace and Privileges, against any Governor or other Minister of the King's, who may pretend to violate the same. But in* Cadiz, *the* English *never had a* Judge-Conservator *but once in all my Time, and the* Dutch *had the very same Person for theirs: But the Merchants of both Nations soon dismiss'd him, because the Governors of the Place were always greater Men than any that could be chosen for a* Judge-Conservator; *For which Reason,*

son, the English *and* Dutch *residing there, rather chose to put themselves under the Protection of the Governor, giving him the same Gratuity or more. than to the* Judge-Conservator. *If there be any thing wherein I may be serviceable, pray command,*

SIR,

Your most Humble Servant,

William Hodges.

P. S. *The* English *and* Dutch *which resided in* Seville, *had always a Judge of the* Audencia *or* Chancery *for their* Conservator, *and usually the same Person for both Nations. In* Malaga *they had usually one of the Judges of the* Chancery *of* Granada *for their* Judge-Conservator, *and deputed some Person of Note and Authority to act for him in ordinary Cases.*

Can any Evidence be stronger or fuller than this, for proving that the *Dutch* had in every Respect as great Advantages as the *English*, as well by *Custom and Practice*, as by their Treaties? Nay, does it not appear, that the *English* are so far from having been favour'd more than the *Hollanders*, or any other Nation whatsoever, that all other Nations had in some Particulars rather the Advantage of Them? And consequently, that this 15th *Article*, by which the *States* themselves are obliged to join in taking care that the Subjects of *Great Britain* shall be treated in all the *Spanish* Dominions *Equally* with their own, and as favourably as the People the most favour'd; lays a Foundation for our obtaining *better* Terms

of

of Commerce to *Spain*, than we ever yet have fully enjoy'd? From what has been said, it must therefore be acknowledged, that the *Dutch* at the breaking out of the present War, not only had by Virtue of their *Treaties* a Right to be treated as favourably as *Great-Britain*, or the Nations the most favour'd; but did also *in Fact* enjoy that Right, and traded to the *Spanish* Dominions upon that Foot; and that the *English* had not either by their *Treaties*, or by any *Usage and Custom*, greater Privileges and Immunities of Trade than the *Dutch*.

3. But because it is still objected, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to this Equality, till by the 15th Article of the Barrier-Treaty it was made a Party to those Clauses in the Treaty of *Munster*, which are most beneficial to the *Dutch*; I shall shew in the *Third* Place, That the *Crown of England* not only long ago *submitted* to the advantageous Terms there stipulated, but actually *first procured* them for the *States*, and by a particular Treaty became *Guarantee* for their Performance; and that Her Majesty is laid under no Obligation by this Article, but what She was *previously* engaged to by the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*.

That the Crown of England *has been so far from not submitting to that Equality, and the other Advantages granted the* Dutch *in the Treaty of* Munster; *that it actually first procured them for the* States, *and by a particular express Treaty became Guarantee for their Performance.*

The Treaty of the 12 *Years Truce* (concluded at *Antwerp*) was the first, as has been observed above, that did or could give the *States* the same Privileges and Immunities of Trade to the *Spanish* Dominions, as were granted to the Subjects of *Great-Britain*, or of any other Friend or Ally of the

the Crown of *Spain* that ſhould be the moſt favoured. From this Treaty (as I have already ſhewn) all the beneficial Clauſes relating to the Trade of the *Dutch*, were derived into the Treaty of *Munſter*; and particularly the *Equality* of Trade between *England* and *Holland*, was there ſtipulated in the very Words of the 7th Article of the *Treaty of Truce*. But the Project of the *Treaty of Truce*, and every individual Article in it, was drawn up, not by the *States* themſelves, but by Sir *Richard Spencer* and Sir *Ralph Winwood* on the part of King *James* the Firſt, in Conjunction with Meſſieurs *Jeannin* and *Ruſſy*, Ambaſſadors of *Henry* the Fourth of *France*, purſuant to their Inſtructions; and the ſame was communicated by them to their reſpective Maſters for their Approbation, before it was reported to the *States* in order to be ſigned; the ſaid Ambaſſadors of *England* and *France* having managed the whole Negotiation, without the Intervention of any Miniſter or Deputy on the part of the *States*, till all the Articles of the Treaty were ſettled and adjuſted; and with the greateſt Difficulty and moſt preſſing Sollicitations, they induced, or rather forced the Crown of *Spain* to grant the *States* the advantagious Terms ſtipulated throughout that Treaty: More eſpecially the beneficial Articles relating to Trade, as they met with greater Oppoſition from the Crown of *Spain* than any others; ſo they were more particularly laboured by the Ambaſſadors of *England* and *France*, and couched in the ſtrongeſt Terms poſſible for the Security of the *States*: And though the Treaty was ſeveral Times in danger of being broken off, yet the Mediators could never be brought to

See *Jeannin Tom.* 2. *p.* 399.

to depart from the least Demand they had made in Favour of the *Dutch* Commerce.

After * the Treaty was first concluded by the Ambassadors, and † again after it was signed by the *States*, the Kings of *England* and *France* ordered their Ambassadors to notify to the *States* their full Approbation of it: And not content with that, they Both entred into a *particular Treaty of Guaranty* (signed *June* 17th. 1609) for the Maintenance of it; with an express Declaration, that if the *States* were molested in their Trade to the *Indies*, (which Trade they could not get expresly mentioned,) the Treaty should be look'd upon to be as truly broken, and the same Succour sent the *States*, as if it were violated in all the other Articles of it. For the Truth of all which, I refer the Reader to *Jeannin's Negotiations, Vol. 2d. in* 12° 1659; and particularly to the *Summary Report* of the Negotiation made by the Ministers of *England* and *France* in the Assembly of the *States-General, March* 18th 1609, soon after the Treaty was concluded by the Ambassadors, and prepared for the Ratification of the *States*: Which *Report* is to be found *Tom.* 2. *p.* 391; and shews what extraordinary Care and Caution the Ambassadors used, that the *States* might enjoy the Privileges of Commerce to *Spain* and the *Indies*, in as full Extent as the *English*, *French*, or any other Nation did or could possibly enjoy them. And though this Treaty was only to continue for 12 Years, yet That Limitation was purely owing to the *Spaniards*; the said Ambassadors being directed by their respective Masters, to use all possible Endeavours for improving it into *an absolute and perpetual* Peace upon the same Terms.

* See *Jeannin Tom.* 2. *p.* 398.
† See *Ibid. p.* 492.

Tom. 1. *p.* 827. *& alibi.*

So

So far is it therefore from being true, that the Crown of *England* never submitted to the Advantages stipulated for the *States* in the Treaty of *Munster*; that the same Advantages were, as has been shewn, actually first *procured by the Assistance*, and afterwards *confirmed by the Guaranty of* England; and That, not at a time when our Affairs were in the utmost Confusion, (which is objected against the Treaty of *Munster*, as being made in the Year 1648;) but at a Time when the fresh Reputation of Queen *Elizabeth*'s long and glorious Reign had put her Successor in a Situation to reject any Treaty that should have been thought inconsistent with his own Honour and the Interest of his Subjects.

That Her Majesty is laid under no Engagement by this 15th Article of the Barrier-Treaty, but what She was previously obliged to by the Grand Alliance.

I shall now shew in the *last* Place, that Her Majesty is laid under no Engagement by this 15*th Article* of the *Barrier-Treaty*, but what She was *previously* obliged to by the *Grand Alliance*. For Proof of this, I shall transcribe the 8*th Article* of the *Grand Alliance* (as far as it relates to Trade,) which is as follows:

As appears by the 8th Article of That Alliance.

" It shall not be permitted to any of the " Parties when the War is once begun, to " treat of Peace with the Enemy, . . . " . . . unless Liberty be granted unto the " Subjects of the King of *Great Britain* and " the *States-General*, to exercise and enjoy " all the same Privileges, Rights, Immunities and Franchises of Commerce by Sea " and Land, in *Spain*, the *Mediterranean*, and " all Lands and Places which the King of " *Spain* last deceased did possess at the Time

" of

"of his Death, as well *in Europe* as elsewhere, "which they used or enjoyed, or which the "Subjects of Both or Either of them, *by any* "*Right acquired by Treaties*, Agreements, Cu-"stoms, or any other way whatsoever, might "have used and enjoyed before the Death of "the late King of *Spain*. It appears therefore that the House of *Austria*, the *Queen*, and the *States*, when they went into the War, tied themselves up from making Peace, till *England* and *Holland* should obtain the same Privileges of Trade to all the *Spanish* Dominions, as Both or Either of them had a Right to, whether by *Treaties*, Agreements, Customs, or any other way. Now what the Privileges are, which each Nation had at that time a Right to by Vertue of its *Treaties* with the Crown of *Spain*, has been examined above, where it was proved *that they had Both a Right of being treated Equally, and one as well as the other as favourably as the Nations the most favoured.* Her Majesty therefore had not only submitted to the advantageous Terms of the Treaty of *Munster*, before they were revived by the present Treaty; but had promised not to lay down Her Arms till the Trade of the *Dutch* should be put upon such a Foot as was there stipulated, that is, upon as favourable a Foot as that of Her own Subjects. And if *Great Britain* had Reason to expect, that Care should have been taken in the Former Negotiations of Peace, to secure to Her some Advantages in relation to the *Spanish* Trade, superior to, and exclusive of, the *Dutch*; the Blame cannot with Justice be laid upon the *Barrier-Treaty*, but must fall on that WISE AND EXCELLENT TREATY OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE

This

Thus I have gone through the principal Points necessary to the forming a right Judgment of the *Barrier-Treaty*, in such a manner as to obviate all those Objections against it, upon which any Stress seems to have been laid: And because such uncommon Industry has been used, to draw the Nation into a Belief that their *Trade* is not only *neglected* but *sacrificed* in this Treaty, I have endeavoured more particularly to shew, that *That*, as well as their *other most valuable Interests*, are secured by it in the most effectual manner. *The Conclusion.*

The Vindication of the Minister that Negotiated this Treaty, and the Lords of the Council who advised the Ratification of it, is no Part of my Design in Publishing these Sheets. I am very sensible, that considering the present Temper of the Nation, nothing said in their Justification can have much Effect: And the Miseries that must inevitably be entailed on Posterity by setting this Treaty aside, will make their Memories more honoured in Future Ages, than the most ambitious amongst them can possibly wish or desire. The Motives therefore which induced me to write, were quite of another Nature. Having carefully perused the *Barrier-Treaty* soon after it was Printed and Published, I was fully convinced that it was the best Scheme that had yet been contrived for enabling *Great-Britain* to hold the Balance of *Europe*, and for securing to Her, not the *Name and Shadow*, but the *solid Blessings* of a *safe and lasting Peace*; being entirely of Opinion with our Ancestors, who have always looked upon the *Low-Countries* as the *Out-Works of Britain*, and that our first and greatest Foreign Interest was to save

those Provinces from falling into the Hands of *France*; and being likewise fully convinced from Reason and Experience, that the chief Defect in all former Schemes for protecting and securing the *Netherlands*, lay in not providing a constant Standing Force ready to oppose any sudden Invasion: Which Defect is remedied in this Treaty, and the Defence of them put into the only Hands which we in Reason ought to trust. This Persuasion and these Motives prevailed with me to endeavour (as is natural in the like Cases) to vindicate my own Opinion, in defending that of our Ancestors; and to restore, if possible, the Ancient and Approved Sense of the Nation in a Matter so nearly related to its Safety, and which is now become more our Interest than ever, by the close Connexion the Security of our *Succession* has with the Preservation of those Countries. For I have shewn, that Foreign Alliances are absolutely necessary to its Security, and particularly an Alliance with the *States*. But no Use can be expected from an Alliance with them, if they are not put in Possession of such a Barrier, as may enable them to appear in Defence of the *Succession*, without exposing themselves to such Danger from *France*, as would threaten nothing less than the Ruin of their State. As nothing can endanger the *Succession*, but *France*'s espousing the Cause of the Pretender; so nothing can tie up the Hands of *France* from attempting this, but the Danger such an Attempt would draw along with it, and the Fear of an Impression from the Side of the *Netherlands*. But such an Impression cannot be made there, without the *States* be secured by such a *Barrier*, as

is may make it possible for them to break with *France*, without the utmost Danger to themselves. Nor is it to be imagined, that the *States* can be brought to break with *France*, while there is so great an Inequality between Her Barrier against the *Netherlands*, and that of the *Netherlands* against Her, as there will be if Things are left in *Flanders* upon the Foot of the *French* Proposals. The *States* in such a Case will not dare to do any thing, that may expose them to the Resentment of *France*; and when *France* is once secure of that Point, What is there that she will not attempt, to disturb our present Settlement, which stands so much in the Way of her Designs against the Protestant Religion, and the Liberties of *Europe*? 'Tis therefore the Interest of *England* to maintain the *States* in their Right to a strong and sufficient Barrier, on a Double Account; both as we are concerned in common with them, to prevent *France* from extending its Conquests in the *Netherlands*, which is the greatest *Foreign Interest* we can have; and as the Preservation of the *Netherlands* is, in its Consequences, the best Security to the *Protestant Succession*, which is our nearest *Home Concern*, and That on which depends the very Being of our Religion and Liberty.

France must therefore without doubt look upon the Advances we have made towards setting this Treaty aside, with more real Pleasure and Satisfaction, than all the Successes she hath been crowned with through the Course of *this most memorable Campaign*. She can't but be truly sensible, that this Treaty had laid a lasting Foundation for the strictest Friendship between *Britain* and *Holland*; a Friendship,

which She has found so fatal to Her Ambitious Designs during the present War, that the Effects of it will not easily be forgotten nor forgiven: Neither could any thing strike such a Terror into Her, as the Prospect of meeting the same formidable Enemies, and the same victorious Arms, United in the Defence of the *Netherlands*, as often as she should think fit to invade them. She knew that a standing Body of 50 or 60 Thousand Men in those Provinces, all of them regular and well disciplin'd Forces, under the Command of a Protestant State, and ready to be supported on occasion by the whole Strength of the Two Maritime Powers, would certainly give a new Turn to the Affairs of *Europe*, and raise the Protestant Interest in general to such a Height, that it would have nothing to apprehend from its most inveterate Enemies. Neither would the ill Consequences of this Treaty with respect to *France*, in all probability have been confin'd to the *Netherlands* only; but it is reasonable to suppose, that all the Provinces and States bordering upon that Kingdom, when they had felt the good Effects of this Treaty, and found by Experience, upon how much easier Teems Peace was to be preserved, than to be recovered when lost, would have been forward to have formed some Association of this Nature, under the Protection of the Two Maritime Powers. And by this means, a Barrier might have been secured, not only for the *Netherlands*, but thence extended to the *Alps*, and a stronger Alliance have been substituted in the room of the old *Burgundian* League, which for so many Years together exhausted the Strength and check'd the Growth of *France*;

The

The Effect of which would have been the setting the Tranquillity of this Part of *Europe* on such a solid Foundation, as it should never have been in the Power of any one Prince to undermine by Treachery, or to disturb by open Violence.

A Copy of the Treaty and Counter-Project, with some Observations upon them.

Having fully considered the Nature and Importance of this Treaty, and answered the most material Objections that have been brought against it; I shall now conclude with a *Translation of the Treaty and Counter-Project*, something more correct than those formerly Printed: And where any Variation occurs that may seem of Moment, I shall make some Observations upon it.

The BARRIER-TREATY between Her Majesty and the *States-General.*

Treaty.

HER *Majesty the Queen of* Great-Britain, *and the Lords the States General of the United Provinces, having considered how much it concerns the Quiet and Security of their Kingdoms and States, and the publick Tranquillity, to maintain and to secure on one side the* Succession *to the Crown of* Great-Britain, *in such manner as it is now established by the Laws of the Kingdom; and on the other side, that the said States General of the* United Provinces *should have a strong and sufficient*

Counter-Project.

HER *Majesty the Queen of* Great-Britain, *and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, having considered how much it concerns the Quiet and Security of their Kingdoms and States, and the publick Tranquillity, to maintain and to secure on one side the* Succession *to the Crown of* Great-Britain, *in such manner as it is now established by the Laws of the Kingdom; and on the other side, that the said States-General of the* United Provinces *should have a strong and sufficient*

Treaty.

ficient Barrier (*a*) against *France* and others who would surprize or attack them : *And Her Majesty and the said States General apprehending with just reason, the Troubles and Mischiefs which might happen, with respect to this* Succession, *if at any time there should be any Person or any Power who should call it in Question ; and if the Countries and States of the said Lords the States-General, were not secured by such a* Barrier : (*b*) *For these said Reasons, Her said Majesty the Queen of* Great-Britain, *tho' in the Vigour of Her Age, and enjoying perfect Health, (which God preserve to Her many Years ;) out of Her usual Prudence and Piety has thought fit to enter, with the Lords the States-General of the* United Provinces, *into a particular Alliance and Confederacy,*

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ficient Barrier against *France*, in case she would surprize or attack them : *And Her Majesty and the said States-General apprehending , with just Reason the Troubles and Mischiefs which might happen, with respect to this* Succession, *if at any time there should be any Person or any Power who should call it in Question ; and if the Countries and States of the said Lords the States-General, were not secured by such a* Barrier : [(*b*) And the abovesaid Queen of *Great Britain*, and the said Lords the States-General, duly reflecting upon the Advantage which *France* has always made use of, to sow Discord and foment Jealousy among the Allies, during the Negotiations of the preceeding Treaties of Peace , for want of necessary and rea-

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federacy; the principal End and only Aim of which, shall be the publick Quiet and Tranquillity; and to prevent, by Measures taken in time, all the Events which might one day excite new Wars. With this View it is, that Her British *Majesty has given Her full Power, for agreeing upon certain Articles of a Treaty additional to the Treaties and Alliances that She already has with the Lords the States-General of the* United Provinces, *to Her Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary,* Charles *Viscount* Townshend, *Baron of* Lyn-Regis, *Privy-Counsellor of Her* British *Majesty, Captain of Her said Majesty's Yeomen of the Guard, and Her Lieutenant in the County of* Norfolk: *And the Lords the States-General of the* United Provinces, *to the* Sieurs John de

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sonable Preliminaries being well established among the Allies.] *For these said Reasons, Her said Majesty the Queen of* Great Britain, *tho' in the Vigor of Her Age, and enjoying perfect Health, (which God preserve to Her many Years) out of Her usual Prudence and Piety, has thought fit to enter, with the Lords the States General of the* United-Provinces, *into a particular Alliance and Confederacy; the principal End and only aim of which, shall be the publick Quiet and Tranquillity; and to prevent, by Measures taken in time, all the Events which might one day excite new Wars. With this View it is, that Her* British *Majesty, has given Her full Power, for agreeing upon certain Articles of a Treaty additional to the Treaties and Alliances that She already*

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
de Welderen, *Lord of* Valbrugh, *Great Bayliff of the* Lower Betuwe, *of the Body of the Nobility of the Province of* Guelder; Frederick *Baron of* Reede, *Lord of* Lier, *St.* Anthony *and* Ter Lee, *of the Order of the Nobility of the Province of* Holland *and* West-Friezeland; Anthony Heinsius, *Counsellor-Pensionary of the Province of* Holland *and* West Frizeland, *Keeper of the Great Seal, and Super-Intendant of the Fiefs of the same Province*; Cornelius Van Gheet, *Lord of* Spanbroek, Bulokestein, *&c.* Gideon Hoeuest, *Canon of the Church of St.* Peter *at* Utrecht, *and Counsellor elect in the States of the Province of* Utrecht; Hessel van Sminia, *Secretary of the Chamber of Accounts of the Province of* Frizeland; Ernest Ittersum, *Lord of* Osterhof, *of the*	*ready has with the Lords the States General of the* United Provinces, *to*——— *And the Lords the States-General of the* United-Provinces, *to*———
Body	*who,*

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Body of the Nobility of the Province of Overyſſel; *and* Wicher Wichers, *Senator of the City of* Groninguen; *all Deputies to the Assembly of the ſaid Lords the States General on the part, respectively, of the Provinces of* Guelder, Holland *and* Weſt-Frizeland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Frizeland, Overyſſel, *and of* Groninguen *and* Ommelands; *who, by Virtue of their full Powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.*	*who, by Vertue of their full Powers, have agreed upon the following Articles.*

(*a*) *Againſt* France *and others.*] Theſe Words, [*and others,*] ought not, it is ſaid, to have been added in the Treaty; the Deſign of the Treaty being to ſecure the Barrier of the *States* againſt *France only.* That the *Firſt and Chief* Deſign of a Treaty for the Barrier, was to ſecure it againſt *France,* I readily allow; becauſe the *Firſt and Chief Danger* is from thence: But if it is the Intereſt of *England* that it ſhould be ſecured at all, it is certainly the Intereſt of *England* that it ſhould be ſecured *againſt others* as well as *France.* If the Barrier be loſt for want of ſuch Security, whoever the Invaders be, *England* as well as *Holland* loſes the Protection it gives them againſt *France*; and therefore it is *our* Intereſt as well as *theirs,* that it ſhould be ſecured *on all ſides,* and expoſed to the leaſt Danger poſſible. And ſince the

States

States oblige themselves to assist in maintaining the *Protestant Succession*, not only against *France*, but against *all others* that shall attempt to disturb it; there is the same Reason Her Majesty should give as full a Guaranty to the *States*, for securing their Barrier against *all* that shall attack it. The Interest of Both is reciprocal, and therefore the Engagements ought to be so too. Nor can any Inconvenience arise, from making the Guaranty *General* against *all* Invaders; because the Obligations of mutual Assistance can't by This Treaty take place on any other Occasion, but then only, when Her Majesty or the *States* shall be attacked *on Account of the Succession or Barrier*. And therefore if the Barrier be not attacked, tho' the *States* be invaded in any other Part, Her Majesty is not hereby engaged. It will be pretended perhaps, that there is no Reason to apprehend any Danger from any Power besides *France*: But first, That is not true; for *France* by her Intrigues has formerly engaged some Princes of the Empire in a War against the *Dutch*, and may do so again. But if it were true that nothing was to be apprehended from any other Power than *France*, it is necessary the Treaty should be made general, if it were only to guard against the mean and pitiful Evasions That Crown is always ready to make use of to carry on her Ambitious Designs. Of which it will be sufficient to give one Memorable Instance, which is to the present Purpose. In the Year 1701, when the *French* Forces had seized the whole *Spanish Low-Countries*, and had by Lines and Forts entirely cooped up the *States* on that Side; not content with this to cut off the *States* from all Communication with the Empire, *France* sent in Concert with the Elector of *Cologn* a great Body of Troops into most of the strong Towns belonging to that Elector, and yet at the same time declared they would observe the Peace and the Treaty of *Ryswick*; and therefore these Troops were called *Auxiliary Troops of the Circle of* Burgundy. Where now is the Difference, whether the King of *France* attack

the

the *Dutch* in his own Name, or whether his Troops do it under the Name of any body else? The Troops are the same, and the Danger all one. If this Treaty therefore were not made *general* against *all* Invaders, such an Evasion might defeat the Intention of it even against *France* it self. Thus much for the Reason of this Addition; And that the Reader may be satisfied it is agreeable to the *Counter-Project* it self, he need only have Recourse to the 16th Article, by which the Defence of the Succession and the Barrier, is left *general* and unlimited.

(*b*) The Reason why these Words [*And the abovesaid Queen, &c. duly reflecting upon the Advantage which* France *has always made use of, &c. for want of necessary and reasonable Preliminaries being well established among the Allies,*] were left out in the Treaty, will appear by observing, that the *Counter-Project* was formed before the *Preliminary-Treaty* in 1709, whereas this of the Barrier was not made till after it; and therefore this Clause was properly left out, the Intention of it having been fully answered and complied with in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, sign'd by the Queen, the Emperor and the States.

Treaty.

Article I.

THE Treaties of Peace, Friendship, Alliance and Confederacy, between Her *British* Majesty, and the *States-General* of the *United Provinces* shall be approved and confirmed by

Counter-Project.

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Treaty.

by the present Treaty, and shall remain in their former Force and Vigour, as if they were inserted in it Word for Word.

II.

The Succession to the Crown of *England* having been Settled by an Act of Parliament passed the Twelfth Year of the Reign of His late Majesty King *William* the Third; the Title of which is, *An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better Securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject*: And lately, in the Sixth Year of the Reign of Her present Majesty, this Succession having been again Established and Confirmed by another Act made for the *greater Security of Her Majesty's Person and Govern-*

Counter-Project.

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Treaty.

vernment, and the Succeſſion to the Crown of Great-Britain, &c. *in the Line of the moſt Serene Houſe of* Hanover, *and in the Perſon of the Princeſs* Sophia, *and of Her Heirs, Succeſſors and Deſcendants, Male and Female, already Born or to be Born :* And though no Power has any Right to Oppoſe the Laws, made upon this Subject by the Crown and Parliament of *Great-Britain* ; if it ſhould happen nevertheleſs, that under any Pretence, or by any Cauſe whatever, any Perſon, or any Power or State ſhould pretend to diſpute the Eſtabliſhment which the Parliament has made of the ſaid Succeſſion in the moſt Serene Houſe of *Hanover*, to Oppoſe the ſaid Succeſſion, to aid or favour thoſe who ſhall Oppoſe

Counter-Project.

vernment, and the Succeſſion to the Crown of Great Britain, &c. *in the Line of the moſt Serene Houſe of* Hanover, *and in the Perſon of the Princeſs* Sophia, *and of Her Heirs, Succeſſors and Deſcendants, Male and Female, already Born or to be Born :* And though no Power has any Right to Oppoſe the Laws, made upon this Subject by the Crown and Parliament of *Great-Britain* ; if it ſhould happen nevertheleſs, that under any Pretence, or by any Cauſe whatever, any Perſon, or any Power or State ſhould pretend to diſpute the Eſtabliſhment which the Parliament has made of the ſaid Succeſſion in the moſt Serene Houſe of *Hanover*, to Oppoſe the ſaid Succeſſion, to aid or favour thoſe who ſhall Oppoſe

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
pose it, whether directly or indirectly, by open War, or by fomenting Seditions and Conspiracies against Her or Him to whom the Crown of *Great Britain* shall descend according to the Acts aforesaid; The *States General* of the *United Provinces* engage and promise to Assist and Maintain, in the said Succession, Her or Him to whom it shall belong by virtue of the said Acts of Parliament, to aid them in taking Possession, if they be not then in Possession, and to Oppose those who would disturb them in the taking such Possession, or in the actual Possession of the said Succession.	pose it, whether directly or indirectly, by open War, or by fomenting Seditions and Conspiracies against Her or Him to whom the Crown of *Great-Britain* shall descend according to the Acts aforesaid; The *States General* of the *United Provinces* engage and promise to Assist and Maintain, in the said Succession, Her or Him to whom it shall belong by virtue of the said Acts of Parliament, to aid them in taking Possession, if they be not then in Possession, and to Oppose those who would disturb them in the taking such Possession, or in the actual Possession of the said Succession.
III.	III.
Her said Majesty and the *States-General*, in Consequence	Her said Majesty and the *States-General*, in Consequence

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
ſequence of the Fifth Article of the Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the *States-General*, the 7th of *September*, 1701, ſhall employ all their Force to recover the reſt of the *Spaniſh Low-Countries*.	ſequence of the Fifth Article of the Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the *States-General*, the 7th of *September*, 1701, ſhall employ all their Force to recover the reſt of the *Spaniſh Low-Countries*.
IV.	IV.
And further, they ſhall endeavour to Conquer as many other Towns and Forts as they can, in order to their being a Barrier and Security to the ſaid Lords the *States*.	And further, they ſhall endeavour to Conquer as many other Towns and Forts as they can, in order to their being a Barrier and Security to the ſaid Lords the *States*.
V.	V.
And whereas, according to the Ninth Article of the ſaid Alliance, it is to be agreed, amongſt other Matters, how and in	And whereas, acccording to the Ninth Article of the ſaid Alliance, it is to be agreed, amongſt other Matters, how and in

Treaty.

in what manner the *States* shall be secured by means of this Barrier; the Queen of *Great-Britain shall use Her Endeavours to procure*, that in the Treaty of Peace it may be agreed, that all the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and what else shall be found necessary, whether of Conquered or Unconquered Places, shall serve as a Barrier to the *States*.

VI.

That to this end their High Mightinesses shall be allowed to put and keep Garison, *to change augment and diminish it as they shall judge proper*, in the Places following: Namely, (*f*) *Newport*, [(*a*) *Furnes*, with] Fort *Knocke*, [(*a*) *Ipres*,] *Menin*, the [(*a*) Town and] Citadel of *Lisle*, *Tournay* [(*a*) and its

Counter-Project.

in what manner the *States* shall be secured by means of this Barrier; the Queen of *Great-Britain shall assist in procuring*, that in the Treaty of Peace it may be agreed, that all the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and what else shall be found necessary, whether of Conquered or Unconquered Places, shall serve as a Barrier to the *States*.

VI.

That to this end their High Mightinesses shall be allowed to put and keep Garison in the Places following: Namely, *Newport*, *Knocke*, *Menin*, the Citadel of *Lisle*, *Tournay*, *Condé*, *Valenciennes*, *Namur* and its Citadel; *Liere*, *Halle* to be Fortified, the Fort of *Perle*, *Damme*, the Castle of *Gand*.

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
its Cittadel] *Condé*, *Valenciennes*, ¶ (b) *and the Places which shall from henceforward be Conquered from* France :] [(a) *Maubeuge*,] [(c) *Charleroy*,] *Namur* and its Cittadel, *Ligere*, *Halle* to be Fortified, the Forts *Pedle*, [(e) *Philippe*,] *Dunone*, the Castle of *Gand*, [(d) *Dendermund* :] [(e) the Fort of St. *Dhonas*, being joined to the Fortifications of *Ecluse*, and being entirely incorporated with it, shall remain and be yielded in Propdrty to the *States* :] [(g) The Fort of *Rodenhuysen*, on this side *Gand*, shall be razed.]	

(a) *Furnes*, *Ypres*, Town of *Lisle*, Cittadel of *Tournay*, *Maubeuge*.] The Addition of these Places, is conformable to Her Majesty's Instructions to Her Ambassadors in the following Words : ["And for the greater Extent and "Strength of the intended Barrier, you are likewise hereby directed to insist, that the Towns and Forts of *Furnes*, *Knoque*, *Ipres*, *Menin*, *Lisle*, *Tournay*, *Conde*, *Valenciennes*, "and *Maubeuge*, be at a Treaty of Peace yielded up, and "deli-

" delivered by *France* to *Charles* the Third King of *Spain*, to " be garison'd in such manner, as shall be agreed on by the " Treaty concerning the said Barrier, to be forthwith " made and concluded between Us and the States General.]

(*b*) *And the Places which shall from henceforward be conquered from France.*] These Words are no more than a Repetition of the 4th Article of the *Counter-Project*.

(*c*) *Charleroy.*] I have already shown that Her Majesty and the Emperor did by the 23d Article of the Preliminary-Treaty, agree that this Place among others should be restored by *France* to make a Part of the *Dutch* Barrier: And it being by its Situation of the greatest Importance for covering the Country between *Mons*, *Maubeuge* and *Namur*, where there is no other Place of Strength for 40 Miles together, it could not in Justice or Prudence have been omitted in the Barrier-Treaty.

(*d*) *Dendermonde.*] The Necessity of making this Town a Part of the Barrier, in order to preserve a safe and free *Communication* between the *States* and their Garisons, has already been sufficiently demonstrated under my *Third* Head: And it can't be pretended this Place can any way prejudice or influence our Trade; since, if any Danger of that kind were to be apprehended, (which I have fully shewn under my 5th Head there is not,) it must arise from the Castle of *Gand*, as lying in the direct Passage of our Trade; But the Reader will observe that the Castle of *Gand* is made a Part of the Barrier by the *Counter-Project*.

(*e*) Fort *Philippe* and Fort St. *Dhonas*.] The Addition of these two Forts can be of no Importance. For with Relation to the first, the *States* have ever since the Treaty of *Munster* had the Command of the Entrance of the *Scheld*, by the Possession of Fort *Lillo*, which lies nearer the Mouth of that River than Fort *Philippe*. Neither can it be pretended, that by means of their Garison in Fort *Philippe*, they may defraud King *Charles* of his Customs, (which has been objected by the Libellers;) since he not only

has a Custom-House higher up the River between Fort *Philippe* and *Antwerp*, but is at Liberty, if That is not thought sufficient, to erect as many more as he pleases, notwithstanding this Treaty. As for Fort St. *Dhonas*, it stands so near *l' Ecluse*, (which Town belongs to the *States*,) that it really makes a Part of its Out-works, and was therefore incorporated with it long before this Treaty was made.

(*f*) *Newport*.] I have already had Occasion to shew the Necessity of making *Gand* and *Dendermonde* a Part of the Barrier. And tho' *Newport* is specified in the *Counter-Project*, yet because it has been pretended that this Place, as well as the other Two, is no necessary Part of a Barrier against *France*, but at the same time highly prejudicial to the *British* Trade; I shall here answer Both those Objections. As for the *First*, it is impossible for any one that has the least Notion of a Barrier against *France*, and of the Situation of the *Low-Countries*, to think that it is not as necessary for the *Dutch* to have a Garison in *Newport*, as in any other Frontier-Town whatever; or that the other Places specified in the Treaty, can be an effectual Security without *Newport*. For What is meant by putting the Barrier into the Hands of the *Dutch*, but that they should Garison and defend the Chain of Towns which divide the *Spanish-Netherlands* from *France*, that no Pass or Inlet may be left open for the *French* to make a sudden Invasion, as they have often done? And let any one cast his Eye upon the Map, and see whether any Town is a more essential Part of this Chain, on the Frontier, than *Newport*; whether the Barrier is in any Part so weak, as in this; and whether it would be safe to leave such an Extent of Country, as is between the Sea and *Ypres*, open and exposed. If *Newport* is left without a Garison, a *French* Army may march directly to *Bruges* and *Gand*, cut the *Dutch* off from their Communication with their Garisons, and bring them into the utmost Danger, without the rest of the Barrier's being of any Use to them. An Irruption made by

by *France* on that side, it is evident would be of more dangerous Consequence both to the *Spanish Netherlands* and the *United-Provinces*, than in any other Part of the Barrier; and therefore *Newport* is so far from being in no Sense a Part of the Barrier, that scarce any other Frontier-place is of so much Importance to it. The *Second* Objection is, that the *States* having a Garison in *Newport*, may make the *British* Trade precarious. Now not to mention the Arguments brought under my 5th Head, which shew that it is morally impossible that the *Dutch* should ever by virtue of their Barrier attempt any thing in Prejudice of our Trade; it is sufficient to observe with respect to *Newport*, that its Situation and the Badness of its Harbour are such, that the *English* have never carried on any considerable Trade thither, but have always frequented *Ostend*; which, besides the Advantage of a more commodious Harbour, lies more convenient for forwarding our Goods to *Brussels*. Now this Town is left entirely in the Hands of the King of *Spain*; and it is to be observed, that the *British* Effects having once paid the Royal Duties or Customs there, they are free for all the other Towns of the *Spanish Netherlands*. And whereas, by the 9th Article of the Treaty, All Rights and Privileges Civil and Ecclesiastical are reserved to King *Charles* over all the *Spanish Netherlands*; and, by the 19th, the *States* engage to assist in maintaining the Trade of both Nations upon an equal Foot; it follows, that any Attempt made by the *States* to the Prejudice of the *British* Trade, would be in all Places alike an Encroachment upon the Sovereignty of the King of *Spain*, and an open and direct Violation of the Treaty; and must therefore, as such, engage them in a Rupture with him and us: Which Opportunity *France* would not fail to improve to the seizing of the Barrier, and the Ruin of the *States*. As long therefore as *Holland* preserves the least Regard for its own Safety and Interest, we shall be more secure of not having the strong Towns of the *Netherlands* turn'd against us, by trusting them to their

Hands, than we could be by putting them into the Possession of any other Power in *Europe*: Which is as great a Security, as the Nature of the thing will admit of, or as can indeed be desired.

(g) *The Fort of* Rodenhuysen *on this side* Gand, *shall be razed.*] The Situation of this Fort is such, that if the *States* were to have the Castle of *Gand*, (as was settled by the *Counter-Project*,) it was absolutely necessary this Fort should be demolished; since it lies between *Gand*, which is to be put into the Hands of the *States*, and the *Sas van Gand* which is already in their possession, and commands that Canal along which all their Provisions, Warlike Stores, *&c.* must pass to *Gand*; so that it might be of the greatest Prejudice to the *States*, without being of any manner of Service to the King of *Spain*.

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VII.	VII.
The said Lords the *States-General* may also [(a) *in case of an apparent Attack*, or] [(b) *War*,] put as many Troops as they shall think necessary in all the Towns, Places and Forts of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, where the Reason of War shall require it.	The said Lords the *States-General* may put into the said Towns, Forts, and Places; and, *in case of* [*Open*] (b) *War with France*, into all the other Towns, Places and Forts; whatever the Reasons of War shall require.

(a) *In case of an Apparent Attack.*] Whoever considers how little Ceremony *France* has always used in invading her

her Neighbours, by the sudden Inundation of Powerful Armies; must think it full as needful for the Safety of the Barrier, to provide against the Case of an *Apparent Attack*, as that of *an open War*.

(*b*) *War*.] (*b*) *War* with France.] The Reason why this Treaty in general, and consequently this Article, ought not to be confin'd to *France only*, has been already given: And it is plain from the very Words of it, that the Privilege of putting their Troops into any Towns of the *Spanish Netherlands*, is restrained to the Case *of an Attack or War on the Low-Countries and the Barrier only*. For by this Article nothing can authorize or justifie their putting Troops into any Place of the *Low-Countries*, but *the Reason of War in case of an Attack*. Should therefore the Bishop of *Munster*, for Example, or any other Neighbour, attack the Province of *Frise* or *Over-Issel*; it is evident the *Dutch* could in such a case neither claim nor exert this Privilege, of putting their Troops into any Places of the *Low-Countries*; because those Countries not being attacked, there could be no Pretence that *the Reason of War required* they should do it; nor indeed would they have any Interest in such a case to do it. The Liberty therefore here given the *States*, is no more in Truth, than what they might in Reason and Justice have taken, even tho' there had been no such Stipulation made in this Treaty. For, the Defence of the *Low-Countries* being put into their Hands, it would be ridiculous to imagine, that in case those Countries were attacked, the *States* ought not to make the best Disposition they could of their Troops for their Defence, and for preventing the Designs of the Enemy, by putting their Forces into all Places where *the Reason of War* should require it. Nor is there the least ground for that malicious Insinuation, that upon a Rupture between *Britain* and *Holland*, the Riches and Strength of the *Netherlands* may be turned against us; For we must first resolve to attack the *Low-Countries*, and consequently break with the House of *Austria*, before the *States* can

make use of any Strength they have in those Parts against us: And should that be the Case, we might depend upon being opposed by all the Power and Wealth of those Countries, even tho' the *States* should have no Garisons in them. But all the Objections of this kind, are already fully answered under my 5th Proposition, where I have largely shewn, *That their having a Barrier pursuant to this Treaty, will be far from exposing Us to any sort of Danger from Them.* Therefore I shall add nothing more on this Head, but the Declaration of the *States* in their Letter to Her Majesty of the 19th of *February* 1712. in which they assure Her "That they have not the least Thought of making Use of the Privilege stipulated in the 7th Article, to put Troops into other Places, but only in case of the last and most apparent Necessity", *viz.* of putting them into those Places. Now there can never be a Necessity of putting Troops into those Places, but only when the *Netherlands* are attacked.

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
VIII.	VIII.
They may likewise send into the Towns, Forts and Places, *where they shall have their Garisons*, without any Hindrance, and without paying any Duties; Provisions, Ammunitions, Arms and Artillery, Materials for the Fortifications, and all that shall be found *con-*	They may likewise send into the *said* Towns, Forts, and Places *abovementioned*, without any Hindrance, and without paying any Duties; Provisions, Ammunitions, Arms, and Artillery, Materials for the Fortifications; and all that shall be found necessary for

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
convenient and necessary for the said Garisons and Fortifications.	for the said Garisons and Fortifications.
IX.	IX.
The said Lords the *States General* shall also have Liberty to Appoint in the Towns, Forts and Places of their Barrier, *mentioned in the foregoing Sixth Article*, where they shall have their Garisons, such Governors and Commandants, *Majors and other Officers*, as they shall think proper; who shall not be subject to any other Orders, whatsoever they may be, or from whomsoever they may come, relating to the Security and Military Government of the said Places, but to those of their High Mightinesses only and exclusively, yet without prejudice to the Rights and	The said Lords the *States General* may also put in the *said* Towns, Forts and Places of their Barrier, where they shall have their Garisons, such Governors and Commandants as they shall think fit; who shall not be subject to any other Orders, relating to the Security and Military Government of the said Places, whatsoever they may be, or from whomsoever they may come, but only to those of their High-Mightinesses, exclusive of all others, yet without Prejudice to the Rights and Liberties, as well Ecclesiastical as Political, (a) *and to the Revenues* of King

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
and Liberties, as well Ecclesiastical as Political, of King *Charles* the Third.	King *Charles the* Third, *in Respect of the said Towns.*

(*a*) *And to the Revenues.*] These Words are left out, to make the Treaty consistent with it self. For the *Revenues* of such Towns in the 6th Article, as were not in Possession of King *Charles* the IId. at his Death, are by the 11th Article of the *Counter-Project* assigned towards the Maintenance of the Barrier; and therefore it would have been absurd to have reserved King *Charles*'s Right to the *whole Revenues* in this Article, when it is (*in part*) taken away by the 11th.

X.	X.
That, besides, the said Lords the *States* shall have Liberty to Fortifie the said Towns, Places and Forts which belong to them, and Repair the Fortifications of them, in such manner as they shall judge necessary; and further to do whatever shall be useful for their Defence.	That, besides, the said Lords the *States* shall have Liberty to Fortifie the said Towns, Places and Forts which belong to them, and Repair the Fortifications of them, in such manner as they shall judge necessary; and further to do whatever shall be useful for their Defence.
XI.	XI.

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
XI.	XI.
The Lords the *States-General* shall be left in Possession of all the Revenues of the Towns, Places, Castellanies, and their Dependencies, which they shall have for their Barrier from *France*, which were not in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain*, at the time of the Death of the late King *Charles* the Second; [(a) *and besides this, a Million of Livres shall be settled, for the Payment of One hundred thousand Crowns every three Months, out of the clearest Revenues of the* Spanish Low-Countries, *which were then in Possession of the said King; to serve Both together for the Maintenance of the Garisons of the* States *and*] for providing the Fortifications, as also the Magazines, and	All the Revenues of the Castellanies and Dependencies of the Towns and Places which the Lords the States-General shall have for their Barrier from *France*, and which were not in the Possession of the Crown of *Spain* at the Time of the Death of the Catholick King of *Spain*, *Charles* the Second; *shall be settled* for a Fund to provide for the Fortifications, as also for the Magazines and other necessary Expences of the said Towns *of the Barrier*.

(a) *And*

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
and other necessary Expences, in the Towns and Places above-mentioned. [(b) *And that the said Revenues may be sufficient to support these Expences, Endeavours shall be used for enlarging the Dependencies and Castellanies aforesaid as much as possible; and particularly for including in the Castellany of* Ipres, *that of* Castel, *and the Forest of* Niepe; *and in the Castellany of* Lille, *the Government of* Douay; *Both having been so joined before the present War.*]	

(a) *And besides this, a Million of Livres,* &c.] This Addition is authorized by Her Majesty's private Instructions to Her Ambassadors. ["Whereas it is expected, that several "Towns now belonging to and in the Hands of *France*, "should be given up and yielded by the Treaty of Peace, "to be garison'd by the Forces of the *States-General* for the "Security of their Barrier; if therefore the Revenues of such "Towns, their Dependencies and Territories, so deliver'd "up and garison'd, be not found sufficient to answer the "necessary expences to be made for that Service; in such "Case, you have Liberty to consent to the adding such "farther

" farther Sum or Sums, as shall be thought requisite and " reasonable for that Purpose, out of the Incomes and Re- " venues arising in general from the *Spanish Low-Coun- tries*".] And how far short the *whole Revenues* assign'd the *States* will fall, of the Expence necessary for maintaining the Barrier; has been already fully and clearly proved under my 5th Proposition.

(*b*) *And that the said Revenues*, &c.] This Addition tending only to the weakning of *France*, and to the reducing those Chatellanies to the Foot upon which they were before the present War, was highly reasonable, in Consideration of the great Disproportion which I have shewn there is between the *Revenues* and the *Expence* of the Barrier.

Treaty.

XII.

That no Town, Fort, Place, or Country of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, shall be granted, transferred, or given, or descend to the Crown of *France*, or any one of the Line of *France*, by vertue of any Gift, Sale, Exchange, Marriage-Settlement, Inheritance, Succession by Will, or *ab intestato*, from any Title whatsoever; nor, in any other manner whatever, be put into the Power or under

Counter-Project.

XII.

That no Town, Fort, Place, or Country of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, shall be granted, transferred, or given, or descend to the Crown of *France*, or any one of the Line of *France*, by vertue of any Gift, Sale, Exchange, Marriage-Settlement, Inheritance, Succession by Will, or *ab intestato*, from any Title whatsoever; nor, in any other manner whatever, be put into the Power or under

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
under the Authority of the most Christian King, or any one of the Line of *France*.	under the Authority of the most Christian King, or any one of the Line of *France*.
XIII.	XIII.
And whereas the said Lords the *States-General*, in Consequence of the Ninth Article of the said Alliance, are to make a Convention or Treaty with King *Charles* the Third, for securing the *States* by means of the said Barrier; the Queen of *Great-Britain* shall use Her good Offices, that all the foregoing Particulars, relating to the Barrier of the *States*, may be inserted in the aforesaid Treaty or Convention; and Her said Majesty shall continue Her good Offices, till the above-mentioned Convention, between the *States* and the said King *Charles*	And whereas the said Lords the *States-General*, in Consequence of the Ninth Article of the said Alliance, are to make a Convention or Treaty with King *Charles* the Third, for securing the *States* by means of the said Barrier; the Queen of *Great-Britain* shall use Her good Offices, that all the foregoing Particulars, relating to the Barrier of the *States*, may be inserted in the aforesaid Treaty or Convention; and Her said Majesty shall continue Her good Offices, till the above-mentioned Convention, between the *States* and the said King *Charles*

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
Charles the Third, be concluded, agreeably to what is before-mentioned; and Her Majesty shall be Guarantee of the said Treaty or Convention.	*Charles* the Third, be concluded, agreeably to what is before-mentioned; and Her Majesty shall be Guarantee of the said Treaty or Convention.
	XIV.
	(a) *The whole, nevertheless, without Prejudice to such other Treaties and Conventions, as the Queen of* Great-Britain *and their High-Mightinesses may think fit to make hereafter with the said King* Charles *the Third, in relation to the aforesaid* Spanish Netherlands, *or to the said Barrier.*

(a) *The Whole nevertheless without Prejudice*, &c.] This Article was (I suppose) omitted as being perfectly insignificant. For it is not said, *such Treaties as the Queen* OR *the States shall make*, disjunctively; which would in effect have rendred the whole Treaty insignificant; but, *the Queen* AND *the States*. Now it is manifest that, without any such Article, Her Majesty *and* the States have the very same Power of making any future Treaties or Conventions upon this or any other Subject by common Consent,

as they would have had if this Article had been inserted. Since therefore this Treaty *could not* in the Nature of it possibly prejudice any subsequent Treaty made by a Joynt Agreement, it would have been perfectly superfluous to have stipulated that it *should not*.

Treaty.

XIV.

And, that the said Lords the *States* may have from this time, as much as possible, a Barrier in the *Spanish Low-Countries*; they shall be permitted to put their Garisons in the Towns already taken, and which shall hereafter be taken, before the Peace be made and put in execution. [(a) *And in the mean time the said King* Charles *the Third shall not be allowed to enter into Possession of the said* Spanish Low Countries, *neither in whole nor in part; and during that time, the Queen shall be aiding to their High Mightinesses to maintain them in the Enjoyment of the Revenues there,*

Counter-Project.

XV.

And, that the said Lords the *States* may have from this time, as much as possible, a Barrier in the *Spanish Low-Countries*; they shall be permitted to put their Garisons into the *principal* Towns already taken, and which shall hereafter be taken before the Peace be made and put in Execution.

Treaty. **Counter-Project.**

there, and to find the Million of Livres a Year, above-mentioned.]

(a) *And in the mean time*, &c.] It has been observed already, that this Treaty leaves the *Netherlands* in the same State that it found them, *during the War*; since it would have been impracticable to have made any Alterations with respect to the Government of those Provinces before the Peace, without introducing the greatest Disorder and Confusion. The *States* therefore being put in Possession of the Towns conquered from *France*, and of the Revenues arising from them, by virtue of the Grand Alliance before ever this Treaty was made; things are only left by this Clause upon the same Foot, till the Conclusion of the Peace. And that no one may think they have enriched themselves by these Revenues, it is well known that since the taking of *Menin* in 1706, they have received in all, from the New Conquests or Barrier, no more than one Million and ½ of Livres, which hardly amounts to 25,000 Pounds Sterling *per Annum*; a Sum so very unequal to the vast Expence the *States* (alone) have been at, for the Sieges of so many strong Towns, and for repairing the Fortifications of them when taken, that no one can imagine they have in these Five Years, by the Revenues of all the Conquered Places, more than made themselves whole for the single Siege of *Lisle*; since, when our Successes were to be lessened and vilified, it has been confessed that the Money spent on the Siege of one Town, would have built Three. And as to the Additional Sum of 400,000 Crowns to be raised Annually upon the *Low-Countries even during the War*, it is well known that the *States* cannot receive or expect any Benefit of it during the War; the whole Revenues of the Country being appro-

 pria-

priated to the Charges of the Civil Government, the Payment of the *Walloon* Regiments, the supplying the Imperial Troops with Bread and Forage, and to other incident Charges of the War. But there is no Occasion to say any thing in Justification of this Clause; since, were it never so practicable to raise the Million, the *States* declared to the Duke of *Marlborough* and the Lord Viscount *Townshend*, that they never intended to make use of this Concession for that Purpose, but only to induce King *Charles* the sooner to comply with the Convention desired of him.

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
XV.	
(*a*) And whereas their High-Mightinesses have Stipulated by the Treaty of *Munster*, in the 14th Article, That the River *Schelde*, as also the Canals of *Sas*, *Swyn*, and other Mouths there opening into the Sea, should be kept shut on the Side of the *States*;	
And in the Fifteenth Article, That the Ships and Commodities going in and out of the Harbours of *Flanders*, shall be and remain charged with all such Imposts and other Duties, as are raised upon Com-	

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
Commodities going and coming along the *Schelde*, and the other Canals above-mentioned:	
The Queen of *Great Britain* promises and engages; That their High-Mightinesses shall never be disturbed in their Right and Possession in that respect, directly nor indirectly; but shall continue to enjoy them fully: As also that Commerce shall not, in Prejudice of the said Treaty, be made more easy by the Sea-Ports, than by the said River, Canals, and Mouths of the Sea on the side of the States of the *United Provinces*, directly nor indirectly.	
And whereas by the 16th and 17th Articles of the same Treaty of *Munster*, his Majesty the King of *Spain* is obliged to treat the Subjects of their High-Mightinesses as favourably	

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
ably as the Subjects of *Great Britain* and the *Hans Towns*, who were then the People the most favourably treated; Her *British* Majesty and their High-Mightinesses promise likewise to take care, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* and of their High-Mightinesses, shall be treated in the *Spanish Low Countries*, as well as in all *Spain*, the Kingdoms and States thereto belonging, equally, and, as well the one as the other, as favourably as the People the most favoured.	

(a) As to this Article; it has been so fully proved above, to be only a Renewal of the Engagement Her Majesty was under by the 8th Article of the *Grand Alliance*, that nothing more need be said in its Defence.

XVI.	XVI.
The said Queen and the States-General oblige themselves to furnish, by Sea	The said Queen and the States-General oblige themselves to furnish, by Sea

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
Sea and Land, the Succours and Assistance necessary to maintain, by Force, Her said Majesty in the quiet Possession of Her Kingdoms; and the most Serene House of *Hanover* in the said Succession, as it is settled by the Acts of Parliament before-mentioned: and to maintain the said *States-General* in the Possession of the said Barrier.	Sea and Land, the Succours and Assistance necessary to maintain, by Force, Her said Majesty in the quiet Possession of Her Kingdoms; and the most Serene House of *Hanover* in the said Succession, as it is settled by the Acts of Parliament before-mentioned: and to maintain the said *States-General* in the Possession of the said Barrier.
XVII.	XVII.
After the Ratifications of this Treaty, a particular Convention shall be made of the Conditions upon which the said Queen, and the said Lords the States-General, shall engage themselves to furnish the Succours which shall be judg'd necessary, as well by Sea as by Land.	After the Ratifications of this Treaty, a particular Convention shall be made of the Conditions upon which the said Queen, and the said Lords the States-General, shall engage themselves to furnish the Succours which shall be judg'd necessary, as well by Sea as by Land.

Treaty.

XVIII.

If Her *British* Majesty, or the States-General of the *United Provinces*, be attacked by any Body whatsoever, on account of this Convention; they shall mutually assist one another with all their Force, and become Guarantees of the Execution of the said Convention.

XIX.

There shall be invited and admitted into the present Treaty, as soon as possible, all the Kings, Princes and States, who shall be willing to enter into the same; particularly his Imperial Majesty, the Kings of *Spain* and *Prussia*, and the Elector of *Hanover*. And Her *British* Majesty, and the States-General of the *United Provinces*,

Counter-Project.

XVIII.

If Her *British* Majesty, or the States-General of the *United Provinces*, be attacked by any Body whatsoever, on account of this Convention; they shall mutually assist one another with all their Force, and become Guarantees of the Execution of the said Convention.

XIX.

There shall be invited and admitted into the present Treaty, as soon as possible, all the Kings, Princes and States, who shall be willing to enter into the same; particularly his Imperial Majesty, the Kings of *Spain* and *Prussia*, and the Elector of *Hanover*. And Her *British* Majesty, and the States-General of the *United Provinces*,

Treaty.

vinces, and each of them in particular, shall be permitted to request and invite those whom they shall think fit to request and invite, to enter into this Treaty, and to be Guarantees of its Execution.

Counter-Project.

vinces, and each of them in particular, shall be permitted to request and invite those whom they shall think fit to request and invite, to enter into this Treaty, and to be Guarantees of its Execution.

XX.

(a) *And whereas by the 5th and 9th Articles of the afore-mentioned Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King of* Great-Britain, *and the Lords the States-General, the 7th of* Sept. 1701, *it is agreed and stipulated, that the Kingdoms of* Naples *and* Sicily, *with all the Dependencies of the Crown of* Spain *in* Italy, *shall be recovered out of the Possession of* France, *as being of the last Consequence to the Trade of the two Nations; as likewise the*

Treaty.

Counter-Project.

Spanish Netherlands, for a Barrier to the Lords the States General: therefore the said Queen of Great Britain, and the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces, agree and oblige themselves not to enter into any Negociation or Treaty of Peace with France, until the Restitution of the said Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with all the Dependencies of the Crown of Spain in Italy; as likewise the Spanish Low-Countries, with the other Towns and Places in the Possession of France above-mentioned in this Treaty and in the manner as specified in this Treaty: also, all the rest of the entire Monarchy of Spain be yielded by France

Preliminary.

(a) See the Note at the End of Article 22d of the Counter-Project.

Treaty.

XX.

And as Time has ſhewn the Omiſſion which was made in the Treaty ſigned at *Ryſwick* in the Year 1697, between *England* and *France*, in reſpect of the Right of the Succeſſion of *England* in the Perſon of Her Majeſty the Queen of *Great-Britain* now reigning; and that, for want of having ſettled in that Treaty this indiſputable Right of Her Majeſty, *France* refuſed to acknowledge Her for Queen of *Great-Britain*, after the Death of the late King *William* the Third, of glorious Memory: Her Majeſty the Queen of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the States-General of the *United Provinces*, do agree and oblige themſelves, not to enter into any Negociation or Trea-

ty

Counter-Project.

XXI.

And as Time has ſhewn the Omiſſion which was made in the Treaty ſigned at *Ryſwick* in the Year 1697, between *England* and *France*, in reſpect of the Right of the Succeſſion of *England* in the Perſon of Her Majeſty the Queen of *Great-Britain* now reigning; and that, for want of having ſettled in that Treaty this indiſputable Right of Her Majeſty, *France* refuſed to acknowledge Her for Queen of *Great-Britain*, after the Death of the late King *William* the Third, of glorious Memory: Her Majeſty the Queen of *Great-Britain*, and the Lords the States-General of the *United Provinces*, do agree and oblige themſelves, not to enter into any Negotiation or Trea-

ty

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
ty of Peace with *France*, before the Title of Her Majesty to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, as also the Right of Succession of the most Serene House of *Hanover* to the aforesaid Crown, as it is settled and established by the afore-mentioned Acts of Parliament, be fully acknowledged, as a Preliminary by *France*, and that *France* has *promised* at the same time to remove out of its Dominions the Person who pretends to be King of *Great-Britain*: [*And that no Negotiation nor formal Discussion of the Articles of the said Treaty of Peace shall be entred into, but jointly and at the same time with the said Queen, or with Her Ministers.*]	ty of Peace with *France*, before the Title of Her Majesty to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, as also the Right of Succession of the most Serene House of *Hanover* to the aforesaid Crown, as it is settled and established by the afore-mentioned Acts of Parliament, be fully acknowledged, as a Preliminary by *France*, and that *France* has *Stipulated* at the same time to remove out of its Dominions, the Person who pretends to be King of *Great-Britain*.

XXII.

Treaty. **Counter-Project.**

XXII.

And whereas Experience has shewn of what Importance it is to Great-Britain *and to the* United-Provinces, *that the Fortress and Fort of* Dunkirk *should not be in the Possession of* France, *in the Condition they are in at present; the Subjects of the Two Nations having sustained such great Losses, and suffer'd so much in their Commerce, by the Ships taken from them as Prize by the Privateers and Ships fitted out of that Port, during the last and the present War; and whereas the Situation of this Port is such, that* France *by its boundless Ambition may always be tempted to undertake some Enterprize against the Dominions of the Queen of* Great-Britain, *or of the Lords the States-General,*

Treaty. **Counter-Project.**

General, and to interrupt the Publick Peace and Tranquillity; for the Preservation of which, and of the Balance of Europe *against the exorbitant Power of* France, *the Allies engaged in this long and burdensome War: Therefore the abovesaid Queen of* Great Britain, *and the Lords the States-General of the* United Provinces, *do agree and oblige themselves not to enter into any Negotiation or Treaty of Peace with* France, *until it shall be yielded and stipulated by* France *as a Preliminary, that all the Fortifications of the said Town of* Dunkirk, *and of the Forts depending thereon, shall be entirely demolished and razed, and that the Port shall be entirely ruined and made impracticable.* (a)

(a) These

(a) These Two Articles, the 20th and 22d of the *Counter-Project*, the Ambassador was authorized to leave out, by Mr. *B——le's* Letter of the 2d of *August*, 1709; the Intention of them having been fully answered by the Unanimous Concurrence of the *Allies* as to Both Points, in the *Preliminary Articles* settled and sign'd by them several Months before this Treaty was concluded. And the Resolution the *States* have hitherto shewn in adhering to the Subject-matter of them, must convince every body that there was no need of making them enter into any New Engagements on those Heads.

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
XXI.	XXIII.
Her *British* Majesty, and the Lords the *States-General* of the *United Provinces*, shall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the present Treaty, within the space of four Weeks, to be reckoned from the Day of the Signing. In Testimony whereof, the under-written Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her *British* Majesty, and the Deputies of the Lords the *States-General*, have signed this pre-	Her *British* Majesty, and the Lords the *States-General* of the *United Provinces*, shall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the present Treaty, within the space of ——————, to be reckoned from the Day of the Signing.

Treaty.

present Treaty, and have affixed their Seals thereunto.

At the Hague, *the 19th of* October, *in the Year* 1709.

(L. S.) *Townshend.*

Counter-Project.

(L. S.) *J. V. Welderen.*
(L. S.) *J. B. van Reede.*
(L. S.) *A. Heinsius.*
(L. S.) *G. Hoeufft.*
(L. S.) *H. Sminia.*
(L. S.) *E. V. Itersum.*
(L. S.) *W. Wichers.*

The Separate Article.

WHEREAS, in the Preliminary Articles Signed here at the *Hague* the 28th of *May*, 1709, by the Plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majesty, of Her Majesty the Queen of *Great Britain*, and of the Lords the States-General of

The Separate Article.

WHEREAS, in the 52d Article of the Treaty of *Munster*, in the Year 1648, it has been already stipulated, That the Upper Quarter of *Guelder* shall be exchanged for an Equivalent; the Queen of *Great Britain* will employ all Her good Of-

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
of the *United Provinces*, it is Stipulated, amongst other Things, that the Lords the States-General shall have, with entire Property and Sovereignty, the Upper Quarter of *Guelder*, according to the Fifty-second Article of the Treaty of *Munster* in the Year 1648; as also that the Garisons which are or hereafter shall be on the Part of the Lords the States-General in the Town of *Huy*, the Citadel of *Liege*, and in the Town of *Bonne*, shall remain there, till it shall be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire: And whereas, the Barrier which is this Day agreed upon in the principal Treaty, for the mutual Guaranty between Her *British* Majesty and the Lords the States-General, cannot give	Offices, that what is here mentioned may be regulated to the reciprocal Satisfaction of King *Charles* the Third, and the Lords the *States-General*.

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
give to the *United Provinces* the Security for which it is eſtabliſhed, unleſs the Parts of it be well joined together by a cloſe Communication from one end to the other; for which Purpoſe the Upper Quarter of *Guelder*, and the Gariſons in the Citadel of *Liege*, *Huy*, and *Bonne*, are abſolutely neceſſary; Experience having thrice ſhewn, that *France* having a deſign to attack the *United Provinces*, has made uſe of the Places above-mentioned in order to come at them, and to penetrate into the ſaid Provinces: And whereas further, with regard to the Equivalent for which the Upper Quarter of *Guelder* ought to be yielded to the *United Provinces* according to the Fifty-ſecond Article of the Treaty of *Munſter* above-	

Treaty.	Counter-Project.
above-mentioned; his Majesty King *Charles* the Third will be much more gratified and advantaged in other Places, than that Equivalent can avail: Therefore, that the Lords the States-General may have the Upper Quarter of *Guelder* with entire Property and Sovereignty, and that the said Upper Quarter of *Guelder* may be yielded in this manner to the said Lords the States-General in the Convention or Treaty that they are to make with His Majesty King *Charles* the Third, according to the Thirteenth Article of the Treaty concluded this Day; as also that their Garisons in the Cittadel of *Liege*, in that of *Huy* and in *Bonne*, may remain there, until it be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire; Her	

Treaty.

Her Majesty, the Queen of *Great-Britain*, engages Her self and promises by this separate Article, (which shall have the same Force as if it was inserted in the principal Treaty,) to use the same Endeavours for all This, as She has engaged to do for their obtaining the Barrier in the *Spanish Low-Countries*. In Testimony whereof, the Underwritten Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her *British* Majesty, and Deputies of the Lords the States-General, have Signed the present Separate Article, and have affixed their Seals thereunto. *At the* Hague, *the* 29*th of* October, 1709. (*a*)

(L. S.) *Townshend.*

Counter-Project.

(L. S.) *J. V. Welderen.*
(L. S.) *F. B. van Reede.*
(L. S.) *A. Heinsius.*
(L. S.) *G. Heeuft.*
(L. S.) *H. Swinia.*
(L. S.) *E. V. Itersum.*
(L. S.) *W. Wichers.*

(*a*) That

(a) That this Article, as it now stands, was necessary for the Security of the *States*, and for the Preservation of the *Netherlands*, and likewise conformable to Her Majesty's Intentions; will appear by the following Observations. First, It must be remembred that the *Counter-Project* was formed before the Negotiations for Peace were set on Foot; that afterwards, in concerting the *Preliminary-Articles*, the Extent of the whole Barrier for the *States* came to be not only discussed, but settled; and that the Ministers of the *Emperor* and the King of *Spain*; as well as those of Her Majesty and the *States*, agreed among other things by the 22d *Article* of the *Preliminaries*, That the *States* should have in full Property and Sovereignty the Upper Quarter of *Gueldre*, according to the 52d *Article* of the Treaty of *Munster*, 1648.

And by the 29th *Article*, it was agreed that the Garisons which are or hereafter shall be on the Part of the *Statts-General* in the Town of *Huy*, Citadel of *Liege*, and Town of *Bonn*, shall remain there until it shall be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial Majesty and the Empire.

These Two Points having been thus regulated by the Consent of all the *Allies* in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, there could be no Objection against making them Part of the *Barrier-Treaty*. For,

1. As for the Upper Quarter of *Gueldre*, Her Majesty did agree by the separate Article of the *Counter-Project*, That pursuant to the 52d *Article* of the Treaty of *Munster*, She would employ Her good Offices to have that Matter regulated to the mutual Satisfaction of the King of *Spain* and the *States*. And since the King of *Spain* had consented in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, that the Sovereignty of the Upper Quarter of *Gueldre* should be given to the *States*; it was plain that this 1*st Separate Article* of the *Barrier-Treaty*, was only pursuant to Her Majesty's declar'd Intentions in the *Separate-Article* of the *Counter-Project*.

2. The making of the Towns mentioned in this *Separate Article*, Part of the Treaty, could admit of no Difficulty; since it imported no more, than the Queen's good Offices for obtaining the Effect of what was agreed with the Consent of the Emperor in the *Preliminary-Treaty*, as a provisional Security for keeping these Places out of the Hands of *France* or their Adherents. Is it not evident to any one who knows the Situation of *Huy*, *Liege* and *Bonn*; that they are of the last Importance for the Defence and Security of the *Empire* as well as the *States*, and for keeping open the Communication between the *Empire* and the *Low-Countries*? Has not *France* attempted three times to penetrate thro' these Places into the *United-Provinces*? Is it not therefore of the greatest Consequence, that these Towns should be sufficiently secured? And could any other effectual Means be taken for that Purpose, besides what is provided in this Article? If the *Dutch* be not allowed to keep their Garisons in those Places, until the Emperor and the Empire are come to an Agreement upon some other effectual Method for doing it; must they not be left open and exposed to the sudden Attacks of *France*? The Elector of *Cologn*, should he be restored at the Peace, has a Right to *Bonn* by his Electorate; and to *Liege* and *Huy*, as Bishop of *Liege*. But would it be safe to trust the Defence of these Places in the Hands of that Prince, an avowed Creature of *France*? Are we sure, that being restored to his Dignity and Dominions, he would become more faithful to the Empire? Or would not there be too much Reason to apprehend, that he would again upon a good Occasion betray them to the *French*? But these being Imperial Towns, the *Emperor* and the *Empire* (it may be said) will take care of them: And so they may; Nothing contained in this Article debars them from this Right; but, on the contrary, whenever they shall think fit to agree upon a Method of securing them by a Garison of *Germans*, the *Dutch* have no Pretence of keeping theirs there any longer; as appears

pears by the expreſs Words of this Article. But if the Proviſion made by this Article be neceſſary for a Barrier againſt *France*, and agreeable to the true Intereſt of the *Empire* and the Common Cauſe, and no more than what had already been agreed in the *Preliminary-Treaty*; what particular Objection can *England* have to it?

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The Second Separate Article.

WHereas the Lords the States-General have repreſented, that in *Flanders*, the Limits between *Spaniſh-Flanders*, and that of the *States*, are ſettled in ſuch a manner, as that the Land belonging to the *States* is extreamly narrow there; ſo that in ſome Places the Territory of *Spaniſh Flanders* reaches to the Fortifications, and under the Cannon of the Places, Towns, and Forts of the *States*; which occaſions many Inconveniencies; as has been ſeen by an Example a little before the

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the beginning of the present War, when a Fort was attempted to be built under the Canon of the *Sas van Gand*, under pretence that it was upon the Territory of *Spain*: And whereas it is necessary for avoiding these and other Inconveniencies, that the Land of the *States* upon the Confines of *Flanders* should be enlarged, and that the Places, Towns and Forts should, by that means, be better covered: Her *British* Majesty entring into the just Motives of the said Lords the States-General in this respect, promises and engages by this *Separate Article*, That in the Convention which the said Lords the States-General are to make with his Majesty King *Charles* the Third, She will be aiding to them, that it may be agreed, That by the	

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the Cession to the said Lords the States-General, of the Property of an Extent of Land necessary to obviate such like and other Inconveniences, their Limits in *Flanders* shall be enlarged more conveniently for their Security, and those of the *Spanish Flanders* removed farther from their Towns, Places and Forts, to the End that these may not be so exposed any more. In Testimony whereof, the under-written Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Her *British* Majesty, and Deputies of the Lords the States-General, have sign'd the present *Separate Article*, and have affixed their Seals thereunto. *At the* Hague, *the* 29*th of* October, 1709. (*a*)	

(L. S.) *Townshend.*
(L. S.) *J. B. van Reede.*
(L. S.) *A. Heinsius.*
(L. S.) *G. Hoeufft.*
(L. S.) *H. Sminia.*
(L. S.) *E. V. Itersum.*

(*a*) The

(*a*) The Matter of this Article is so evidently reasonable, that it would be superfluous to go about to justifie it.

Thus I have considered the several Variations, which have been pointed out and magnified with so much Art and Industry; and have shewn that there is not one of any Moment throughout the whole Treaty, but what is either pursuant to former Treaties, or necessary to the rendring the Barrier compleat and effectual; and, on that Account, as much for the Interest of *England*, as of *Holland* it self.

THE END.
